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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Macé, Antonin; Xefteris, Dimitrios |
| Abstract: | We study voting when voters have different information quality. In such environments, voting rules with richer ballot spaces can help voters better aggregate information by endogenously allocating more decision power to better-informed members. Using laboratory experiments, we compare two polar examples of voting rules in terms of ballot richness: majority voting (MV) and continuous voting (CV). Our results show that CV outperforms MV on average, although the difference is smaller than predicted, and that CV has more support than MV in treatments where it is expected to perform better. We also find that voters with intermediate information overestimate the importance of their votes under CV. |
| JEL: | P00 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20173 |
| By: | Braun, Sebastian; Öztürk, Timur |
| Abstract: | How do social cleavages shape party-system fragmentation, and how does this relationship change when parties organize across instead of along these cleavages? We examine the Catho-lic-Protestant divide in Germany from Weimar to the postwar period, exploiting the confes-sional mosaic of Baden and Württemberg. Using data from over 3, 000 parishes, we show that fragmentation in Weimar Germany followed a hump-shaped relationship with the local Catho-lic share, peaking in religiously mixed parishes where a cohesive Catholic bloc coexisted with a fragmented Protestant center-right. During the Great Depression, the Nazi Party consolidated the fragmented Protestant vote. After 1945, the cross-confessional CDU weakened the link between religious cleavages and fragmentation. Yet Catholic areas remained less susceptible to far-right voting, a persistence that survey evidence attributes to church influence rather than policy preferences. Overall, our findings show that the effect of social cleavages on political fragmentation hinges on how parties and organizations mobilize them. |
| Keywords: | Cleavage Politics, Party Fragmentation, Religion, Far-Right Voting, Historical Political Economy, Germany |
| JEL: | N14 D72 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:341992 |
| By: | Chakraborty, Adrij; Singhal, Karan |
| Abstract: | The 1947 Partition of British India triggered the largest forced migration of the twentieth century, redistributing millions of refugees across newly independent India. We study whether this demographic shock left a lasting imprint on democratic politics. Combining district-level refugee shares from the 1951 Census with constituency-level electoral data covering Indian state assembly elections between 1960 and 2007, we estimate the long-run effects of refugee settlement on electoral competition. We find that constituencies exposed to larger refugee inflows exhibit higher voter turnout, narrower victory margins, and a lower likelihood of electing candidates from national parties. Instead, refugee settlement shifted electoral support toward regional parties and contributed to the long-run denationalization of political competition. Our findings show that large demographic shocks can leave enduring political legacies, reshaping patterns of political representation and party competition long after displacement itself has ended. |
| Keywords: | Partition of India, forced migration, electoral competition, political persistence |
| JEL: | D72 J15 N35 N45 O15 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1795 |
| By: | Estruch-Garcia, Cèlia; Solé-Ollé, Albert; Tassinari, Filippo; Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the local electoral effects of Barcelona's Superblocks pedestrianization policy, an initiative aimed at reducing car traffic and air pollution while enhancing urban livability. Using census tract-level data from local elections, we analyze its impact on support for the incumbent mayor. We find a significant increase in votes in tracts directly affected by the policy, which also extends to neighboring areas. Traffic was not displaced to adjacent tracts, which also saw reduced pollution, suggesting that concerns about congestion did not materialize and may explain the absence of electoral backlash. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the effects are stronger in tracts with higher levels of education and that they are not affected by gentrification or mobility disruptions. Overall, our results highlight that voters respond to localized improvements in traffic, air quality, and public spaces, offering insights into the political economy of urban climate policies and public support for green interventions. |
| Keywords: | Cities; Elections; Green Policies |
| JEL: | D72 Q58 R53 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19925 |
| By: | de Albuquerque, Amanda; Finan, Frederico; Jha, Anubhav; Karpuska, Laura; Trebbi, Francesco |
| Abstract: | We present a methodology for decoupling taste-based versus statistical discrimination in political behavior. We combine a flexible empirical model of voting, featuring vertical and horizontal candidate differentiation in gender, ability, and policy positions, with a large-scale micro-targeted electoral experiment aimed at increasing female candidate vote shares. Our structural econometric approach allows to separately identify preference parameters driving taste-based discrimination and beliefs parameters driving statistical discrimination through expectations about ability and policy positions of female politicians. Our application to Brazilian municipal elections uncovers substantial levels of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Counterfactual political campaigns show promise in reducing both. |
| Keywords: | Discrimination; Elections; Identity; Gender; Ability; Policy; Brazil |
| JEL: | D72 P0 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20291 |
| By: | Brown, Jacob; Cantoni, Enrico; Enos, Ryan; Pons, Vincent; Sartre, Emilie |
| Abstract: | Using two datasets tracking the location and party affiliation of every U.S. voter between 2008 and 2020 in states recording partisan registration, we find that geographic segregation between Democrats and Republicans has increased year over year at all geographic levels, from Congressional Districts to Census Blocks. Areas trending Democratic have a starkly different demographic profile than those trending Republican, so the confluence of demographics, partisanship, and geography is growing. We decompose the increase in geographic partisan segregation into different sources and show that it has not been driven primarily by residential mobility but rather by generational turnover, as new voters entering the electorate cause some places to become more homogeneously Democratic, and by party switching, as existing voters leaving the Democratic party cause other places to become more Republican. The groups that most contribute to the rise in partisan segregation are young people, women, and non-white voters in Democratic-trending areas; and white and older voters in Republican-trending areas. |
| Keywords: | Residential segregation; Partisanship; Internal migration; Political polarization |
| JEL: | D72 R23 J11 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19927 |
| By: | Federico Boffa (Free University of Bozen, IRCRES/CNR, Collegio Carlo Alberto); Tommaso Reggiani (Cardiff University, Masaryk University, IZA); Matteo Rizzolli (LUMSA University, Rome, Italy); Federico Trombetta (DISEIS, Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Proxy voting on behalf of children (also known as Demeny voting) has been proposed as a measure to contrast demographic decline in low-fertility countries. We study the effects of Demeny voting on fertility and budget allocation in the context of a probabilistic voting model. Citizens can vote to allocate the budget between either the production of a public good that results in immediate benefits for the present generation, or investment in a future-oriented public good that benefits the productivity of newborn children and society as a whole over time. Fertility is endogenous and disagreements arise between parents and non-parents over public spending. We show that proxy voting, by acting as a commitment device towards pro-children policies, increases fertility, future-oriented spending, such as early childhood investment and universal child care, and, under some conditions, increases long-term welfare for non-parents, thereby generating a Pareto improvement. |
| Keywords: | Demeny voting; proxy voting; fertility; democracy |
| JEL: | H31 H52 H63 I25 J13 J18 K16 D72 Q01 |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsa:wphurf:wphurf02 |
| By: | Onuchic, Paula; Ramos, João |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a model of group communication, in which a group of senders with conflicting interests collectively communicate with a receiver through the disclosure or non-disclosure of information about a relevant state. Collective disclosure decisions are reached via the aggregation of group members’ disclosure recommendations via a pre-determined deliberation procedure. In contrast with classic results from single-agent disclosure, (sequential) equilibria of the group disclosure game typically do not involve full disclosure. We investigate the relation between the group’s deliberation procedure and features of equilibrium communication. In particular, we characterize changes in the deliberation procedure that increase a group’s informativeness; and show that the receiver interprets group messages less favorably for group members who have relatively more power. |
| Keywords: | Disclosure; Groups; Organizations; Communication |
| JEL: | D7 D8 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20057 |
| By: | Ash, Elliott; Galletta, Sergio; Opocher, Giacomo |
| Abstract: | This study explores the potential for AI-powered chatbots to strengthen democracy by boosting political knowledge and engagement through better access to political information. We develop and evaluate BallotBot, an AI chatbot with access to official voter guide information from the November 2024 referendums in California. In a pre-registered three-wave survey experiment in the weeks around election day, participants (California voters) were randomly assigned to use either BallotBot or a traditional digital voter guide to answer questions about ballot initiatives. BallotBot access improved participants’ ability to answer in-depth questions, reduced overconfidence, lowered the perceived cost of acquiring information for less-informed participants, and fostered greater engagement with political information. However, it had no clear effect on self-reported turnout or the direction of voting. |
| Keywords: | Artificial intelligence; Democracy; Overconfidence |
| JEL: | D72 D83 L82 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20070 |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans; Blieske, Pio |
| Abstract: | We provide a foundation for debt-sensitive majority rules as a debt-brake. Under such rules, the larger the new debt issued in parliament is, the larger the majority required for the approval. Using a standard model with tax distortions, we show that suitable debt-sensitive majority rules can limit debt issuance optimally, as it can be costly for the agenda setter to propose higher debt issues not only for providing public goods, but also to channel subsidies to the groups in the governing coalition. In a recession or when public goods become temporarily more valuable, debt levels increase and debt-sensitive majority rules act as a macroeconomic stabilization mechanism. Debt-sensitive majority rules cannot be replicated by fixed majority rules and debt limits. |
| Keywords: | Legislative bargaining; Flexible majority rules; Public goods |
| JEL: | C73 D72 H63 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20266 |
| By: | Persico, Nicola; Ravina, Enrichetta |
| Abstract: | We examine how the political polarization of individual investors, particularly regarding Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) issues, is reflected in institutional investor proxy voting and in corporate decision-making. We develop a theoretical model with two types of investors: those who value ESG factors (activists) and those who do not (skeptics). We find that large funds, seeking to attract investors of all ideologies, tend to adopt moderate stances on ESG, which they can impose on corporations, while small funds cater to investors’ polarized positions. We then explore counterfactual settings where individual investors vote directly or delegate their vote to individuals and organizations of their choice (political entrepreneurs), like in a representative democracy, and show that more-extreme corporate ESG policies are likely to be implemented in these cases, reflecting the underlying polarization among investors. In such settings, self-confirming multiple equilibria can arise since share ownership is endogenous to the firm’s ESG stance. Additionally, we explore shareholder abstention and the role of investors as citizens. |
| Keywords: | ESG |
| JEL: | D72 G23 G30 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20153 |
| By: | Fos, Vyacheslav; Tamburelli, Tommaso; Xu, Nancy |
| Abstract: | When Federal Reserve districts experience high inflation or low unemployment but lack voting rights to influence FOMC decisions, credit extended to commercial banks through the Discount Window (DW) declines. Our identification strategy is based on the exogenous rotation of voting rights among Reserve Banks and on within borrower-time and district-time variation in DW loans and Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) loans, implying that factors related to changes in macroeconomic conditions, local credit demand, or borrower characteristics do not drive the results. The effect on bank funding sources translates into changes in the composition of loans extended by commercial banks. |
| JEL: | E5 E51 E58 D7 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20312 |
| By: | Gonzalez, Felipe; Prem, Mounu |
| Abstract: | Despite economic crises, incumbents often retain electoral support. We study Chile’s 1970-1973 infant nutrition program under Salvador Allende’s left-wing government and attribute this electoral resilience to the political returns of transfers during crises. The program provided milk to preschoolers, reducing infant mortality and bolstering electoral support despite hyperinflation and economic hardship. Using administrative data, surveys, and variation in crisis severity, we show transfers had greater political returns in areas most affected by the crisis. Survey evidence suggests voters swayed by transfers did not blame the government for the crisis. Our findings highlight how transfers and crisis perceptions sustain electoral popularity. |
| JEL: | H51 N35 N46 P35 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20059 |
| By: | Algan, Yann; Dalvit, Nicolo; Do, Quoc-Anh; Le Chapelain, Alexis; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We examine how social interactions and friendships shape students' political opinions in a natural experiment at Sciences Po, a leading French university specializing in social and political sciences. The quasi-random assignment of students into short-term integration groups before their academic curriculum reduces political opinion gaps and fosters friendship formation. Using same-group membership as an instrumental variable for friendship, we find that after 6 months friendship reduces opinion differences by 50% of the mean opinion gap. Our evidence supports a homophily-enforced mechanism: friendships form among initially politically similar students, leading them to join political associations together, reinforcing their similarity. However, friendship does not significantly influence politically dissimilar pairs. Instead, it reduces opinion divergence without enforcing ideological convergence. |
| Keywords: | Political opinion |
| JEL: | C93 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20075 |
| By: | Wolton, Stephane; Gasimova, Samira; Paccioretti, Ricardo; Palladino, Giuseppe |
| Abstract: | The high street serves more than a commercial function. It is the heart of a community. Some of the outlets that line our streets play an important social role, they are third places, communal places beyond work and home. We proxy third places with independent consumer outlets and study how their presence affects the electoral fortune of the UK Independent Party (UKIP), the main populist party in England in our time period (2011-19). Employing both a panel approach and an IV strategy, we find that a decrease in the number of independent consumer outlets yields an increase in the vote share of UKIP. Additional tests indicate that this electoral effect is due in part to the social role played by independent consumer outlets and that the phenomenon we study is distinct from previous cultural explanations for the rise of populists. Analyses of survey data suggest that residential sorting is unlikely to be the main driver behind our electoral results, whereas a loss of social capital in communities where third places disappear is a more plausible mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Community; Social capital |
| JEL: | D72 L81 L84 Z10 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:19932 |
| By: | Auriol, Emmanuelle; Dahmani, Anais |
| Abstract: | In a model featuring two regions — one affluent and the other impoverished — the allocation of public spending is examined under an initially centralized and autocratic political process. In a stable autocracy, the decision to implement decentralization reforms hinges on a tradeoff: while centralization enables the autocrat to extract higher rents, it also results in reduced productivity in the poor region. The autocrat opts for decentralization when the negative impact on productivity outweighs the benefits of rent extraction. Moreover, under the pressure of democratic movements and growing instability, an authoritarian regime may also pursue decentralization reforms to preserve its wealth from the decisions of the poor median voter. |
| Keywords: | Autocracy; Decentralization; Democratization |
| JEL: | D02 D72 D74 O57 P48 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20058 |