nep-cfn New Economics Papers
on Corporate Finance
Issue of 2006‒09‒30
four papers chosen by
Zelia Serrasqueiro
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Asset pricing, asymmetric information and rating announcements: does benchmarking on ratings matter? By Spyros Pagratis
  2. Bank loans versus bond finance: implications for sovereign debtors By Misa Tanaka
  3. The substitution of bank for non-bank corporate finance: evidence for the United Kingdom By Ursel Baumann; Glenn Hoggarth; Darren Pain
  4. Do corporate financial patterns in European countries converge and testitfy for disintermediation? By Rivaud-Danset, Dorothée; Oheix, Valérie

  1. By: Spyros Pagratis
    Abstract: Using an intertemporal model of asset pricing under asymmetric information, we demonstrate how public ratings about the quality of a risky asset could enhance information efficiency, albeit at a cost of higher asset price volatility. The analysis also draws implications for the use of ratings for benchmarking purposes, in particular, ratings-based capital requirements and an investment/subinvestment grade dichotomy depending on the rating of the asset. In this situation, allowing a class of market participants (eg pension funds) to hold an asset only if its rating exceeds a certain threshold may lead informed traders to overreact to news about fundamentals. In this case, ratings induce lower price efficiency and excessive asset price volatility.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:265&r=cfn
  2. By: Misa Tanaka
    Abstract: This paper develops a model to analyse the optimal choice between bank loans and bond finance for a sovereign debtor. We show that if banks have better information about their borrowers compared to bondholders, only the least risky sovereigns issue bonds. But if borrowers can be 'publicly monitored' by an outside agency that disseminates the information about their creditworthiness, their choice between bank loans and bond finance is determined endogenously by the trade-off between two deadweight costs: the crisis cost of a sovereign default and the cost of debtor moral hazard. In equilibrium, sovereigns use bank loans for financing short-term projects and bond issuance for projects with uncertain timing of cash flows if crisis costs are large. We also demonstrate that state-contingent debt and IMF intervention can improve welfare.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:267&r=cfn
  3. By: Ursel Baumann; Glenn Hoggarth; Darren Pain
    Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which changes in the quantity and cost of non-bank finance impact on the quantity and interest cost of UK-owned banks' corporate lending. The results give some support to the view that there is substitution between market finance and bank loans - loan growth rises (falls) during periods when corporate bond spreads widen (decline). In particular, bank loans seem to substitute for other forms of finance in some periods of market stress such as in 1998 Q3. Moreover, this increase in credit seems to be supplied on unchanged terms, perhaps suggesting that banks passively accommodate changes in corporate loan demand. During other episodes of disturbances in non-bank finance, such as when bond or commercial paper issuance falls sharply, banks appear to increase their loan rates, perhaps reflecting greater perceived borrower risk or some reduction in banks' own risk appetite.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boe:boeewp:274&r=cfn
  4. By: Rivaud-Danset, Dorothée; Oheix, Valérie
    Abstract: This paper provides a quantitative comparison of the financial patterns of non-financial European firms for seven Continental European countries and the period 1991-2001. Our analytical framework departs from the common one as we consider that long-term and short-term sources of funds have to be analysed separately. Using the BACH database, principal component analysis, cluster analysis and econometrical tests are carried out in order to test for two hypotheses : i) there is a tendency toward grouping around a common corporate financial pattern; ii) there is a general tendency across countries toward less bank financing. We find that differences between European countries remain highly significant so that the first hypothesis is not validated. The second hypothesis is rejected with the long-term intermediation ratio but validated with the short-term one. Indeed, econometrical tests lead to a strong conclusion : the existence of a common trend toward disintermediation of short-term financing. The banking function of allocating liquidity for day-to-day business and providing a certain liquidity insurance to firms is declining whatever the size of firms.
    Keywords: corporate financial structure; BACH database; European convergence; financial intermediation; liquidity insurance.
    JEL: G32
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40&r=cfn

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