2005-06-19 papers

on Confederation of Independent States

Issue of 2005–06–19
one paper chosen by
Anna Y. Borodina, Perm State University

Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives By S. CLAEYS; G. LANINE; K. SCHOORs

Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

By:	S. CLAEYS; G. LANINE; K. SCHOORs
Abstract:	We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.
Keywords:	Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia
JEL:	G2 N2 E5
Date:	2005–05
URL:	https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/307

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