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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Matteo F. Ferroni (Department of Economics, University of Missouri); Jeffrey Milyo (Department of Economics, University of Missouri) |
| Abstract: | Several recent studies examine the ease of voting across states using a "cost of voting index" (COVI) based on state election administration laws in a given election year (e.g., Pomante II et al., 2023). However, the original COVI is based on different sets of state laws across elections and normalized to have a mean of zero in each election. Consequently, the original COVI does not afford straightforward and meaningful comparisons of changes in the cost of voting over time. We gently revise the original COVI to generate a time-consistent "dynamic cost of voting index" (DCOVI) that is better suited to comparing within state changes in the cost of voting over time. We demonstrate that DCOVI is more strongly associated with state-level voter turnout than COVI, as well as a signi cant determinant of self-reported individual-level turnout and several measures of perceived frequency of illegal voting (albeit not perceived errors in vote counting). In general, higher costs of voting within a state are associated with lower voter turnout and improved public perceptions of the integrity of elections, although all of these e ects are modest. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Election Law, Election Reform, Election Administration, Voter Turnout, Cost of Voting, Integrity of Elections, Vote Fraud. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 H11 K16 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umc:wpaper:2516 |
| By: | Yixuan Shi |
| Abstract: | In mixed electoral systems, candidates can win parliamentary seats either by securing the most votes in local districts or through party lists. Candidates’ successes of district elections often hinge on personal charisma, whereas the total number of party seats depends on the overall party vote share. With limited campaign budget, candidates face a trade-off between allocating resources towards their individual or team battles: more individualised campaigning boosts individual appeal and attract voters at local districts, while more party-centric campaigning increases the party’s seat share. We examine how candidates allocate resources in mixed electoral systems using a contest-theoretical model. Under a closed-list system, where party-level prizes are distributed according to a predetermined ranking, lower-ranked candidates concentrate their efforts on their individual battles, while higher-ranked candidates balance resources in both battles. Their exact allocation also depends on the rank of their district-level opponents. In contrast, in an open-list system, where party-level prizes are tied to candidates' vote shares, all candidates are incentivised to contribute to party-centric campaigning. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–12–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2025-08 |
| By: | David Doherty (Department of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago); Conor M. Dowling (Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, SUNY); Michael G. Miller (Department of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University); Jeffrey Milyo (Department of Economics, University of Missouri) |
| Abstract: | To what extent are partisan differences about voting rules rooted in sincere disagreements about the relative importance of maximizing turnout versus preventing ineligible voters from casting ballots? We document partisan differences in preferences regarding this trade-off over time, demonstrating that these differences are particularly pronounced among the most politically interested respondents. We then report findings from two pre-registered survey experiments that shed light on whether these gaps are a product of partisan sorting or responses to elite cues. The experiments asked participants to make trade-offs between a pair of voting systems: one that would entirely prevent ineligible votes, randomly varying turnout rates among eligible voters, and one that would have 100 percent turnout among eligible voters, but result in some randomly varied number of ineligible voters casting ballots. Some participants were also provided with cues signaling which party endorsed which system. Our results suggest that the effects of divergent partisan cues, rather than differing priorities regarding maximizing eligible turnout and minimizing ineligible turnout explain the partisan gaps we find in our observational data. Taken together, the findings suggest that strategic elites can stoke partisan disagreements about how the democratic process should work. |
| Keywords: | Voting rules, partisanship, survey, experiment |
| JEL: | D72 H79 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umc:wpaper:2517 |
| By: | Jeffrey Milyo (Department of Economics, University of Missouri) |
| Abstract: | State voter identification laws involve a potential tradeoff between the ease of voting and public perceptions of the integrity of elections. While several prior studies have examined the effects of voter ID laws on turnout, relatively few have investigated the effects of such laws on public confidence in the integrity of elections. These earlier efforts do not support the hypothesis that voter ID laws significantly improve common proxies for confidence in the integrity of elections. This study introduces a new survey instrument that directly measures confidence in the integrity of elections and employs this measure to estimate the within-state effects of changes in strict voter ID laws on confidence in the integrity of elections. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, strict voter ID requirements are shown to have a substantively large and statistically significant impact on the probability that citizens express confidence (and especially high confidence) in the integrity of elections. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Election Administration, Voting Rights, Trust in Government |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H79 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umc:wpaper:2518 |
| By: | Joop Age Harm Adema |
| Abstract: | Far-right parties frequently mobilize anti-refugee sentiment during periods of high asylum migration. Prior work shows that exposure to transit routes and regional inflows tends to raise far-right support, whereas direct local contact with asylum seekers can dampen it. Yet much of the sharp rise in far-right voting around major refugee waves remains unexplained by actual inflows. I study a Dutch policy reform, the Dispersal Act, which obligated municipalities to host asylum seekers and thereby generated a sudden, plausibly exogenous increase in expected future local inflows. Comparing changes in far-right vote shares between not-yet and already hosting municipalities before the actual arrival of asylum seekers allows me to isolate the electoral effect of heightened expectations of future hosting. I find that affected municipalities experienced a substantial increase in far-right support following the Act’s passage. The effect operates on both the extensive margin (whether municipalities expect to host) and the intensive margin (how many they expect to host): a one-percentage-point increase in allocated asylum-seeker share raises far-right vote shares by about 1.2 percentage points. |
| Keywords: | asylum seekers, far-right voting, group threat, migration |
| JEL: | D72 F22 H75 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12312 |
| By: | Hanno Jentzsch (Department of East Asian Studies, University of Vienna); Kostiantyn Ovsiannikov (Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | In Europe and the US, regional inequalities have been linked to growing electoral support for right-wing populist parties. In contrast, Japan’s rapidly shrinking rural areas have continued to support the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This makes Japan a productive case to investigate factors that moderate the electoral effects of regional decline. This paper analyzes municipal-level electoral data across four general elections between 2012 and 2021 to investigate the relationship between regional decline, interregional redistribution, and electoral behavior in Japan. We focus on municipalities designated as “rapidly depopulating†, which display above-average levels of population decline and economic dependency, based on which they receive additional government support. “Depopulating municipalities†feature stronger support for the LDP-led coalition and higher turnout. This electoral profile is most pronounced in “depopulating municipalities†that remained intact during a wave of municipal mergers in the mid-2000s. The results suggest that the combined effects of high aging rates, interregional redistribution and relatively stable socio-spatial boundaries affect electoral behavior in declining regions in ways that can benefit the established conservative party. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2025-9 |
| By: | Laura Barros; Aiko Schmeißer |
| Abstract: | Adverse economic shocks are known to reshape voter behavior – the demand side of politics. Much less is known about their consequences for the supply side: how such shocks affect who becomes a politician. This paper examines how job losses influence individuals' decisions to enter politics and the implications for political selection. Using administrative data linking political participation records to matched employer-employee data covering all formal workers in Brazil, and exploiting mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, indicating that economic shocks can improve the quality of political entrants. The increase in candidacies is strongest among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from holding office and higher predicted income losses. A regression discontinuity design further shows that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases political entry. These results are consistent with a reduction in individuals' opportunity costs – both in terms of reduced private-sector income and increased time resources – facilitating greater political engagement. |
| Keywords: | political selection, economic shocks, job loss, mass layoffs |
| JEL: | D72 J63 J65 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12327 |