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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Simeon Djankov (the World Bank); Yingyi Qian (UC Berkeley and NBER); Gerard Roland (UC Berkeley and CEPR); Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (New Economic School/CEFIR and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We study the determinants of the decision to become an entrepreneur in Russia, China, and Brazil, using unique survey data at the individual level. We find that entrepreneurs have many common characteristics relative to non-entrepreneurs in all three countries. They are more likely to have entrepreneurs among their relatives and friends, place a higher value on work, are happier and perceive themselves as more successful. There are also a few important differences. Russian and Chinese entrepreneurs are more mobile geographically and across jobs. In Brazil, on the contrary, entrepreneurs are less mobile across jobs and industries. Brazil entrepreneurs have higher trust than non-entrepreneurs, while in Russia and China this is not the case. Finally, we confirm that perceptions of institutional environment are an important determinant of individual decisions to expand business. |
| Date: | 2006–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0066&r=cis |
| By: | Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies); Andrey Timofeev (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies) |
| Abstract: | National equalization policies often are concerned with the quality and accessibility of services delivered at the lowest level (or local) government. When these policies are implemented in a hierarchical fashion through the intermediate level governments, national equalization policies need to take into account possible offsetting effects originating on regional or provincial government policies. In this paper, we examine recent fiscal equalization outcomes for about 2,000 Russian local governments to assess and explain the extent of equalization differences between and within regions. In particular, we examine the claim that intraregional policies should be blamed for rising disparities in local fiscal outcomes despite Russia 's federal government efforts to equalize sub-national government finances. |
| Keywords: | Russia's Fiscal Equalization, equalization differences, local fiscal, sub-national government finances |
| Date: | 2006–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0616&r=cis |
| By: | John Nellis |
| Abstract: | In the last 25 years many thousands of formerly state-owned and operated firms have been privatized in developing and transition countries, generating over $400 billion (US) in sales proceeds. In addition, thousands of firms have been transferred by privatization processes in which no money was raised (though a surprising number of state-owned firms remain in these regions). The vast majority of economic studies praise privatization’s positive impact at the level of the firm, as well as its positive macroeconomic and welfare contributions. Moreover, contrary to popular conception, privatization has not contributed to maldistribution of income or increased poverty——at least in the best-studied Latin American cases. In sum, the technical picture is generally positive. Nonetheless, public opinion in the less developed world is generally suspicious of, and often hostile to, privatization. A good part of the problem is that privatization has proven harder to launch, and is more likely to produce errant results, in low-income, institutionally weak states, particularly in the most important infrastructure sectors. Privatization is hard to sell politically; it has become a lightning rod and handy scapegoat for all discontent related to liberalization and globalization. What is needed are reform mechanisms that give incentives and comfort to reputable private investors, that create and sustain the policy and regulatory institutions that make governments competent and honest partners with the private operators, while at the same time protecting consumers, particularly the most disadvantaged, from abuse. |
| Keywords: | privatization, weak institutions, poverty, liberalization, globalization, incentives |
| JEL: | E21 E20 D60 F4 O1 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:87&r=cis |