|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde (University of Pennsylvania, NBER, and CEPR); Carlos Sanz (Banco de Espana and CEMFI) |
| Abstract: | Due to a last-minute fight among the candidates, Vox, a party at the right end of the Spanish political spectrum, could not run in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, a relatively representative electoral constituency, in the general election of July 23, 2023. Since this fight was a power struggle within Vox unrelated to any fundamental in the constituency or ideological differences among the candidates, we can exploit this event as a quasinatural experiment to measure the effects of new parties on electoral outcomes. Using three different but complementary research designs (matching, synthetic controls, and a triple-difference analysis), we get to the same main result: Vox’s presence significantly increases votes for the right as a whole. The increase in votes for the right caused by Vox’s presence is particularly strong in areas with high unemployment. The presence of Vox also reduces protest votes but, on the other hand, votes for the left are unaffected. |
| Keywords: | New parties, quasi-natural experiments, electoral outcomes |
| JEL: | D72 N30 N40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–06–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:24-014&r= |
| By: | Giulia Buccione; Brian G. Knight |
| Abstract: | We investigate the rise of the religious right in the context of the Moral Majority and Jimmy Carter, the first Evangelical President. During Carter's Presidency, the Moral Majority, an Evangelical group headed by televangelist Jerry Falwell, turned against the incumbent Carter, a Democrat, and campaigned for Ronald Reagan, a Republican, in the 1980 Election. To investigate the role of religious groups and leaders in the political persuasion of followers, we first develop a theoretical model in which single-issue religious voters follow better-informed religious leaders when choosing which candidates to support. Using data from county-level voting returns, exit polls, and surveys, we document that Evangelical voters indeed shifted their support from Carter in 1976 to Reagan in 1980. We also provide three pieces of evidence that the Moral Majority played a role in this switching: survey data on Moral Majority campaign issues, exposure to Jerry's Falwell's television ministry, and exposure to state headquarters of the Moral Majority. |
| JEL: | P0 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32551&r= |
| By: | Giampaolo Bonomi |
| Abstract: | We study polarization in a probabilistic voting model with aggregate shocks and a decreasing marginal utility from office rents. In equilibrium, parties offer different policies, despite being rent-motivated and ex-ante identical from the point of view of voters. When candidates compete on a single policy issue, parties' equilibrium payoffs increase in voter polarization, even when the change is driven by the supporters of the opposite party becoming more extreme. With multiple policy issues, parties benefit if the society is split into two factions and the ideological cohesion within such factions increases. We connect our results to empirical evidence on polarizing political communication, party identity, and zero-sum thinking, and find that polarization could be reduced by intervening on the electoral rule. |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2405.20564&r= |
| By: | Pedro Albarrán (University o Alicante); Carmen Herrero (University o Alicante & Ivie); Antonio Villar (Universidad Pablo de Olavide & ISEAK) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we conduct an empirical analysis of the transition from voters' preferences to electoral outcomes, a process significantly influenced by the electoral system. We introduce a measure called 'support' that summarizes voters’ preferences. Then, we examine how these preferences are compressed under the plurality voting mechanism, which forces to select just one option. This choice is captured by the 'affinity', which singles out the preferred party for each voter. The final decision, though, is affected by strategic considerations and several other factors. Using survey data from three Spanish regions (Andalusia, Madrid, and the Valencian Community) prior to their respective Regional Elections, our findings indicate that political representation in all three Regional Parliaments would be more diverse if based on voters’ complete preferences (i.e., support). In all instances, smaller parties lose ground, a trend that emerges even before strategic considerations. These results suggest that the electoral system may exacerbate political polarization, diverging from social preferences. |
| Keywords: | Voting; regional elections; surveys; voters’ preferences; political support; political representation; Spain. |
| JEL: | N36 D64 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:24.02&r= |
| By: | Richter, Dirk (Bern University Hospital for Mental Health); Richter, Mona |
| Abstract: | Democracy is under threat in many countries, particularly from illiberal and right-wing populist parties. This does not reveal a social trend towards conservatism and right-wing to far-right positions among the population, as moral and social attitudes are generally becoming increasingly liberalised. The shift to the right is primarily taking place within the political system, where right-wing conservative and illiberal parties are recognising insecurities among the population and taking up certain trigger topics (e.g. migration, climate, gender and identity issues) in order to increase their share of the vote. To put it in economic terms: The shift to the right does not follow a demand from the voting population, but follows a supply by political parties. Political systems can therefore react accordingly and counter populist positions appropriately. Progressive-left parties can do this by ensuring that the issues and positions they launch do not exacerbate social insecurities, while conservative-right parties can do this by maintaining a clear distance from illiberal positions in terms of content and rhetoric. |
| Date: | 2024–06–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:2p38n&r= |
| By: | Prato, Carlo; Wolton, Stephane |
| Abstract: | The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggregation in a common-value environment with exogenous policy options: a large electorate of imperfectly informed voters almost always selects the correct policy option. Rather than directly voting for policies, citizens in modern representative democracies elect candidates who make strategic policy commitments. We show that intermediation by candidates sometimes improves policy choices and sometimes impedes information aggregation. Somewhat paradoxically, the possibility of information aggregation by voters encourages strategic conformism by candidates. Correlated information or partisan biases among voters can mitigate the political failure we un- cover. We also discuss possible institutional solutions. |
| Keywords: | information aggregation; elections; representative democracy; Elections; Information aggregation; Representative democracy |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2022–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:115180&r= |
| By: | Mario Gilli; Andrea Sorrentino |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a "max-min group contest", as defined by Chowdhury et al. (2016). However, instead of a continuum effort set, we employ a binary action set. Further, we consider private good prizes, so that there is a sharing issue within the winning group. Therefore, we include two stages: the first one about the setting of a sharing rule parameter and the second one about simultaneous and independent actions' choices. The binary action set allow us to innovate on the existing literature by (i) characterizing the full set of the second stage equilibrium actions; (ii) computationally characterizing in MATLAB the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entire game. We find conditions such that the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies have the cardinality of the continuum. We also check whether this paper's results are due to discreteness or to binary choice, proving that in this case there are no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as proved in the continuum case in Gilli and Sorrentino (2024). |
| Keywords: | Group contests, sharing rules, indeterminacy. |
| JEL: | D74 D71 C72 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:539&r= |