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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Daiki Kishishita |
| Abstract: | This paper studies an electoral competition model in which parties maximize legislative power rather than vote shares. Voters are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and vote for the party proposing the closest policy platform. After the election, parties form coalitions through a communication network arising from ideological proximity: two parties are directly linked if their policy distance is at most $d$. A party's objective is its Myerson value in the resulting graph-restricted voting game. I characterize symmetric pure-strategy equilibria in two-, three-, and four-party systems. The two-party case yields convergence to the median. The three-party case admits a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which the two extreme parties are directly linked. In the four-party case, the unique symmetric equilibrium places two parties at $(1-d)/2$ and two parties at $(1+d)/2$. In both three- and four-party systems, more restrictive coalition communication, represented by a smaller $d$, generates a centripetal force, and the median voter theorem holds in the limit despite the multiparty setting. |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2607.27996 |
| By: | Wesley H. Holliday |
| Abstract: | A common problem in social choice is to determine whether there is a social choice procedure, such as a voting method, satisfying some desired criteria. Computer-aided methods such as SAT solving can sometimes answer these questions. However, under typical encodings, a SAT solver may only synthesize a voting method on a finite domain, while we may want one on an infinite domain, such as the domain of all preference profiles for a fixed number of candidates but any finite number of voters. In this paper, we use an approach based on reasoning with constrained Horn clauses and computation with polyhedra to synthesize a voting method on an infinite domain. We then use SMT and Lean to verify its properties. Our main result is a possibility theorem about four well-known criteria from voting theory: the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement, and resolvability. Previous work has shown that for five or more candidates, there is no voting method satisfying these axioms, and that for four candidates, there is no method satisfying these core axioms plus one more invariance axiom. Here we show that for four candidates, there does exist a method satisfying the core axioms and more. |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2608.08897 |
| By: | Uwe Jirjahn; Jens Mohrenweiser; Stephen C. Smith |
| Abstract: | Works councils have been often thought to contribute to workplace democracy. However, workplace democracy not only requires that works councils have the power to influence management decisions but also that this institution of establishment-level codetermination itself is based on democratic principles and processes. The most basic procedure of workplace democracy is the participation of workers in works council elections. Against this background, our study provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors that are associated with voter turnout in the elections. The study shows that the election procedure, establishment size, atypical employment, learning, type of establishment owner, economic circumstance, and union support have an influence on the turnout rate. We also find evidence that the role of a series of determinants of voter turnout depends on whether or not an establishment is covered by industry-level collective bargaining. |
| Keywords: | Works Council Elections, Voting, Election Procedure, Collective Bargaining, Establishment Size, Atypical Employment, Learning, Ownership, Economic Situation |
| JEL: | D72 J50 J51 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:202610 |
| By: | Berticeroni, Carlotta; Piemontese, Lavinia; Prarolo, Giovanni; Schiavone, Antonio |
| Abstract: | This study explores the crucial role of local immigration history in shaping the relationship between the arrival of refugees and support for anti-immigration parties. Using unique georeferenced individual-level survey data, we show that opening refugee hosting facilities close to voters polarises support for anti-immigration parties: in neighbourhoods with established immigrant communities such support reduces, while it increases in areas with fewer long-term immigrants. These findings are consistent when using official electoral outcomes. We extend the analysis beyond the direct effect of exposure to immigrants by examining the role of voters’ demographics. Our results are mainly driven by male, childless, and low-skilled working-age voters. Moreover, facilities that highlight the presence of short-term immigrants amplify the main effects. These findings underscore the importance of considering both the composition of the immigrant population and individual demographics to fully understand how contact influences voter behaviour. Crucially, by examining the interplay between long- and short-term immigrant presence, our study provides a unifying framework that explains the polarised voter responses to refugee shocks, reconciling contrasting outcomes observed in different contexts. |
| Keywords: | Immigration; Voting behaviour |
| JEL: | D72 F22 J15 R23 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19236 |
| By: | Fetzer, Thiemo; Edenhofer, Jacob; Garg, Prashant |
| Abstract: | Support for right-wing populist parties is characterised by considerable regional heterogeneity and especially concentrated in regions that have experienced economic decline. It remains unclear, however, whether the spatial externalities of local decline, including homelessness and crime, boost support for populist parties, even among those not directly affected by such decline. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in two ways. First, we gather novel data on a particularly visible form of local decline, high-street vacancies, that comprise 83, 000 premises in England and Wales. Second, we investigate the influence of local decline on support for the right-wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) between 2009 and 2019. We find a significant positive association between high-street vacancy rates and UKIP support. These results enhance our understanding of how changes in the lived environment shape political preferences and behaviour, particularly in relation to right-wing populism. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19330 |
| By: | Battaglini, Marco; Leone Sciabolazza, Valerio; Lin, Mengwei; Patacchini, Eleonora |
| Abstract: | It has long been noted that there is little money in U.S. politics relative to the stakes. But what if political contributions are not fully observable or are non-monetary and thus difficult to quantify? We study this question using new data on top donors in U.S. congressional races. To identify their influence, we exploit exogenous shocks to candidate–donor relationships generated by donor deaths. We show that the death of a top donor reduces a candidate's probability of election in subsequent elections. The loss of a donor also affects legislative behavior: elected candidates become more aligned with their party and concentrate their legislative activity in fewer policy areas. These effects are not explained by the size of donors' direct contributions. Instead, they are stronger for prominent donors and appear to operate through their impact on broader fundraising and social networks. Our findings suggest that observable campaign donations capture only a small share of the political influence exercised by major donors. |
| Keywords: | Political contributions; Political influence |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19195 |
| By: | Carlos Fernando Avenancio-León; Daniel B. Jones; Ying Shi |
| Abstract: | Electoral maps translate residential geography into political representation, yet they have never been systematically measured for thousands of local governments across the country. We reconstruct 3, 712 city council and county commission maps across 18, 521 districts using nationwide voter-file and Census data. Enacted maps overrepresent White voters and underrepresent Black and Hispanic voters, with gaps predicting the racial composition of officeholders. We juxtapose these with simulated, race-blind maps satisfying common districting constraints. Simulated maps reproduce much of this disparity, showing that geography skews representation before any boundary-drawing. Enacted maps substantially improve on the race-blind baseline only in jurisdictions subject to oversight from the Voting Rights Act or districting litigation. As courts curtail race-conscious districting, local governments may revert to a baseline that is formally neutral but substantively unequal. |
| JEL: | D72 H70 J15 K16 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35623 |
| By: | Julien Labonne; Pablo Querubín; Martín Rossi; Sebastian M. Saiegh; Ivan San Miguel; Shanker Satyanath |
| Abstract: | Elites maintain disproportionate political power even in formally inclusive political systems, yet the institutions through which they coordinate and reproduce this advantage remain poorly understood. We study membership in the Buenos Aires Jockey Club—Argentina's most prominent elite social club—exploiting staggered variation in family entry. Using difference-in-differences techniques, we find that Jockey Club membership increased the probability of holding legislative office by approximately four percentage points—more than twice the control-group mean. Consistent with a network-based mechanism, membership also increased families' centrality in elite marriage networks—a resource that can facilitate political success through access to party nominations and voter mobilization. This electoral advantage declines substantially after the 1912 Sáenz Peña democratizing reforms, suggesting that the political returns to club membership are conditional on institutional contexts that make elite network connections valuable. Our findings shed light on how elite social institutions reproduce political inequality where personal connections are essential for accessing political office. |
| JEL: | D70 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35611 |
| By: | Raffaele Giammetti (University of Cassino and Southern Lazio); Giuseppe Spataro (Marche Polytechnic University); Davide Ticchi (Department of Economics and Social Sciences - Marche Polytechnic University, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Does the political response to globalisation depend on how regions are integrated into global production networks? We combine regional input-output measures of global valuechain exposure with lower-house election outcomes for 249 NUTS-2 regions in 24 European countries over 2000–2010. We distinguish seller-side exposure to foreign final demand (FPEX) from buyer-side exposure to foreign production (FPEM), and measure regions' average position relative to final demand. In two-way fixed-effects specifications, FPEX is positively associated with populist vote shares: a one-within-region-standarddeviation increase in FPEX (about 1.1 percentage points) is associated with an increase of roughly 3.5 percentage points in the populist vote share. When FPEX and FPEM are included jointly, FPEX remains positive and statistically significant, the buyer-side estimate is small and statistically not significant, and a formal test rejects equality of the two coefficients. The FPEX association is weaker in regions with higher average upstreamness and higher service-employment shares. The FPEX point estimate is larger in Central and Eastern Europe; a pooled interaction confirms a positive difference, although it is significant only at the 10 percent level under wild-cluster-bootstrap inference. Results are qualitatively similar under an alternative, narrower authoritarian-populist classification and are not reproduced for green-party voting. The findings highlight a politically relevant distinction within the architecture of international integration: dependence on foreign final demand is more consistently associated with populist voting than total buyer-side dependence on foreign production. |
| Keywords: | Global value chains, populism, political backlash, structural dependence, input-output analysis, regional economics. |
| JEL: | F14 F60 D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2026–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:509 |
| By: | Nunnari, Salvatore; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo |
| Abstract: | Rational choice theories assume that voters accurately assess the outcomes of policies. However, many important policies—such as regulating prices and introducing Pigouvian taxation—yield outcomes through indirect or equilibrium effects that may differ from their direct effects. Citizens may underestimate these effects, leading to a demand for bad policy, that is, opposition to reforms that would increase welfare or support for reforms that would decrease it. This appreciation might be linked to cognitive functions, raising important research questions: Do cognitive abilities influence how individuals form preferences regarding policies, especially untried reforms? If so, what is the underlying mechanism? We use a simple theoretical framework and an experiment to show that enhanced cognitive abilities may lead to better policy choices. Moreover, we emphasize the crucial role of beliefs about other citizens' cognitive abilities. These findings have important policy implications as they suggest that educational programs developing cognitive skills or interventions increasing trust in others' understanding could improve the quality of democratic decision-making in our societies. |
| Keywords: | Voting; Cognition; Experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19217 |