nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2007‒01‒14
six papers chosen by
Anna Y. Borodina
Perm State University

  1. The Role of Russia and the Countries of the Central Asia in Maintenance of Europe With Energy Carriers (Production of a Fuel and Energy Complex) By Vyacheslav Vashanov; Jahan Orazdurdiyeva
  2. Coalition Formation, Bargaining and Investments in Networks with Externalities: Analysis of the Eurasian Gas Supply Network By Ikonnikova, Svetlana
  3. Russian Regions on the Route From Industrial to Network (Russian Realities and Experience of the EU Regions) By Alexander Granberg; Alexander Pelyasov
  4. The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia By Simon Gaechter; Benedikt Herrmann
  5. Fiscal Centralization and Decentralization in Russia and China By Elliott Parker; Judith Thornton
  6. Territorial "Points of Growth" of Northern Region Economy Development in Russia. By Galina Golobokova

  1. By: Vyacheslav Vashanov; Jahan Orazdurdiyeva
    Abstract: This paper gives a review on the role of Russia and the countries of the Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) in maintenance of the Europe with energy carriers. The paper examines the issues mentioned below. 1.Modern reserves of oil and gas (in % from world reserves) 2.Output of mineral products and distribution of their export on the countries 3.Volume of foreign (European) investments 4.Competitiveness 5.Forecasts of extraction and transportation of oil and gas 6.Opportunities of increase of volumes of export Being among the richest countries in the world in terms of hydrocarbon resources, this region represents unquestionable interest for European community as an oil and gas exporter and interests at the world’s energy markets as well.
    Date: 2006–08
  2. By: Ikonnikova, Svetlana
    Abstract: We present a new methodology to study how upstream (e.g. producers) and downstream (e.g. transiters) players form coalitions, bargain over joint profit sharing and invest. Within coalitions players combine resources, coalitions compete on a market. Profit of each coalition depends on the cooperation among the outside players. Hence, we consider a game with externalities. To find the equilibrium coalition structure and the expected payoffs, we use the solution proposed by Maskin (2003). Payoffs reflect the bargaining power and depend on capacities of players. We show, how investment options available to players matter. We apply the study to analyze the Eurasian gas supply network. Russia and Turkmenistan - producers and Ukraine, Belorus, Azerbaijan, Iran - transiters form coalitions to supply gas and bargain over profit sharing. Besides, the players invest in pipelines. We derive the bargaining power of the countries from the architecture of the network and calculate the strategic value of the different pipeline projects.
    Keywords: Partition Function; Coalitional Bargaining; Coalition Formation; Externalities; Gas Supply
    JEL: C72 C71
    Date: 2005–12
  3. By: Alexander Granberg; Alexander Pelyasov
    Abstract: This work reflects the results from the cycle of research done in 2001-2004 for 20 Russian regions. At the end of it it was possible to generalize the regularities of the initial stage of transition which were characteristic for the Russian regions on their move from industrial to network model of economic development; compare Russian experience with EU core regions experience (the latter has started this way 20-25 years earlier, in mid-seventies). Typical features of this period are the increasing economic role of support sector and knowledge economy in the regional development, the increasing role of the mobile assets and footloose firms, gradual transformation of the industrial complexes into economic clusters, changes in typology of infrastructural networks (from vertical hierarchy to horizontal grid), etc. Regional authorities in every region abandon previous style of administrative commands and shift to economic coordination with the actors of the regional economy. There are expectations in the Russian regions that this transition will help to overcome economic and environmental limitations of the industrial paradygm which are evident in late Soviet period. The speed, intensity, and vulnerability of these transition are different among northern, central, and southern regions of Russia. Old economic ranks of the Russian regions of the industrial period has changed essentially. Cities-service centers have increased their importance; on the other side, role of big and small industrial cities and settlements have universally decreased. The most painful transformation is characteristic for the big industrial regions like Kuzbass (analogue of the German Ruhr). On the other side oil and gas regions of Russia are passing this transformation in easier way. But each Russian region has its own peculiarities in economy and social sphere which determine the trajectory and speed of transition.
    Date: 2006–08
  4. By: Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Benedikt Herrmann (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is substantial spiteful punishment of high contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, spite undermines the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.
    Keywords: social norms, free riding, punishment, spite, experiments
    JEL: H41 C91 D23 C72
    Date: 2006–07
  5. By: Elliott Parker (Department of Economics, University of Nevada, Reno); Judith Thornton (Department of Economics, University of Washington)
    Abstract: In this paper we review the fiscal evolution of China and Russia, asking how the process of creating a separate, tax-financed public sector in the two countries differed. We observe that the size of China's budget sector was consistently smaller than in Russia and that budget decentralization was consistently greater. We see both pros and cons in China's decentralization. Local governments that were allowed to keep marginal increases in local tax revenue had incentives to pursue growth-supporting policies, including support for foreign investment and export-oriented production. However, in the absence of financial markets, there were barriers to investment outside the local region, resulting in inefficient use of capital and protectionism. Fiscal deficits and rapid expansion of credit have threatened stability in both countries, but China has proved more successful than Russia in managing macroeconomic policies. Finally, we argue that Russia's status as a petro-state makes management of the public sector particularly difficult. In Russia, recentralization has been associated with expansion of state ownership of enterprises and production by territorial governments, state ministries, state banks, and the natural monopolies.
    Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Russia, China, regional growth
    JEL: H6 H7 P35
    Date: 2006–12
  6. By: Galina Golobokova
    Abstract: Establishing of Special (Free) Economical Zone (SEZ) in Magadan region has become an actual task to support surviving of the territory in the condition of being remote from central regions of Russia and limited financial resources. This is determined by slow accumulation of local funds and constant sufficient flow of capital from Northern regions to the central parts of Russia. In 1999 on the territory of SEZ the preferential economical mechanism was applied. It allowed the companies registered within the SEZ not to pay federal taxes and customs fees in order to improve their financial status and also to create the Fund of SEZ which is used to new companies establishing and regional social problems solving. By 2004 the number of SEZ participants has reached 440 including 125 gold mining companies producing 63% of gold in region, and small entrepot companies covering 64 % of regional production. Due to SEZ region managed to obtain stable dynamics of growth of gross regional product, installments to consolidated regional budget, and reduce the number of companies failing to pay wages in time. The Fund of SEZ financed construction of blasting material plant, silver processing line of Kolyma refinery plant; new mining complexes were set in operation. Due to foreign economical activity development new equipment and machinery for enlargement of output were delivered to Magadan region. Due SEZ the territorial so called “points of growth†were created. They had multiplicative direct and indirect effect on different sectors of economy. Magadan region, which is counted as a depressive region was able to reduce the decline of production, hold the inflation level, hold unemployment growth, improve social condition of population. The governmental restriction of period of SEZ existence and also problems resulting in SEZ operations are as follows: legislation instability, defective structure of management, unreadiness of some branches of economy for effective use of preferences, lack of innovative approach. This makes to review in prospects institutional and legislative basis of SEZ.
    Date: 2006–08

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