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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Torun Dewan (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science); Christopher Kam (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia); Jaakko Meriläinen (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Janne Tukiainen (Department of Economics, University of Turku) |
| Abstract: | Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) proposed that organiza tions persist when loyalty tempers incentives to exit after adverse shocks. We test this argument using newly digitized individual-level voting records from 28 English constituencies (1832-1868), covering 134, 000 real votes. Voters could exit by switching parties, use voice by splitting their two votes between opposing parties, or remain loyal. Exploiting favorite candidates’ exit as a negative shock to the choice set, we show that candidate exits increased party switching more than expressing voice. We show that candidate exit initially induces substantial voter exit and voice, especially among Liberal voters, but that these responses attenuate sharply by the mid-1860s, consistent with the consolidation of party organizations and the emergence of durable partisan loyalty. |
| Keywords: | candidate turnover, electoral volatility, exit-voice-loyalty, party loyalty, political development, vote switching, voting behavior |
| JEL: | D72 N43 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp178 |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin |
| Abstract: | In turbulent times, political labels become increasingly uninformative about politicians’ true policy preferences or their ability to withstand the influence of special interest groups. We offer a model in which politicians use campaign rhetoric to signal their political preferences in multiple dimensions. In equilibrium, the less popular types try to pool with the more popular ones, whereas the more popular types seek to separate themselves. The ability of voters to process information shapes politicians’ campaign rhetoric. If the signals on the cultural dimension are more precise, politicians signal more there, even if the economy is more important to voters. The unpopular type benefits from increased conformity, which bridges the candidates’ rhetoric and makes it more difficult for voters to make an informed decision. |
| JEL: | D72 D84 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34909 |
| By: | Ignacio Lago; André Blais |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization affects the politics of public goods provision. Using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data from 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies between 1960 and 2018, the study analyzes how centralized, symmetric, and asymmetric territorial arrangements influence electoral accountability and party nationalization. The authors find that asymmetric decentralization decreases electoral accountability in national elections but increases it in regional elections, and that it contributes to greater territorial heterogeneity in partisan support. |
| Keywords: | Accountability; asymmetric decentralization; economic voting; nationalization; public goods |
| JEL: | H70 H77 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–01–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2601 |
| By: | Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza,; Mengwei Lin; Eleonora Patacchini |
| Abstract: | It has long been observed that there is little money in U.S. politics compared to the stakes. But what if contributions are not fully observable or non-monetary in nature and thus not easily quantifiable? We study this question with a new data set on the top 1000 donors in U.S. congressional races. Since top donors do not randomly support candidates, we propose an identification strategy based on information about top donors' deaths and the observed variations in candidates' performance after these events. The death of a top donor significantly decreases a candidate's chances of being elected in the current and future election cycles. Moreover, it affects the legislative activities of elected candidates. These effects do not depend on top donors' monetary contributions to a candidate but on their prominence and their total contributions during the election campaign. |
| Keywords: | Campaign Finance; Top Donors; Tullock Paradox; Electoral Outcomes; Political Networks |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp277 |
| By: | Do, Quynh; Mahmood, Rafat; Mavisakalyan, Astghik; Tyers, Leigh |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the causal impact of female political representation on legislative behavior, social attitudes, and gender-based crime. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mixed-gender electoral contests, we compare electorates that narrowly elected female versus male candidates. We link computational text analysis of parliamentary debates, roll-call votes, post-election survey responses, and administrative police records from 2010 to 2022 in Australia. We document three main findings. First, female MPs devote significantly more attention to gender-related issues in parliamentary speech and are more likely to support gender-related legislation, including measures addressing gender-based violence, with no evidence of differential voting absence. Second, exposure to a narrowly elected female MP shifts constituent attitudes toward greater support for women's rights. Third, electorates that narrowly elect a female MP experience a statistically and economically meaningful decline in gendered crime rates during the subsequent term. Together, the results indicate that female representation can shape policy priorities, social attitudes, and downstream gendered outcomes, even within a disciplined party system. |
| Keywords: | Female political representation, Legislative behaviour, Public attitudes, Gender-based crime, Regression discontinuity design |
| JEL: | J16 D72 I38 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1722 |
| By: | Lauren Cohen; Bo Li |
| Abstract: | We find that randomly assigned peers play a sizable and unique role in shaping political economy. Closely seated, and exogenously assigned, US Senate peers have a significant impact on Congressional voting, shifting votes by 11.9 percentage points (t=7.34). Physical distance is the largest and most consistent of any characteristic outside of party or state in impacting voting behavior. The distance effect is concentrated in the closest peers, existing for up to 19.6 feet on the Senate floor, then dissipating. Close peers additionally increase the probability of aisle-crossing (voting with the opposite party), with the aisle-crossing impact being roughly eight times larger on the final votes on bills. We then utilize a state-of-the-art AI-enhanced computer vision model based on real-time interactions using CSPAN video data at every 10-second interval amongst Congressional members. Using these observed interactions, we find that face-to-face interactions are associated with significant impacts on immediately pending votes. The interactions are largely driven by distance, with aisle-seated Senators from both parties being amongst the most likely to engage in face-to-face interactions across party lines. By conducting counterfactuals through randomized Senate seating, 59 consequential bills would have switched outcomes over our 30-year sample period. |
| JEL: | C53 C82 D72 D78 D82 H10 P0 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34925 |