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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Antoine Prévotat (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Université Lyon 2, Emlyon Business School, GATE, 42100, Saint-Etienne, France); Zoi Terzopoulou (CNRS, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Université Lyon 2, Emlyon Business School, GATE, 42100, Saint-Etienne, France); Adam Zylbersztejn (Université Lyon 2, Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, Emlyon Business School, GATE, CNRS, 69007, Lyon, France; research fellow at Vistula University Warsaw (AFiBV), Warsaw, Poland) |
| Abstract: | In a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine voting behavior under rule uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about the voting rule itself. We compare behavior under three voting-rule conditions: simple plurality (1R), plurality with runoff (2R), and their probabilistic mixture (1R/2R) that is a lottery generating either 1R with known probability p, or 2R with probability 1-p. Following the previous literature, we conjecture that 1R/2R raises computational complexity and thus mitigates strategic manipulation. We test different models – either heuristic-based or rational – of (i) the formation of beliefs about other voters’ behavior, and of (ii) the resulting voting decisions. We find that beliefs tend to be formed in a myopic manner in all experimental conditions. With repetition, however, the accuracy of the belief formation process improves and we observe convergence between beliefs and votes. Regarding voting decisions, the model with highest (resp., lowest) predictive power is strategic (resp., sincere) voting, with some variation across conditions. Overall, our initial conjecture is not supported by the experimental data. Rule uncertainty steers the voters neither towards sincerity nor towards any other voting heuristic. If anything, it contributes to promoting strategic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Rule uncertainty; strategic voting; sincere voting; heuristics; plurality; plurality with runoff; economic experiment |
| JEL: | C23 C72 C91 C92 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2603 |
| By: | Yaron, Tal |
| Abstract: | As groups grow in size, the complexity of collective decision-making increases exponentially, leading societies to concentrate authority in small hierarchical subgroups. While this enables coordination at scale, it systematically underrepresents the interests of broader populations and limits collective learning. Traditional voting mechanisms exacerbate these problems: binary choices, fixed option sets, and winner-take-all outcomes incentivize polarization rather than consensus-seeking. This paper introduces a deliberative framework designed to support meaningful participation at scale. The framework combines three innovations: (1) open and continuous proposal generation, allowing participants to introduce new alternatives throughout the process; (2) continuous preference expression on a scale from strong opposition to strong support; and (3) real-time aggregation using the Consensus Algorithm, which calculates scores as Mean − SEM (standard error of the mean), yielding a confidence-adjusted estimate of collective agreement that penalizes uncertainty and protects minority positions. Two proof-of-concept applications demonstrate the framework's practical viability. In the first, 53 participants converged on a single name from 26 proposals within approximately five minutes. In the second, 40 participants representing secular and religious perspectives jointly developed a social charter on religion-state relations over two sessions totaling 5 hours, achieving consensus above 60% on key provisions. These results suggest that appropriately designed deliberative technologies can enable rapid, inclusive decision-making on both simple and normatively contested issues—offering a pathway toward scalable deliberative democracy. |
| Date: | 2026–01–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:u4phy_v1 |
| By: | Alex Krumer; Felix Otto; Tim Pawlowski |
| Abstract: | Despite a large body of theoretical literature on voting mechanisms, there is no documented evidence from real-world panel evaluations about the effect of trimming the extreme votes on sincere voting. We provide the first such evidence by comparing subjective evaluations of experts from different countries in competitive settings with and without a trimming mechanism. In these evaluations, some of the evaluated subjects are experts' compatriots. Using data on 29, 383 subjective evaluations, we find that experts assign significantly higher scores to their compatriots in panels without trimming. However, in panels with trimming, this favoritism is generally insignificant. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.05542 |