|
on Corporate Finance |
| By: | Davide Arnaudo (Bank of Italy); Vincenzo Cuciniello (Bank of Italy); Giorgio Gobbi (Bank of Italy); Federico Guerra (Bank of Italy); Federico Labianca (Bank of Italy); Valentina Nigro (Bank of Italy); Sara Pinoli (Bank of Italy); Massimiliano Rigon (Bank of Italy); Paola Rossi (Bank of Italy); Federico Maria Signoretti (Bank of Italy); Pietro Tramontano (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the Italian private equity and venture capital market. Although total investment more than doubled between 2015 and 2025, the Italian market remains less developed than those of the other main European economies. Private equity investment is strongly oriented towards technology- and knowledge-intensive sectors, with significant participation by foreign funds. The public sector plays a prominent role in fundraising by Italian operators, whereas the contribution of private institutional investors remains relatively limited. Compared with firms in the same sector, size class and geographical area, private equity target firms are larger, more profitable and better capitalized; after turning to private equity, they record faster growth in total assets, employment, and investment, particularly in intangible assets. The further development of private capital markets in Italy could be fostered by a greater involvement of private investors and a wider availability of patient capital to support firms' growth and innovation. |
| Keywords: | private equity, venture capital, firm growth |
| JEL: | G23 G24 L25 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_1061_26 |
| By: | Josh Lerner; Fiona Paine; Antoinette Schoar |
| Abstract: | Private capital fund managers appear to possess significant information about the relative quality of their portfolio firms even within the first three years after the investment. But the way this information is disclosed to investors changes dynamically: Textual discussions of portfolio companies have substantial information about the firms’ ultimate performance in the early stages of investment, while interim valuations are less important. Over time, this pattern reverses, with interim valuations becoming more important in explaining future returns, especially after portfolio companies have a financing event. The results vary not only with the tone but also with the content of fund manager disclosures. In an opaque market with substantial information asymmetries, textual discussions seem to serve as a signal about general partner quality. |
| JEL: | G24 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35860 |
| By: | Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh |
| Abstract: | Artificial intelligence is driving a large expansion in data center capacity, power infrastructure, and specialized computing equipment. We estimate that a 1 GW AI campus costs about $41 billion. A 188 GW U.S. buildout completed by 2032 would require total investment of nearly$9 trillion and amount to annual investment of 3.2 percent of GDP over 2025–2032. As hyperscaler capital expenditures outgrow internal cash flow, financing is shifting toward leases, joint ventures, project debt, private credit, securitization, and special-purpose vehicles. These structures expand funding capacity but also raise asset-level leverage, obscure contingent obligations, and expose investors to tenant concentration, technological obsolescence, execution delays, and uncertain residual values. |
| JEL: | E01 E22 G1 G31 R33 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35865 |
| By: | Husnu C. Dalgic; Brittany Almquist Lewis; Andrea Modena |
| Abstract: | We show that strengthening creditor rights can exacerbate financial instability, par ticularly under long debt maturities and low collateral volatility. We build a model of financial intermediaries that raise financing by pledging collateral in the sale and repurchase (repo) market. In the short term, increasing collateral pledgeability makes repo creditors safer and reduces debt rollover risk; however, it also expands long-term debt capacity and leverage, ultimately heightening run risk. This instability is a dis tinct feature of environments with long-term liabilities and low-volatility assets, where market discipline fails to constrain post-policy leverage. We test our model’s predic tions by exploiting the 2005 BAPCPA bankruptcy reform, which expanded creditor protections via repo safe harbors. Using hand-collected data on dealer repo collateral, we confirm that while the law enhanced collateral pledgeability, it fueled short-term leverage and precipitated sharper de-leveraging during the downturn |
| Keywords: | repo, collateral, safe harbor, bankruptcy, leverage, dealer banks, bank runs. |
| JEL: | G01 G21 G23 G28 G33 |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_783 |
| By: | Marius A. K. Ring |
| Abstract: | Whether imposing higher taxes on business owners adversely affects business activity by constraining investment and inducing capitalist flight is a central question in the ongoing debate on how to tax the ultra wealthy. To shed new light, I exploit a series of related Norwegian reforms during 2021–2024 that increased dividend tax rates, removed migration-related capital gains tax loopholes, and nearly doubled the effective marginal tax rate on business wealth. These reforms spurred international debate and, allegedly, an “exodus” of Norwegian billionaires (Financial Times, 2023). While I document clear effects on migration, these responses are concentrated among the top 0.1% of the wealth distribution and mostly confined to 2022 and 2023. My results indicate that at most 100 individuals left due to the reforms. I find no evidence of significant outmigration or reduced inflows of startup founders or inventors. I estimate that absent any outmigration, wealth tax revenues would have increased by 75% from 2021 to 2024. Reform-driven outmigration lowers the revenue gain to 71.5%. My findings further show that outmigrating owners’ firms remain economically active and do not reduce investment. In a broader set of analyses, I examine whether business outcomes are affected, regardless of whether owners outmigrate, since firms may reduce investment both due to liquidity constraints or distortions to owners’ savings decisions. I compare firms owned by Norwegian individuals subject to the wealth tax with firms owned by foreigners and other tax-exempt entities. By merging historical ownership data from Orbis with the Norwegian shareholder register, I perform these analyses on both Norwegian and foreign-domiciled firms. Across settings, I find no evidence that Norwegian-owned firms pay out more dividends or invest less after the reforms, nor is there any evidence that the reform induced more bankruptcies. These findings indicate that the short-run economic costs of wealth taxation, in terms of migration and firm investment, are more limited than the public debate implies. |
| JEL: | H0 H2 H3 H31 H32 |
| Date: | 2026–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35854 |