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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Hans Gersbach |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a simple democratic procedure. In a first stage, all members of a polity decide whether to apply for proposal-making or later vote on proposals made in the second stage. This procedure is called Propose or Vote (PoV). With appropriate default points and majority voting over two randomly selected proposals, the PoV procedure can implement the Condorcet winner with only one round of voting if a Condorcet winner exists. We explore ways to establish uniqueness, alternative voting procedures over the selected alternatives, and the application to elections. In the latter case, agents can decide whether to stand for election to an office or to vote on the set of candidates. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.05998 |
| By: | Saka, O.; Ji, Y.; Minaudier, C. |
| Abstract: | We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial de-liberalisation than those facing re-election, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favour incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We rationalise this behaviour with a theory of political accountability in which crises generate two opposite effects: they increase the salience of financial policies to voters but also create a window of opportunity for politicians captured by the financial industry to push potentially harmful reforms. In line with the implications of our model, we show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank-friendly policies after crises. |
| Keywords: | Financial crises; political accountability; democracies; term-limits; special-interest groups. |
| Date: | 2024–11–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cty:dpaper:24/01 |
| By: | Gendron, Yves (Université Laval); Madelaine, Alexandre; Paugam, Luc (HEC Paris); Stolowy, Hervé (HEC Paris) |
| Abstract: | In 2021, a social movement rallying retail investors unexpectedly shocked Wall Street, forcing a prominent multi-billion-dollar hedge fund to shut down one year later, after incurring massive financial losses. Social movements in financial markets have significantly developed in the wake of the 2007–09 financial crisis, resulting in the emergence of various collective actions. We analyze one recent example of such action undertaken by the r/WallStreetBets (WSB) community on Reddit, which disrupted the stock prices of several “meme stocks” (e.g., GameStop) by disseminating influential investment narratives. We analyze the 150 most upvoted Due Diligence posts on WSB and interview eight members of its community. We find that a popular expertise in investment narratives emerged, developed, and was propagated on this digital platform. WSB authors’ claim to popular expertise is made in a hybrid language combining traditional financial expertise with an accessible and entertaining writing style, complemented by references to pop culture. Our analysis brings out a growing resentment among retail investors about the unfairness of financial markets, and its role in mobilizing them for collective action that challenged the existing order of things. Yet this widespread resentment did not spontaneously translate into a meaningful, sustainable collective action initiative. Our thesis is that the development of popular expertise played an instrumental role in the formation of WSB’s collective action initiative targeting several perceived investment opportunities. |
| Keywords: | Collective action; Digital platforms; Fairness in financial markets; Popular expertise; Social movement; WallStreetBets |
| JEL: | G10 G41 M40 |
| Date: | 2025–03–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1552 |