By: |
Ouidad Yousfi (MRM - Montpellier Recherche en Management - Université Montpellier II - Sciences et techniques : EA4557 - Université Montpellier I - Université Paul Valéry - Montpellier III - Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School) |
Abstract: |
This paper analyzes the link between the financial capital structure in LBO
(Leveraged Buyout) acquisitions and the agents' incentives under asymmetric
information. We present a static model with three agents: the entrepreneur,
the LBO fund and the bank. The first two agents provide complementary and
non-observable efforts to enhance the distribution of the project's revenues.
Our results provide evidence that there are no debt-equity contracts that
solve the double-sided moral hazard problem; however, the project must be
financed jointly by the three partners. Moreover, financing the project
through a mixture of debt and equity or solely through equity does not improve
the incentive to provide efforts. Under taxation, agents provide low levels of
efforts, but the entrepreneur is better off if the level of leverage is the
highest to take advantage of the tax deductibility of interests. |
Keywords: |
Corporate Governance Journal, Financial Capital Structure, LBO Projects, Under Asymmetric Information, Leveraged Buyout, Leveraged Management Buyout. |
Date: |
2012 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813878&r=cfn |