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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Bonneton, Nicolas; Polborn, Mattias |
| Abstract: | We present a moral hazard model of electoral accountability that challenges the common view of the populist vote as mere frustration with the elite. Rational voters use the threat of electing outsiders to incentivize more competent insiders whose policy preferences diverge from those of voters. Their optimal retention strategy involves differentiated punishment for failing incumbents, replacing them either with other elite politicians or with outsiders. The latter only occurs when the incumbent’s policy is both perceived as a failure and as benefiting the elite. This strategic voting behavior explains why outsider electoral success is often volatile: rational voters may back an outsider in one election and an establishment candidate in another, without changing their fundamental preferences. |
| Date: | 2025–05–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130565 |
| By: | Yoshikuni ONO; Hirofumi MIWA; Yuko KASUYA |
| Abstract: | Does allowing voters to choose multiple candidates foster diversity in legislative bodies? Majoritarian systems typically restrict voters to casting a ballot for one candidate, yet research suggests that permitting voters to select multiple candidates could boost the election of women and racial minorities. Despite indications of greater diversity under multiple-vote systems, voter behavior evidence remains scarce. To address this, our survey experiment varied the number of selectable candidates on a ballot in local elections. Results revealed that respondents alternated candidate genders, particularly in their second and third choices, supporting the theory that multiple voting promotes diverse representation. However, men more frequently became their first choice when multiple candidates were selectable, giving male candidates an overall advantage on the aggregate level. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:25047 |
| By: | McWay, Ryan; Braaksma, Matthew |
| Abstract: | Mahadevan and Shenoy (2023) assesses the use of state influence on funding for welfare programs in West Bengal for political targeting during periods of economic distress. Using a multidimensional regression discontinuity design, the authors find a misallocation of funding for a make-work program to support incumbent majority parties in electoral jurisdictions facing water-stress. This clientelism increased voting shares from farming communities using vote-buying strategies during a period of high unemployment (the dry season). We successfully computationally reproduce their results, and note some potential revisions to the replication packet to improve future replication. Further, we test the robustness replicability of the results through re-analyses modifying the definition of labor allocation, the definition of water-stress, as well as sub-analysis by voter turnout and voter population. We find that extreme water-stress jurisdictions are heavy recipients of reallocated labor, and find that labor is reallocated from part-time to full-time employment through the welfare program. Electoral victories from the ruling party successful implement vote-buying strategies in water-stressed electorates with high voter-turnout and large constituencies. This replication provides support for the internal validity of Mahadevan and Shenoy (2023)'s results and sheds a deeper light into the reallocation of welfare programs during periods of economic disaster. |
| Keywords: | Democracy, Resource Scarcity, Labor Allocation, Groundwater, India |
| JEL: | D72 H53 I38 O13 Q25 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:231 |
| By: | Pia Hüttl |
| Abstract: | This paper provides causal evidence on the effect of credit crunches on political polarisation. Combining data on bank-firm connections and electoral outcomes at the city-level during the 2008-2014 Spanish financial crisis, I construct an instrument for unemployment based on the city-level exposure to (foreign) weak banks. I find that a 10% increase in (instrumented) local unemployment rates leads to radical parties gaining approximately one percentage point more in vote share relative to centrist parties. This suggests that credit contractions do not only impact firm performance and economic output, but also shape political polarisation through the channel of economic uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | polarisation, Financial Crisis, Instrumental Variable Strategy, Spanish Elections, Credit Supply Shock, Real Effects |
| JEL: | G01 P16 D72 P43 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2120 |
| By: | Vladimir Otrachshenko (National Bank of Slovakia); Olga Popova (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to a better understanding of the drivers of electoral support for Green parties and the environmental actions they promote, which is crucial for ensuring the long-term feasibility of environmental policies. We examine whether individual environmental preferences translate into voting for Green parties and analyze the mechanisms behind this effect. Employing an individual-level survey from developed and developing economies matched with the political parties’ programs globally, we find that individuals who prefer environmental protection over economic growth are likely to translate their preferences into voting and supporting Green parties. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of Green parties and environmental preferences, as well as to potential endogeneity concerns. The key mechanisms behind this relationship are changes in the stringency of environmental regulations, individual economic insecurity, and individual- and country-level exposure to environmental changes. The effect of environmental preferences on Green party voting is less pronounced among individuals living in rural areas and those who are economically disadvantaged, including those with lower levels of education and income. These results suggest that support for Green parties and environmental policies is contingent on voters’ economic security even when environmental preferences are strong. |
| JEL: | D72 H11 Q56 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:svk:wpaper:1120 |
| By: | Ryotaro Yamana (School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University); Ryo Takahashi (Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, University of California, Santa Barbara) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates whether symbolic inclusion can promote political participation among linguistic minorities. Leveraging Zimbabwe’s 2013 multilingual policy as a quasi-experimental setting, we examine the effects of the official recognition of minority languages on political participation and its underlying mechanisms. Using a difference-in-differences model, we find that the policy increased voter turnout among linguistic minorities by approximately 10 percentage points, with particularly strong effects observed among rural residents and women. Mechanism analysis suggests that this behavioral change was not driven by increased feelings of social inclusion, but rather by improved perceptions of democracy and political freedom, which enhanced the perceived legitimacy of electoral participation. These findings underscore the potential of symbolic inclusion policies—such as multilingual reforms—to strengthen institutional connectivity and foster democratic engagement among historically marginalized groups. |
| Keywords: | nation building, ethnic minority, language |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:2511 |
| By: | Arkadiusz Lipiecki; Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron |
| Abstract: | Political polarization hinders collective decision-making across multiple domains, from public health to environmental policy. Therefore, depolarization strategies are crucial and have been increasingly studied. Anticonformity, responding to social influence by opposing the opinions of others, has been associated with increased polarization, while its potential role as a depolarizing force has been largely overlooked. Although psychologists point to different forms of anticonformity, most computational models focus solely on xenophobia, prejudice against outsiders, which radicalizes opinions. Our work addresses this gap by considering another type of anticonformity -- asserting uniqueness. We propose the counterintuitive hypothesis that increasing the disagreement by anticonforming to the influence group can reduce issue-based polarization. Within a family of computational models, we show that a depolarizing intervention based on promoting uniqueness may be more effective than traditional interventions, such as decreasing in-group favoritism or enhancing tolerance. We discuss the relevance of our findings through the lens of recent psychological experiments on strategic anticonformity, which demonstrate the potential of applying the proposed depolarizing intervention in real-world settings. |
| Keywords: | Political polarization; Strategic anticonformity; Opinion dynamics; Bounded confidence |
| JEL: | C63 D72 D74 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahh:wpaper:worms2503 |