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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Kitamura, Shuhei; Takahashi, Ryo; Yamada, Katsunori |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how voters' perceptions of other voters influence their voting behavior. We first document substantial misperceptions regarding others’ attitudes toward political malfeasance by incumbent politicians: some voters, particularly those who support the malfeasant incumbent’s party, hold more lenient views, perceiving others as more tolerant of political corruption. In contrast, voters who support opposition parties and those without strong partisan affiliations tend to hold more stringent views. Using an online survey experiment, we provide information about prevailing social norms of intolerance toward corruption. We find that the treatment increases voter turnout and the likelihood of voting for an opposition candidate, particularly among voters with stringent prior beliefs. However, we also observe a backfire effect among those with more lenient views. This study underscores the critical role of voters' perceptions of others in shaping vote decisions and offers insights into how political accountability can be promoted in a world of rising political polarization. |
| Date: | 2025–05–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:gajx9_v1 |
| By: | Quynh Do (Curtin University); Pushkar Maitra (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Activism against climate change is becoming more common globally. There is, however, little evidence on how such activism affects political outcomes. We examine the impact of the Stop-Adani convoy, a protest led by the former leader of the Greens against the proposed Adani Carmichael coal mine in Queensland Australia, on the electoral outcomes in the 2019 Australian federal election. We find that relative to 2016, the Liberal-National Coalition vote share in 2019 was 10 percent higher along the route of the convoy. In addition, mining engagement in the area significantly and positively affected the Coalition vote share. Surprisingly, the convoy had little positive electoral effects for the Greens. Residents of mining regions exhibited lower environmental consciousness and more socially conservative attitudes, and were more likely to vote for the more conservative Coalition. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Activism, Electoral Outcomes, Australia |
| JEL: | D72 Q50 P18 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2025-05 |
| By: | Elvio Accinelli (Facultad de Economia, Universidad Autonoma de San Luís Potosí, México); Atefeh Afsar (Mathematics Department, Allen University, Columbia, SC, United States); Filipe Martins (University of Coimbra, CeBER and Faculty of Economics); José Martins (LIAAD INESC TEC, Escola Superior de Tecnologia e Gestão, Politecnico de Leiria); Bruno Oliveira (LIAAD INESC TEC, Faculdade de Ciências da Nutrição e Alimentação, Universidade do Porto); Alberto A. Pinto (LIAAD–INESC TEC, Departmento de Matemática, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade do Porto); Luis Quintas (Universidad de La Punta, San Luis, Argentina) |
| Abstract: | Baliga and Maskin introduced a model of contributions for the provisions of public goods such as contributing for the reduction of air pollution. In this work we consider an extended version of Baliga and Maskin's model with a parameter a which is the elasticity of the benefit function, and with heterogeneous agents, each with their own preferences for the good. For this generalized version of the model, we consider the formation of stable coalitions which are absorbing states of a bargaining Markov chain, where agents join or leave coalitions according to their cooperation and free-riding incentives. We show that there is a stable high coalition consisting of the set of agents most preferring/valuing the public good. The increase of the elasticity parameter a increases the size of the stable high coalition that changes from a single member (called the competitive coalition as appearing in Baliga and Maskin's paper) to the grand coalition involving all agents. However, the utility of members of the stable coalition can be very small when compared to the utility of the free-riders, rendering the formation of stable coalitions difficult. We show that a variant of the coalition folk theorem holds, meaning that member heterogeneity will tend to decrease the size of stable coalitions. We show that the formation of stable coalitions is subject to the paradox of cooperation, since even when stable coalitions are large and free-riders have not very low preferences for the public good, the utility of the stable coalition may still be low when compared to the full cooperation scenario of the grand coalition. However, the paradox does not hold when the free-riders have a very low preference for the public good, which also facilitates the spontaneous formation of stable coalitions, or when there are no free-riders and the grand coalition is stable, which is always the case when the elasticity a is large enough. |
| Keywords: | public and common goods, free-riding, coalitions, stability, Barrett's paradox of cooperation, Markov chains |
| JEL: | C7 D7 H4 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:papers:2025-03 |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], AIRESS - Africa Institute for Research in Economics and Social Sciences); Eric Kamwa (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Abdelmonaim Tlidi (UAE - Abdelmalek Essaadi University [Tétouan] = Université Abdelmalek Essaadi [Tétouan]) |
| Abstract: | The impact of election closeness on the likelihood of monotonicity paradox has recently been studied by some authors (e.g., Lepelley et al., 2018; Miller, 2017). It was shown that the frequency of such a paradox significantly increases as elections become more closely contested. This paper aim to analyze the impact of election closeness on other best-known paradoxes of voting. Based on the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption, our preliminary results show that closeness has also a significant effect on the likelihood of observing the studied voting paradoxes in the class of scoring rules and scoring elimination rules. |
| Abstract: | L'impact des élections serrées sur la probabilité de paradoxe de monotonie a été récemment étudié par certains auteurs (e.g., Lepelley et al., 2018; Miller, 2017) . Il a été démontré que la fréquence d'un tel paradoxe augmente considérablement à mesure que les élections deviennent plus disputées. Le présent papier vise à analyser l'impact des élections serrées sur d'autres paradoxes de vote bien connus. En se basant sur l'hypothèse de la culture neutre et anonyme (IAC), nos résultats montrent que des élections serrées ont un effet significatif sur la probabilité d'observer les paradoxes de vote étudiés dans la classe des règles de scores et des règles de scores avec éliminations. |
| Keywords: | Voting paradoxes, Election closeness, Scoring Rules, Scoring Elimination Rules, Probability. |
| Date: | 2025–05–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04230359 |