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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Jesper Jensen; Thomas F. Rutherford; David G. Tarr (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | In World Trade Organization (WTO) accession negotiations, telecommunications is always a sector that receives close scrutiny by the WTO Working Party, and the extent of market access and nondiscriminatory treatment of multinational telecommunications companies in Russia has been a significant issue in Russia’s accession negotiations. Jensen, Rutherford, and Tarr use a computable general equilibrium model of the Russian economy to assess the role of telecommunications in the discussions regarding Russian accession to the WTO. The results show that reduction of barriers to foreign direct investment in telecommunications will bring substantial gains to the Russian economy, including an increase in the productivity of Russian labor and capital. Despite the fact that multinationals use Russian labor less intensively than Russian firms, demand for Russian labor employed in telecommunications should increase, following reductions in barriers to foreign direct investment that are included in the context of WTO accession. This is because the overall demand for telecommunication services should increase due to the growth effects of the liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment generally and the reduction in tariffs. Russian capital owners in telecommunications will likely be sought as joint venture partners and can restructure and obtain gains as partners with foreign firms. Wholly owned Russian firms are likely to experience losses. This paper—a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the consequences of liberalization of barriers against foreign direct investment in services. |
| Keywords: | International Economics |
| Date: | 2005–01–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3501&r=cis |
| By: | David M. Kotz (University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
| Abstract: | This paper compares two radically different approaches to transforming an economic system based on central planning and state property into a capitalist system, the neoliberal transition strategy and the state directed transition strategy. Russia’s transition since 1992 is examined as an example of the neoliberal approach, while China’s transition since 1978 is analyzed as an example of the state directed approach. The primary explanation for China’s economically superior transition performance is located in the advantages of the state directed transition strategy. However, contradictions in a state directed transition strategy are identified which tend to promote an eventual shift toward a neoliberal strategy. JEL Categories: P27, P21, P52 |
| Keywords: | transition, neoliberalism, state, Russia, China |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ums:papers:2005-04&r=cis |
| By: | Jose Noguera |
| Abstract: | This paper sets up a model to inquire into whether the rise and fall in barter transactions in Russia and other CIS countries during the 1990’s was an involuntary decision resulting from credit rationing or the consequence of firms’ optimal choice. We find that the transmission mechanism of the government policy contains the necessary information to answer the question. An inquiry into the empirics of the model is then conducted using data from Russia. |
| Keywords: | Barter, Interest rate, Credit rationing, Optimal choice |
| JEL: | E0 E4 E5 F41 P24 P26 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp243&r=cis |