|
on Corporate Finance |
| By: | Hoppe, Robert A.; MacDonald, James M.; Korb, Penni |
| Abstract: | Ninety-one percent of U.S. farms are classified as smallâgross cash farm income (GCFI) of less than $250,000. About 60 percent of these small farms are very small, generating GCFI of less than $10,000. These very small noncommercial farms, in some respects, exist independently of the farm economy because their operators rely heavily on off-farm income. The remaining small farmsâsmall commercial farmsâaccount for most small-farm production. Overall farm production, however, continues to shift to larger operations, while the number of small commercial farms and their share of sales maintain a long-term decline. The shift to larger farms will continue to be gradual, because some small commercial farms are profi table and others are willing to accept losses. |
| Keywords: | Family farms, farm businesses, farm financial performance, farm-operator household income, farm operators, farm structure, noncommercial farms, small farms, small commercial farms, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:uersib:58300&r=cfn |
| By: | Watanabe, Mariko |
| Abstract: | Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. If the “one share, one vote†principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent. |
| Keywords: | China, Government Enterprises, Corporate Governance, Concentrated Owner, Expropriation, State Owned enterprises, China |
| JEL: | G32 G34 K22 O31 P34 P31 |
| Date: | 2010–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper224&r=cfn |
| By: | Sampsa Samila; Olav Sorenson |
| Abstract: | We find that the enforcement of non-compete clauses significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth. Based on a panel of metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, our results indicate that, relative to states that enforce non-compete covenants, an increase in the local supply of venture capital in states that restrict the scope of these agreements has significantly stronger positive effects on (i) the number of patents, (ii) the number of firm starts, and (iii) employment. We address potential endogeneity issues in the supply of venture capital by using endowment returns as an instrumental variable. Our results point to a strong interaction between financial intermediation and the legal regime in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth. |
| JEL: | G24 K31 L26 O43 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:10-02&r=cfn |
| By: | Di Corato, Luca |
| Abstract: | A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade of rents with option values. |
| Keywords: | Real Options, Nash Bargaining, Expropriation, Natural Resources, Foreign Direct Investment, International Relations/Trade, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, C7, D8, K3, F2, O1, |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:suaswp:58292&r=cfn |