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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Calafate, Vítor; Costa, Francisco J M (FGV EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance); Pessoa, João Paulo |
| Abstract: | Extreme weather events can undermine political representation by preventing vulnerable populations from voting. Using georeferenced polling-station records from eight Brazilian elections (2010–2024) matched to daily river discharge, we exploit within-polling-station variation to show that historically low river discharge on election day increases voter abstention in communities dependent on river transportation. The effects are larger in polling sections with higher illiteracy rates and married voters. These shocks also shift electoral outcomes by reducing the vote share of parties whose bases overlap with affected populations. Our findings show that climate change can systematically weaken the political voice of the populations most exposed to climate damages. |
| Date: | 2026–04–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ypgsf_v1 |
| By: | Fontana, Nicola (Trinity College Dublin); Nannicini, Tommaso (European University Institute); Snyder, James (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race. |
| Keywords: | judicial elections, partisan alignment, regression discontinuity |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K40 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18533 |
| By: | Cerqua, Augusto (Sapienza University of Rome); Nocito, Samuel (Sapienza University of Rome); Pinto, Gabriele (Sapienza University of Rome) |
| Abstract: | Local governments in advanced democracies have increasingly struggled to attract political candidates, weakening electoral competition and accountability at the municipal level. While several factors may contribute to this trend, politicians' salaries represent one of the few policy levers that can be directly adjusted by policymakers. We study a large-scale reform that substantially increased local politicians' pay, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in election timing across municipalities. We find that higher salaries increase political entry, particularly among first-time candidates. Importantly, effects are heterogeneous across local contexts: in less affluent municipalities and in areas with lower entry barriers, higher pay also raises female candidacies and their probability of election. In the poorest areas, the reform further alters the composition of local political elites, shifting recruitment toward candidates with different educational and occupational backgrounds. |
| Keywords: | local governments, politicians' wages, time-shifted control design |
| JEL: | D04 D72 J45 C13 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18527 |