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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Braghieri, Luca; Bursztyn, Leonardo; Fasnacht, Jan |
| Abstract: | Voting-based collective decisions are typically made either anonymously or publicly. Anonymous voting protects truthful expression but conceals individual behavior; public voting provides information about individual votes, but, when one option is socially stigmatized, it can distort participation and choices. We introduce threshold majority voting, in which voters choose a disclosure threshold determining whether and when their votes are revealed. In an experiment at UC Berkeley on the participation of transgender women in women’s sports, public voting nearly doubles abstention and reduces support for the stigmatized option. Threshold voting eliminates these distortions while revealing one-third of individual votes. |
| JEL: | D72 D82 C93 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21485 |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans |
| Abstract: | Incumbents can secure re-election by strategically raising the cost of reversing their policies, allowing low-ability office-holders to persist and weakening electoral accountability. We develop a dynamic electoral model with heterogeneous candidates in which policy choices endogenously generate switching costs that shape future electoral competition. This mechanism creates a novel channel of political entrenchment: incumbents can deter replacement not by outperforming challengers, but by making policy change sufficiently costly. We introduce midterm reviews — an institutional device that allows voters to determine, during the term, whether an incumbent remains eligible for re-election — which constrains this form of entrenchment. Midterm reviews weakly increase voter welfare and strictly do so when they screen out low-ability incumbents who would otherwise survive. More broadly, the mechanism strengthens democratic resilience by limiting institutional entrenchment and preserving effective electoral accountability. Extending the model to multi-member executives, we show that cabinet-level reviews mitigate collective entrenchment arising from joint cost-setting. |
| Keywords: | midterm reviews; democratic resilience; Electoral accountability; Political entrenchment |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21465 |
| By: | Eliaz, Kfir; Rubinstein, Ariel |
| Abstract: | We propose a model of electoral competition in which parties compete by making statements linking policies to outcomes. Voters assess these statements not by Bayesian updating, but by sequentially sampling past cases until they encounter evidence that confirms or refutes one of the two statements made by the incumbent and a challenger. The incumbent's policy determines the distribution of cases voters observe. We introduce equilibrium notions capturing stable regimes and cyclical competition over statements. Our analysis highlights several phenomena such as: logically equivalent statements may differ in effectiveness, parties with less successful policies may remain in power, society may become trapped in cycles of power change, and politicians may strategically deviate from their ideology to shape the evidence available to voters. |
| Keywords: | Electoral campaign |
| JEL: | D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21491 |
| By: | Martin Adler; Stefanie Peer; Antonio Russo |
| Abstract: | Policymakers frequently implement environmental policies that are less ambitious than what voters would prefer. We document this gap using findings from previous research as well as evidence from climate policy in Austria's transport sector. To account for this pattern, we develop a model in which political parties compete with electoral platforms that involve multiple policy dimensions. When voters place greater weight on a primary issue -such as fiscal policy - than on environmental policy, we show that parties may refrain from proposing environmental reforms, even when these reforms enjoy broad public support. This dynamic arises once the primary issue becomes sufficiently salient to voters. We then examine potential ways to overcome this policy inertia, including the use of direct democratic instruments (e.g., referendums) and the delegation of environmental policy decisions from national to regional governments. |
| Keywords: | parties, political economy, environmental policy, transport policy |
| JEL: | Q58 D78 H23 R41 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12785 |
| By: | Fontana, Nicola; Nannicini, Tommaso; Snyder, James |
| Abstract: | We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K40 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21544 |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans; Kravchenko, Egor; Martinelli, Cesar |
| Abstract: | We study how new information technologies affect democratic decision-making in a Condorcet model with costly information acquisition. Voters endogenously choose whether to become informed. Technological change alters both information costs and signal precision, with nontrivial effects on equilibrium participation and collective accuracy. Lower information costs can reduce information acquisition and collective accuracy only when the electorate is odd, a phenomenon we call the odd-electorate paradox. Under uniqueness of equilibrium, however, lower costs increase participation and improve collective accuracy when initial information acquisition is sufficiently low. Improvements in signal quality need not increase equilibrium information acquisition and may even reduce collective accuracy through equilibrium responses. In large electorates, the fraction of informed voters converges to zero, while the number of informed voters converges to a Poisson distribution. Democratic accuracy may therefore rest on sparse expertise and socially aggregated information. |
| Keywords: | epistemic democracy; Costly information acquisition; Voting; Majority rule; Pivotality; equilibrium participation; Artificial intelligence |
| JEL: | D72 D83 C72 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21534 |
| By: | Buonanno, Paolo; Lecce, Giampaolo; Ogliari, Laura; Plevani, Giacomo |
| Abstract: | We study how violence reshapes electoral competition and political selection during state formation. Using new district-level data on brigandage, elections, and political elites in post-unification Southern Italy, we show that violence reduced turnout, especially where it increased the risks of accessing polling stations. Beyond participation, brigandage also altered the supply side of politics: exposed districts experienced fewer contested elections and fewer new candidates. At the same time, political representation shifted away from aristocratic deputies and toward more locally embedded elites with administrative experience, while candidate pools also moved away from court-linked elite profiles. We provide evidence that these shifts were also reflected in parliamentary activity, with locally embedded representatives placing relatively greater emphasis on territorially targeted claims. Consistent with this pattern, districts more exposed to violence experienced greater expansion of the road network, but not railways, precisely where conflict induced a stronger shift toward local representation. These findings point to a political-representation channel through which violence shapes development, by altering who competes for office and how public resources are allocated. |
| JEL: | D72 N43 O43 H41 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21428 |
| By: | Aswin Sivapragassam |
| Abstract: | We revisit the two-candidate, three-alternative election campaign game with strategic ambiguity of Aragones & Postlewaite (2002), in which ambiguity arises in equilibrium when no pure alternative is majority-winning and voters exhibit sufficiently intense preferences. We show that the existence condition for winning strategies of the candidate associated with the Condorcet alternative is not sufficient for the existence of such a strategy. The original derivation evaluates the worst-case opponent strategy only at two extreme points of the feasible set, whereas the relevant bound is attained elsewhere. We provide a counterexample showing that the original condition can be satisfied even though no winning strategy exists, and derive a corrected characterization: winning strategies rely on voters who most prefer the remaining alternative, associated with neither candidate, rather than those who rank the Condorcet alternative second. This mirrors the coalition logic of the non-Condorcet candidate, yielding a structural symmetry between the two candidates’ equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, association with a Condorcet alternative does not confer a systematic strategic advantage, and strategic ambiguity operates as a selective rather than aggregative electoral device. |
| Keywords: | Strategic ambiguity, Condorcet winner, Electoral competition, Coalition structure, Voting |
| JEL: | C72 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2026-13 |
| By: | Bhusal, Bhishma; Callen, Michael; Pande, Rohini; Prillaman, Soledad; Singhania, Deepak; Subedi, Apurva |
| Abstract: | How does wartime rebel governance shape post-conflict institutions? We study this in Nepal, where the Maoist People's War (1996–2006) dismantled a 240-year caste-based monarchy and ended with Maoists entering democratic politics. During the conflict, Maoists established sub-national ``People’s Governments" that administered justice, collected taxes, and delivered local services. Using a spatial regression-discontinuity design, we show that exposure to People's Governments increased political knowledge and participation especially among historically marginalized indigenous groups (Janajatis). Exposure also reshaped party institutions and inter-party competition: candidate-selection committees in more exposed areas have 26 percent more Janajati members who, drawing on novel implicit-attitude data, exhibit less pro-upper caste bias. Non-Maoist parties' Janajati nomination rates nearly double in fully exposed areas, consistent with competition for newly mobilized voters. Nearly two decades on, local governments in exposed areas score 0.2–0.3 standard deviations higher on state capacity indices and receive 13 percent more in conditional federal grants. These findings show that when rebel groups enter competitive democratic politics, wartime governance institutions can — through citizen mobilization, party gatekeeping, and cross-party competition — enable a more inclusive and capable post-war state. |
| Keywords: | Conflict; Political selection; State capacity; Institutions; Nepal |
| JEL: | D72 O17 H11 D73 O12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21532 |
| By: | Konrad Bierl; Klaus Eisenack; Angelika von Dulong; Peter Wieland |
| Abstract: | Do democratic elections affect policy outcomes, and how do these effects evolve over time? Existing evidence is mixed, focusing on federal elections in two-party systems using RDDs. We study municipal elections in Germany’s multiparty system, examining how electoral support for the pro-environmental Green Party affects photovoltaic power capacity investment. Exploiting quasi-random variation generated by staggered elections, we implement a triple difference-in-differences design using panel data (1990-2022). We find strongly time-dependent electoral effects. Electoral support generates sizable short-run increases in capacities (+3.4 MW/municipality), including anticipation effects. These effects reverse in the long-run (-4.2 MW/municipality), primarily driven by less residential capacity. |
| Keywords: | Local elections; Municipal climate action; Renewable energy; Political parties; Triple difference-in-differences |
| JEL: | C21 D78 Q48 |
| Date: | 2026–06–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0098 |
| By: | Koch, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert |
| Abstract: | Radical Right (RR) political parties have become increasingly radicalized on immigration across many developed countries. We study whether exposure to slanted (i.e., one-sided) news shifts policy views of RR voters on immigration in Austria. In an online experiment, participants received slanted news about the effects of immigration on the welfare state. We find that anti-immigration news further radicalizes RR voters by reinforcing extreme policy views, while slanted pro-immigration news has no de-radicalizing effect. Surprisingly, balanced news — presenting both sides — reduces radicalization. We show that balanced news coverage increases trust, thereby increasing RR voters’ receptiveness to opposing viewpoints. |
| JEL: | C90 D72 F22 H30 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21474 |
| By: | María Cadaval-Sampedro; Santiago Lago-Peñas; Xoaquín Fernández-Leiceaga; Alejandro Domínguez-Lamela |
| Abstract: | How do citizens evaluate complex public policies when information is limited, and responsibility attribution is unclear? This paper examines the causal impact of source cues on attitudes toward subnational fiscal policies and the extent to which political alignment conditions citizens’ responses. Using an original survey of 1, 501 adults in Galicia (Spain) we implement two randomized survey experiments that vary the attribution of identical policy statements across technocratic and partisan sources. The experiments cover two policy domains that differ in complexity and opinion crystallization: policy evaluation for improving public spending efficiency and a reform of the regional fiscal framework. Results show that source cues significantly shape opinion formation, primarily by reducing uncertainty and activating partisan reasoning. Their effects are modest when citizens hold well-defined prior preferences but become substantially stronger in complex and unfamiliar policy domains. Moreover, responses are systematically conditioned by political alignment: individuals are less supportive of proposals associated with opposing parties and more supportive when the same proposals are endorsed by their preferred party. These findings provide new evidence on the role of source cues as mechanisms of uncertainty reduction and preference formation in multilevel governance settings. |
| Keywords: | Source cues, Motivated reasoning, Partisanship, Survey experiments, Fiscal federalism, Public opinion |
| JEL: | D72 D83 H77 D91 C93 |
| Date: | 2026–06–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2613 |
| By: | Sutirtha Bagchi (Department of Economics, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University); Camryn Browne (Department of Economics, Villanova School of Business, Villanova University); Corey Lang (Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, College of the Environment and Life Sciences, The University of Rhode Island) |
| Abstract: | Does inequality reduce willingness to collectively fund public goods? We examine this question using data from 3, 273 school district referenda from the state of Ohio for the period from 2009 to 2019. We examine the differential effects of income inequality typically captured in economic surveys and the inequality that voters themselves perceive through variation in their community's housing stock. Our primary measure of perceived inequality is the 90/10 ratio of home values within a district - a dimension of inequality made salient by the physical landscape voters encounter in their everyday lives. We find that greater visible housing inequality is associated with a lower referendum yes-vote share whereas the Gini coefficient of income inequality is not. The effects of perceived inequality are concentrated in geographically compact districts where routine exposure to housing disparities is highest, and absent in more spreadout districts where such exposure is lower. The negative effect is also substantially attenuated in counties with stronger cross-income social ties, consistent with bridging social capital sustaining solidarity in the presence of salient inequality. Our results suggest that voters respond to the inequality they perceive in their community rather than inequalities in the underlying income distribution that are commonly used by social scientists to explain voter behavior. |
| Keywords: | Perceived Inequality; Housing; Public Goods; Voting; Referendum; Economic Connectedness |
| JEL: | D63 D72 H41 H75 I22 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vil:papers:65 |
| By: | Davies, Rob; Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Kalle; Torvik, Ragnar |
| Abstract: | The relationship between land reform and electoral support for the government is crucial for countries considering any form of asset redistribution. We develop a unique data set for Zimbabwe, in which we combine data for 19, 374 farm redistributed properties and other estates, with election results from 1, 960 wards in the presidential election in 2018. The farm data are collected in the midst of the land reform in Zimbabwe, and make it possible to analyze how a massive and national land reform goes hand in hand with the support for the long-term ruling party in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF. The results show that for every percent of a rural ward's land area that was subject to land redistribution, the support for ZANU-PF increases by a quarter of a percentage point. The results are compatible both with a mechanism of gratitude from the beneficiaries and with a precautionary strategy where beneficiaries want to block regime change and potential reversal of the redistribution. |
| Keywords: | Land reform |
| JEL: | D72 P48 Q15 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21396 |
| By: | Frings, Nina Leonie; Fenn, Julius; Aeschbach, Samuel PhD (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Mata, Rui (University of Basel); Hahnel, Ulf J.J. |
| Abstract: | Lacking public support remains a major barrier to ambitious climate policy, yet little is known about how citizens mentally represent specific policy proposals and whether or how these representations change over time. We assessed voters’ cognitive– affective mental models of a real-world climate policy proposal, the 2023 Swiss Climate Protection Law, at two time points preceding a national referendum on the policy. A sample of Swiss voters (N=254) drew their mental models by adding their own cognitive associations and affective evaluations towards the law one month before and immediately prior to the referendum. Opposers were more likely to make reference to financial or personal costs and to rate concepts more negatively, whereas supporters were more likely to make reference to climate and future protection concepts and to rate concepts more positively. While the cognitive associations differed across voter groups, the complexity of mental models, indicated by the number of provided concepts and their interconnectedness, did not. Both opposers and supporters reported more cost-related concepts at the second time point but there was no strong evidence of increased complexity or changes in affective evaluations over time. Crucially, affective evaluations were the strongest predictor of final policy support relative to cognitive associations. These results suggest that while political campaigns may shape the considerations citizens associate with a policy, policy support does not necessarily reflect differences in the complexity of these representations and may be more closely associated with their affective evaluation than with their cognitive content. |
| Date: | 2026–06–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:az345_v1 |
| By: | Della Lena, Sebastiano; Jansen, Yannick; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We study how the degree of zero-sumness in a social environment shapes cooperation and network formation. When individual gains partly come at others’ expense, agents face a trade-off between contributing to a public good and extracting rents from their network position. We model this as a public good game on a directed, weighted network with a parameter capturing the intensity of zero-sum conflict. Our Zero-Sum Theorem shows that greater zero-sumness increases contributions while reducing social connectedness: agents sever links to limit exposure to extraction and increase self-provision to compensate for the diminished free-riding opportunities associated with sparser networks. The unique Nash equilibrium has contributions equal to weighted sign-alternating Bonacich centralities, reflecting how network position shapes behavior through alternating spillovers while incorporating extraction incentives. With endogenous links, equilibrium total connectivity is uniform across homogeneous agents, and heterogeneity in extraction incentives generates an inverse relationship between rent-extraction benefits and network centrality. |
| Keywords: | Public goods; Rent extraction; Network formation; Network centrality; Social connectedness |
| JEL: | C72 D62 D85 H41 |
| Date: | 2026–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21459 |