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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | L. Flóra Drucker (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf)); Attila Gáspár (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the impact of a door-to-door information campaign on the outcome of Hungary’s 2022 parliamentary elections. Although newsletter circulation was not randomized, we employ three complementary identification strategies that yield consistent results: (i) settlement-level fixed-effects regressions with rich controls for concurrent campaign activity, (ii) a weather-based instrumental variable exploiting changes in local air pressure, and (iii) within-settlement comparisons using GPS data on activist routes. We find small but statistically significant positive effects on voter turnout, opposition vote share, and the share of invalid ballots in a government-backed anti-LGBTQ referendum. The latter result, in particular, suggests that the campaign succeeded in transmitting relatively sophisticated political messages even within a highly constrained media environment. Because the campaign did not reduce support for the ruling party, its effect appears to have operated primarily through mobilizing previously disengaged voters. |
| Keywords: | Information campaigns, Electoral behavior |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:2519 |
| By: | Tito Boeri; Nina Nikiforova; Guido Tabellini |
| Abstract: | We study the communication strategies on Twitter/X of 367 political leaders in 21 countries, focusing on electoral competition between populists and non-populists. We measure polarization by the ease with which the leader can be classified as populist or not, conditional on his tweet. We find that political rhetoric becomes more polarized before and around election dates. This happens because, in pre-electoral quarters, opposite leaders are more likely to: i) talk about different topics, and ii) frame differently the same issues. Our results are consistent with competing politicians targeting different voters, rather than appealing to the same swing voters. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, populism, partisanship, polarization |
| JEL: | H00 P00 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12558 |
| By: | Liu, Junxi (University of Warwick); Pi, Shaoting (Iowa State University); Wang, Ao (Universioty of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Shareholder support for environmental and social (ES) proposals increased by more than 50% between 2010 and 2020, yet the content of such proposals can vary substantially. We first document that there has been a large retreat in big-ask proposals (e.g., demanding operational changes for firms). The big-ask proposals fell from about 40% of ES ballots to roughly 5%, being replaced by small-ask proposals (e.g., requesting additional disclosure), and the increase in overall support rate is driven by favorable votes on small asks compared to big asks. However, we caution against interpreting these trends as greenwashing. Investigating both sides of shareholder democracy (proponents and voters), we develop and estimate a structural model in which ES proponents choose a portfolio of proposal types, anticipating vote outcomes. The model captures a feedback: changes in voting reshape the mix of sponsored proposals, and that mix, in turn, shapes observed support rates. Counterfactuals based on resubmission-style benchmarks suggest that the early part of the decade featured an oversupply of big-ask proposals and a moderate undersupply of small-ask proposals; the subsequent decline in big asks reflects an equilibrium correction toward small asks that are expected to receive meaningful support to generate incremental progress in ES. Therefore, the correction, along with growing voter support, suggests a shift towards a more pragmatic approach to ES issues rather than greenwashing. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance ; ESG, Shareholder Voting ; Shareholder Proposals ; Socially Responsible Investing ; Sustainability JEL codes: G12 ; G14 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1607 |
| By: | Łukasz Wiktor Olejnik; Marcin Grygo |
| Abstract: | To date, there have been dozens of publications confirming the existence of alignment bias or hometown bias in the allocation of intergovernmental grants. However, the assumption is typically made that members of one party support one another in principle. Meanwhile, in proportional systems, candidates from one party compete with one another for a seat in parliament, which may affect the distribution of grants. This paper analyses the distribution of investment grants to local governments from the Polish Covid-19 Response Fund in 2021-2023. It presents results suggesting that if the distribution of discretionary investment grants is controlled by the members of a single party faction, local governments with ties to the hometowns or birth towns of members of parliament (MPs) representing that faction receive significantly more funding than other local governments. The hometowns or birth towns of opposition members receive significantly lower grants, while the hometowns or birth towns of politicians from the opposite faction of the ruling party receive the lowest grants. This supports the hypothesis that intra-party rivalry and the desire to reduce the re-election chances of rivals can have a powerful impact on the distribution of discretionary grants. |
| Keywords: | alignment bias, hometown bias, core vs. swing voters hypothesis, intra-party competition |
| JEL: | D72 H72 H73 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2024104 |
| By: | Jacob Bastian |
| Abstract: | While the correlation between working and voting is positive, I provide the first causal evidence that this relationship is negative. Using five decades of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) expansions and 1990s welfare reform as instruments for employment, I find that working lowers voter turnout and increases conservatism among lower-income mothers. Voter registration, political knowledge, and civic engagement decline, while preferences for conservative policies rise. Effects are largest for unmarried, younger, and less-educated mothers and are substantially stronger outside metropolitan areas. Notably, political shifts are concentrated among White women despite larger employment gains among non-White women, driven in part by White women entering more conservative coworker environments. Prior exposure to work also matters: women without working mothers experience larger ideological shifts. While recent decades have seen more women voting Democrat, even more women would have voted Democrat if not for decades of pro-work public policy targeting lower-income mothers. |
| JEL: | D72 H24 J22 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34980 |
| By: | Michael Finus (University of Graz, Austria); Francesco Furini (University of Hamburg, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We study the voluntary provision of two pure global public goods with a summation technology in a two-stage coalition formation game. Signatories may cooperate on only one public good (a partial agreement) or on both public goods (a full agreement). In the single-public-good case, provision levels across countries are strategic substitutes and stable agreements tend to be small, yielding only limited improvements over the non-cooperative outcome. One reason is that outsiders benefit from coalition expansion: as signatories increase their provision levels, non-signatories reduce their contributions. Another reason is that superadditivity may fail, particularly for small coalitions, because many outsiders offset the efforts of signatories. With multiple public goods, the strategic interaction may change fundamentally. Provision levels across countries may become strategic complements, and large, stable, and effective agreements may emerge when the cross derivative of the benefit function with respect to the two public goods is sufficiently large and positive. If the cross derivative is negative, however, the global provision level of one public good may decline as the coalition expands. Moreover, under a partial agreement, the game may become a negative-externality game in which also global welfare declines with coalition size and reaches its minimum in the grand coalition. This may occur when countries cooperate on the public good with lower marginal returns. |
| Keywords: | Coalition Formation, Multiple Global Public Goods, Strategic Substitutes vs Complements |
| JEL: | C72 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2026-02 |