| By: |
Ettore Andreani (University of Rostock);
Kathrin Dummann (University of Rostock);
Doris Neuberger (University of Rostock) |
| Abstract: |
This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for
a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the
supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and
inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are
representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of
former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks
controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the
chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank.
Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased. |
| Keywords: |
corporate governance, dual board system, principal agent theory, stakeholder theory, banks |
| JEL: |
G21 G34 |
| Date: |
2009 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ros:wpaper:103&r=cfn |