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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces Propose or Vote (PoV), a democratic procedure for collective decision-making and elections that does not rely on a central mechanism designer. In the first stage, members of a polity choose whether to become proposal-makers or to participate only as voters. In the second stage, voters decide by majority voting over the set of submitted proposals. With appropriately chosen default points, PoV implements the Condorcet winner in a single round of voting whenever one exists. We show that this implementation is globally unique when the number of members is odd; for an even number of members, uniqueness can be restored by adding an artificial agent. PoV can also be applied to elections, where agents decide whether to stand as candidates or vote over the resulting candidate set. |
| Keywords: | proposal-making; Democracy; Majority voting |
| JEL: | C72 D70 D72 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21026 |
| By: | Carattini, Stefano; Fletcher, Ian; Kendall, Chad; Price, Michael K.; Vu, Arthur |
| Abstract: | Many socially desirable policies are not implemented because of their ex-ante unpopularity, but this unpopularity may be overcome through experience with the policy. In this paper, we examine how opposition to carbon pricing in the state of Washington turned into support after voters experienced a cap-and-trade policy with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes – "cap-and-invest." Analyzing voting behavior at the census block group level, we observe that support varies by political affiliation as expected, but experience consistently increases support across the board. Using a proprietary survey, we further show that the increase in support among voters in Washington state is specific to the cap-and-invest policy they experienced; support for carbon pricing or climate policies more generally remained unchanged. |
| Keywords: | Carbon pricing; Experience; Public support; Voting; Polarization |
| JEL: | C93 D72 D83 H23 H71 Q58 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20948 |
| By: | Gratton, Gabriele; Lee, Barton |
| Abstract: | We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles, including recruiting of public servants and isolating them from politics. Our results support the view that a more inclusive and representative bureaucracy protects against anti-elite populism. We provide empirical evidence that lack of trust in public servants is a key force behind support for anti-elite populist parties and argue that our model helps explain the rise of anti-elite populism in large robust democracies. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21048 |
| By: | Acemoglu, Daron; Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin |
| Abstract: | In turbulent times, political labels become increasingly uninformative about politicians' true policy preferences or their ability to withstand the influence of special interest groups. We offer a model in which politicians use campaign rhetoric to signal their political preferences in multiple dimensions. In equilibrium, the less popular types try to pool with the more popular ones, whereas the more popular types seek to separate themselves. The ability of voters to process information shapes politicians' campaign rhetoric. If the signals on the cultural dimension are more precise, politicians signal more there, even if the economy is more important to voters. The unpopular type benefits from increased conformity, which bridges the candidates' campaign rhetoric and makes it more difficult for voters to make an informed decision. |
| JEL: | D72 D84 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21133 |
| By: | Blumenthal, Benjamin; Nunnari, Salvatore |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we introduce reciprocity concerns in a political agency model with symmetric learning about politicians’ ability and moral hazard. Voters with reciprocity concerns are both prospective — that is, seek to select competent politician s— and retrospective — that is, reward fair actions and punish unfair ones. We focus on how electoral incentives induce politicians to exert effort (electoral control) and how voters remove incompetent politicians (electoral screening). We show that taking voters' reciprocity concerns into account has important normative implications and can overturn results from standard models that neglect them: increasing transparency about the incumbent's effort improves electoral control if and only if voters have sufficiently strong reciprocity concerns; increasing benefits from office improves electoral control if and only if voters have sufficiently low reciprocity concerns. Moreover, we show that reciprocity concerns can affect electoral screening, by affecting the competence threshold incumbents must clear to ensure reelection, generating incumbency advantages or disadvantages. |
| Keywords: | Political agency; Career concerns; Social preferences; Behavioural political economy |
| JEL: | D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20998 |
| By: | Fasani, Francesco; Ferro, Simone; Romarri, Alessio; Pasini, Elisabetta |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first causal evaluation of the political impact of asylum seekers in the UK. Although they are dispersed across areas on a no-choice basis, political bargaining between central and local governments introduces potential endogeneity in their allocation. We address this concern with a novel IV strategy that exploits predetermined public-housing characteristics. Focusing on 2004-2019, we estimate a sizeable increase in the Conservative-Labour vote share gap in local elections: a one within-area standard deviation increase in dispersed asylum seekers widens the gap by 3.1 percentage points in favour of the Conservatives. We observe a similar shift to the right in national elections and longitudinal survey data on voting intentions, along with an increase in the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum. Electoral gains are observed for UKIP as well, although this finding is less robust. No effect is detected for non-dispersed asylum seekers, who forgo subsidised housing and make independent residential choices. Turning to mechanisms, voters move to the right without becoming more hostile towards foreigners. Leveraging the universe of MPs' speeches, we show that representatives from more exposed areas emphasise asylum and migration more, with no systematic change in tone or content. This heightened salience appears to shape voters' choices, with Conservative MPs particularly effective at channelling discontent. |
| Keywords: | Refugees; Elections; Brexit referendum; Speech analysis |
| JEL: | F22 D72 J15 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20892 |
| By: | Ajzenman, Nicolas; Dominguez, Patricio; Novaes, Lucas M. |
| Abstract: | Can electoral outcomes shape voters' perceptions of the past? We argue that electoral outcomes provide informational cues that prompt voters to reinterpret prior conditions, shifting the benchmarks on which accountability rests. We focus on perceptions of crime, a valence issue that voters likely take into account when choosing any candidate. We propose that perceptions of crime change immediately after an election, as voters reinterpret prior conditions through the lens of the relevance of crime in the winning candidate's platform. We leverage the timing of opinion surveys in Chile on public security to compare respondents interviewed just before and just after local elections, across municipalities where a right-wing mayor narrowly won versus narrowly lost. We show that shortly after a local right-wing candidate wins by a small margin, respondents report that their neighborhood, state, and country are less safe than those who answered the same survey a few days before the election. Victimization, which is unlikely to be misremembered, does not vary across groups of respondents. The findings show that this shift in perceptions directly affects electoral accountability: When political outcomes shape beliefs about past performance, accountability itself becomes endogenous to electoral results. |
| Keywords: | Crime perceptions; beliefs |
| JEL: | D84 D91 K42 H70 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21065 |
| By: | Tricaud, Clemence; Wacziarg, Romain |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we argue that recent trends in party seat margins and election vote margins result from structural changes in the nature of US political competition. We assemble a comprehensive database of electoral results for the House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We propose a model of electoral competition with multiple districts that can rationalize these trends. We show theoretically that an increase in politicians' information about voter preferences, together with the growing nationalization of politics, can account for the decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins. As implied by the model, we document that campaign contributions received by House and Senate candidates are increasingly concentrated in a dwindling set of swing constituencies. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20934 |
| By: | Gamalerio, Matteo; Morelli, Massimo; Negri, Margherita |
| Abstract: | We show that polities using plurality rule to elect their policymakers are more likely to adopt more restrictive immigration policies than those using dual-ballot systems. Plurality rule provides stronger incentives for right-wing, anti-immigrant parties to run alone, as opposed to joining a coalition with other right-wing parties that offer a less restrictive immigration policy. We prove the result theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical results hold with sincere and strategic voters, with and without endogenous turnout, and can be extended to the comparison between plurality rule and proportional representation without majority bonuses in parliamentary elections. Empirically, we combine municipal-level data on migration-related expenditures and mayoral elections and establish causality using a regression discontinuity design. |
| Keywords: | Immigration; Salience |
| JEL: | D72 J24 J61 R23 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:20873 |
| By: | Boeri, Tito; Nikiforova, Nina; Tabellini, Guido |
| Abstract: | We study the communication strategies on Twitter/X of 367 political leaders in 21 countries, focusing on electoral competition between populists and non-populists. We measure polarization by the ease with which the leader can be classified as populist or not, conditional on his tweet. We find that political rhetoric becomes more polarized before and around election dates. This happens because, in pre-electoral quarters, opposite leaders are more likely to: i) talk about different topics, and ii) frame differently the same issues. Our results are consistent with competing politicians targeting different voters, rather than appealing to the same swing voters. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition; Populism; Partisanship; Polarization |
| JEL: | P H |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21317 |
| By: | Fouka, Vasiliki; Serlin, Theo |
| Abstract: | When do people identify with their class? Evidence from social psychology shows that individuals are more likely to identify with a group if they are similar to its members. We study early 20th century Britain and show that regional cultural heterogeneity combined with internal migration influenced class identity. We develop and validate a measure of class identity using naming decisions. Exploiting within-household variation, we show that migration patterns that increased the local share of culturally-distant workers reduced working class identification. Where migration increased the cultural distance of the working class, workers were less likely to join unions, voters were less likely to support the nascent Labour Party, and parliamentary candidates were less likely to target working class voters. By 1911, slower in-migration and rising local population growth reduced working class distance in urban areas, which also became strongholds of support for Labour. Migration alters social identity and creates political cleavages. |
| JEL: | D72 J61 N33 Z10 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21051 |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans; Schichl, Arthur |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces political term length as a strategic variable in electoral competition, allowing candidates to compete not only over policy but also over the duration of their mandate if elected. In a two-candidate race with an incumbent and a challenger, we model the incentives to propose either a short term (e.g., two years) or a long term (e.g., four years). Because voters can directly assess the incumbent’s ability but face uncertainty about the challenger’s, strong incumbents may favor longer terms while challengers, and weaker incumbents, may prefer shorter ones. We develop a dynamic election model in which candidates compete on term length, characterize the equilibria, and show how such competition can enhance voter welfare by balancing experimentation with new officeholders against stability under high-performing officeholders. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition; Term length |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21334 |
| By: | Satoshi Nakada; Toshiya Yoshimura |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes new robustness criteria for social choice correspondences under single-peaked preferences, inspired by the concepts of robustness in statistical estimation, where robust estimators are designed to be resilient to both model misspecification and outliers. Motivated by robustness to model assumptions, we introduce peak-robustness: a voting rule is peak-robust if it never selects an alternative that is a majority loser relative to some unchosen alternative for any preference profile sharing the same peak profile. To capture robustness to outliers, we propose tail-invariance, which requires that variations in the tails of the peak distribution do not affect the collective decision. Our main result shows that the median voting rule is the unique efficient rule satisfying these robustness criteria. When peak-robustness is weakened, we characterize the broader class of quantile rules. Taken together, these results provide a robustness-based axiomatic foundation for median and quantile voting rules, independent of the traditional strategy-proofness approach. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2606.25798 |
| By: | Robert Gonzalez; Tannishtha Ghosh; Kelly Lifchez |
| Abstract: | Research on the determinants of election fraud typically focuses on conventional factors such as election monitoring, legal punishments, and voter education. This paper examines an often-overlooked factor: whether polling location (e.g., school, place of worship) influences election fraud. Combining validated fraud measures from the 2009 Afghan presidential election with a novel instrumental variable approach, we find that polling centers within schools report an 8 percentage-point lower likelihood of fraud compared to those within mosques. Two mechanisms may explain this difference. First, mosques designated as polling centers were more likely to be attacked by the Taliban, likely suppressing turnout and creating incentives for fraudulent votes through a vote-substitution channel. Second, election-related complaint data indicate systematic differences in the behavior of voters and polling officials between schools and mosques. Compared to mosques, voters at schools are more willing to file complaints, complainants are more often women, and polling officials are less likely to be the subject of complaints. |
| Keywords: | election fraud, insurgent violence, polling location |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K42 |
| Date: | 2029 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hic:wpaper:458 |
| By: | Hansen, Casper Worm; Jensen, Peter Sandholdt |
| Abstract: | We study how institutional constraints on executive selection shape redistributive policy, using a 1919 Danish reform that allowed town councils to democratically elect mayors. While the reform applied uniformly across towns, it made left-wing executive control politically feasible for the first time, particularly in towns with stronger prior support for the Social Democratic party. Exploiting predetermined Social Democratic vote shares from the 1917 election interacted with the post-reform period, we identify the causal effect of Social Democratic executive control on local public finance. We show that Social Democratic mayors substantially increased social spending, especially on poor relief and public assistance, with these expansions financed primarily through higher direct taxes. We find no robust evidence that these policies reduced local economic activity. The results highlight how removing institutional constraints on executive selection can translate latent voter preferences into concrete redistributive policy outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Democratization; Redistribution |
| JEL: | H53 H71 N44 O43 |
| Date: | 2026–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:21047 |
| By: | Eric Schniter (Department of Anthropology, California State University Fullerton and ESI, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Observed group sizes rarely match the size that would maximize what each member gets from belonging. We propose a two-part theory in which group size is regulated by two related conflicts: insider-outsider conflict over admission, and within-group conflict as crowding, competition, and social tensions intensify with size. Three strategies are available: admission, exclusion, and fission. The first part shows that even when exclusion is unavailable, fission dynamics alone drive group size away from the optimum in both directions, with the pattern set by how prospective joiners encounter groups and by the geometry of fission. When joiners compare groups across a shared landscape and fission is asymmetric, the standing distribution is bimodal: supra-optimal large groups coexisting with a sub-optimal mode of small groups, the pattern characteristic of fission-fusion societies. The second part promotes exclusion and fission to active decisions: incumbents weigh the per-capita cost of accommodating entry (β) against the costs of coordinated exclusion (c + γN*) and fissioning (F). A single inequality, β > c + γN*, partitions populations into two regimes: where it holds, exclusion is viable and groups lock at the optimum size; where it fails, groups grow past the optimum and cycle through recurrent fission. Modal group size, fission frequency, and exclusion behavior together identify which regime governs a population — a set of predictions applicable across fishes, social insects, birds, and mammals including primates and human foragers. |
| Keywords: | group size; fission–fusion dynamics; insider–outsider conflict; optimal group size; collective action; coagulation–fragmentation |
| JEL: | C73 D74 D71 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:26-07 |
| By: | Rodrigo Martins (University of Coimbra, Faculty of Economics and CeBER); José Murteira (University of Coimbra, Faculty of Economics and CeBER) |
| Abstract: | Since most of the world’s democracies feature multiparty systems, the analysis of aggregate electoral data involving three or more parties is of particular interest to political scientists. To handle this type of situation, the present paper adopts a quasi-maximum likelihood approach in the estimation of regression models of multiparty vote shares, which accommodates any number of parties and different functional forms, while relying only on correct specification of conditional means of shares. Rather than introducing a new estimator, this framework is used to quantify and assess the extent of covariate-independent vote persistence in multiparty elections, evincing how the well-known Dogit specification can be used to operationalize and estimate this persistence within a compositional setting. In particular, the distinction between the share of votes that systematically responds to political, economic, and sociodemographic stimuli and the share that remains stable across local contexts can be formulated as an estimation and testing problem using aggregate data. The strategy set forth in the paper is illustrated with cross-sectional data on aggregate vote shares from a Portuguese legislative election. |
| Date: | 2026–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:papers:2026-05 |