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on Corporate Finance |
| By: | Celine (Yue) Fei; Ulrich Hege; Xiao Jia |
| Abstract: | We study how IPO reforms transmit to venture capital (VC) markets using the introduction of China’s entrepreneurial boards, ChiNext and the registration-based STAR. We document that both boards attract younger, higher-growth firms with weaker fundamentals in levels, but post IPO growth persists for ChiNext firms while decelerating sharply for STAR firms. VC backing plays different roles across regimes: on ChiNext it aligns with valuation premia and long-run outperformance, whereas on STAR it mainly predicts higher first-day returns. To identify causal effects on VC allocation, we construct novel text-based regulatory exposure measures from listing documents using keyword matching and Sentence-BERT semantic similarity, and show that VC financing reallocates toward firms more aligned with “supported” activities. |
| Keywords: | IPO Reforms; IPO Listing Requirements; Venture Capital; Business Description; BERT; China |
| JEL: | G24 G28 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_736 |
| By: | Ambler, Kate; Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab; de Brauw, Alan; Uddin, Mohammad Riad |
| Abstract: | Credit market failures may reflect voluntary withdrawal by risk-averse borrowers in addition to supply-side constraints. We conduct a randomized trial with 1, 517 Bangladeshi households, offering cattle financing through conventional loans or profit-sharing contracts that spread risk between the farmer and the financial partner. Overall, interest in and take-up of the profit-sharing contracts were modestly higher than the conventional loans. However, conventional loan take-up was much lower among risk-averse farmers, and profit-sharing eliminated the take-up gap between risk-averse and non-risk-averse farmers. We find that it is male risk preferences that are associated with these decisions even when contracts explicitly target women. Livestock investment increases under both contracts with no evidence of moral hazard under profit-sharing. |
| Keywords: | gender; credit; financing; livestock; loans; smallholders; financial innovation; access to finance; risk; risk coping strategies; Bangladesh; Southern Asia; Asia |
| Date: | 2026–02–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:181679 |
| By: | Flora Bellone (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France; OFCE, Sciences Po, France); Charlie Joyez (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Xavier Poulet-Goffard (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France) |
| Abstract: | The OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative, adopted in 2015, introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCR) obligations for multinational groups with consolidated turnover above €750 million. This paper examines whether the reform generated unintended behavioral responses among smaller firms below the reporting threshold. Using firm-level data on French multinationals from OFATS, FARE, and DIANE (2007, 2009, 2014–2022), we estimate difference-in-differences models in a linear probability framework with firm and year fixed effects. We focus on restructuring at the extensive margin, distinguishing entry into and exit from tax-haven jurisdictions. Firms below the threshold significantly increase their probability of opening tax-haven affiliates after 2016, the year CbCR started to be enforced in Europe, while larger firms become more likely to exit. The results are robust to alternative tax-haven definitions and to excluding firms near the cutoff. Heterogeneity analyses show that the post-reform entry in tax havens is concentrated among financially structured small MNEs. Overall, the findings suggest that targeted transparency reforms can reallocate tax-haven activity across the firm size distribution rather than uniformly reduce it. |
| Keywords: | tax avoidance; multinational enterprises; BEPS; country-by-country reporting; tax havens; firm heterogeneity |
| JEL: | F23 H26 H32 K34 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-10 |
| By: | Reda Mouna (FSJEST - Faculté des sciences juridiques, Economiques et Sociales de Tanger); Oumaima Mouna (ENCGT - Ecole Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion - Tanger) |
| Abstract: | The objective of this paper is a comparison between the Corporate Governance models—conventional and Islamic—establishing their theoretical grounds and aiming to clarify points of convergence and divergence. After an initial alignment inherent to corporations, that is, value creation, the analysis demonstrates a significant divergence between the Shura and Shareholder model on the ownership nature, participation in the decision- making process, and the selection and responsibility of managers. A convergence between the conventional and Islamic stakeholder model is evident since the Islamic-oriented model adapts the conventional stakeholder model according to the precepts of the Shari'ah as guidelines, however, maintaining the principles and foundations of the model. Both conventional and Islamic stakeholder models have nuanced differences with the Shura model, aligning on inclusion as an objective but diverging on its modality. They share a double structure of governance, which in the Shura model is circular while for the stakeholder model it is mixed—horizontal and vertical. Simultaneously, the shareholder and stakeholder models differentiate on inclusion and the importance of extra- financial objectives. This work offers an analysis of four prevalent models, establishing their theoretical grounds for future empirical studies and application by practitioners. |
| Abstract: | L'objectif de cet article est de comparer les modèles de gouvernance d'entreprise—conventionnel et islamique— en établissant leurs fondements théoriques et en visant à clarifier les points de convergence et de divergence. Après un alignement initial inhérent aux entreprises, à savoir la création de valeur, l'analyse démontre une divergence significative entre les modèles Shura et Actionnaires (Shareholder) concernant la nature de la propriété, la participation au processus de prise de décision, ainsi que la sélection et la responsabilité des dirigeants. Une convergence entre le modèle Parties Prenantes (Stakeholder) conventionnel et islamique est évidente, car le modèle à orientation islamique adapte le modèle conventionnel des parties prenantes selon les préceptes de la Shari'ah comme lignes directrices, tout en maintenant les principes et les fondements du modèle. Les deux modèles des parties prenantes, conventionnel et islamique, présentent des différences nuancées avec le modèle Shura, s'alignant sur l'inclusion comme objectif, mais divergent sur sa modalité. Ils partagent une double structure de gouvernance, qui est circulaire dans le modèle Shura, tandis que pour le modèle des parties prenantes, elle est mixte—horizontale et verticale. Simultanément, les modèles Actionnaires et Parties Prenantes se différencient sur l'inclusion et l'importance des objectifs extra-financiers. Ce travail propose une analyse de quatre modèles prévalents, établissant leurs bases théoriques pour de futures études empiriques et pour l'application par les praticiens. |
| Keywords: | Maqasid-based Governance, Shura Governance Model, Stakeholder Model, Shareholder Model, Corporate Governance |
| Date: | 2026–01–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05479434 |