Abstract: |
We analyze the interaction between managerial decisions and firm value/asset
prices by embedding the standard agency model of the firm into an otherwise
standard asset pricing model. When the manager-agent's compensation depends on
the firm's stock price performance, stock prices are set to induce the
creation of future cash flows, instead of representing the discounted value of
exogenous cash flows, as in the standard model. In our case, stock prices are
formed via trading in the market to induce the managers to hold the number of
shares consistent with the optimal effort level desired by the outside
investors. We compare two price formation mechanisms, corresponding to two
firm ownership structures. In the first, stock prices are formed competitively
among a continuum of dispersed investors. In the second, stock prices are set
by a single block shareholder, as a bargaining solution. Under both mechanisms
there are persistent, dynamic, patterns of asst prices, The level of the
equity premium and the return volatility depend on the risk aversion of the
agents in the economy and the ownership structure of firms. |