|
on Corporate Finance |
| By: | Maria Lucia Stefani (Bank of Italy); Valerio Vacca (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses ECB survey data to assess whether gender matters in the small firms’ financial structure and access to credit. Firms owned or managed by women (female firms) use smaller amounts and less heterogeneous sources of external finance than their male counterparts. According to statistical evidence, female firms have difficulty in accessing bank finance: on the demand side, they apply for bank loans less frequently, as they more often anticipate a rejection; on the supply side, they experience a higher rejection rate. Econometric analysis shows that these different patterns are largely explained by the characteristics (such as business size, age and sector of activity) that make female firms structurally different from those led by men, without leaving room for a significant gender effect. An additional contribution of this paper is to compare the major euro-area countries within a homogeneous framework: weak evidence of gender discrimination appears in the supply of bank loans in Germany, Italy and Spain, while some demand obstacles arise in France. |
| Keywords: | financial structure, banking, economics of gender, small business finance |
| JEL: | G32 G21 J16 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_176_13&r=cfn |
| By: | Francesca Maria Cesaroni (University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”); Francesca Lotti (Bank of Italy); Paolo Emilio Mistrulli (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | During the financial crisis banks faced liquidity shocks, and lending slowed down. The reduction in credit availability was due to demand- and supply-side factors. The decrease in turnover and investment led to a contraction of financial needs; on the other hand, the tightening of credit supply was the result of banks’ greater risk-aversion, difficulties in raising funds, and a worsening in the creditworthiness of borrowers. However, banks do not pass on liquidity shocks to borrowers according to a homogenous pattern: by following a pecking order, they first reduce lending to the marginal segment of borrowers to protect their core customers. Previous studies have shown that banks are less prone to lend to female firms than to others: lending to female firms may have suffered more during the crisis than other segments of the credit market. By using data from the Credit Register at the Bank of Italy for the period 2007-2009, we find that women-owned firms faced a more pronounced credit contraction with respect to other firms. |
| Keywords: | financial crisis, banks, loans, women-owned firms. |
| JEL: | J16 G21 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_177_13&r=cfn |
| By: | Domenico Depalo (Bank of Italy); Francesca Lotti (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | Many empirical analyses find that the performance of firms headed by women (female firms) varies with respect to those headed by men and that the greatest part of this gap is due to observable characteristics (i.e. gender) related to firms’ characteristics. In this paper we evaluate whether this finding also holds for Italy in terms of productivity and returns.The classification of firms by gender follows that prescribed in Law 215/92; for the purposes of this paper only partnerships and private and public corporations were considered, the sole legal forms for which balance sheets are available. Whilst male firms operate in almost all sectors, female firms tend to cluster in those areas where interpersonal relations are most important, namely the retail sector, restaurants, hotels etc.. In terms of performance, measured by profitability and productivity (and even when controlling by sector and company size), there do not appear to be any significant differences between male and female enterprises. |
| Keywords: | female entrepreneurship, gender economic differences |
| JEL: | J1 L11 L25 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_184_13&r=cfn |
| By: | Claude Fluet; Paolo G. Garella |
| Abstract: | Can debt rescheduling decisions differ in multiple lenders’ versus a single lender loan? Do multiple lenders efficiently react to information? We show that the precision of information plays an essential role. Foreclosing by one lender is disruptive so that a lender can rationally wait for the decision of other lenders, rescheduling her loan, if she expects that other lenders receive more precise information. We develop a Bayesian game where signals of different precision are randomly distributed to lenders. Both, premature liquidation and excessive rescheduling are possible in equilibrium, according to the pattern of information. However this is a second-best outcome, given that private information cannot be optimally shared. |
| Keywords: | Overlending, debt contracts, insolvency, illiquidity, liquidation, relationship lending, multiple lenders, Bayesian games |
| JEL: | G32 G33 D82 D86 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1332&r=cfn |