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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier; Stefano Iandolo; Hillel Rapoport; Riccardo Turati; Gonzague Vannoorenberghe |
| Abstract: | We propose new ways to measure populism, using the Manifesto Project Database (1960-2019) as main source of data. We characterize the evolution of populism over 60 years and show empirically that it is significantly impacted by the skill-content of globalization. Specifically, imports of goods which are intensive in low-skill labor generate more right-wing populism, and low-skill immigration shifts the distribution of votes to the right, with more votes for right-wing populist parties and less for left-wing populist parties. In contrast, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration flows, tend to reduce the volume of populism. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, Populism, Immigration, Trade |
| JEL: | D72 F22 F52 J61 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2550 |
| By: | Pauline Grosjean; Saumitra Jha; Michael Vlassopoulos; Yves Zenou |
| Abstract: | We show how exposure to partisan peers, under conditions requiring high stakes cooperation, can trigger the breakthrough of novel political beliefs. We exploit the large-scale, exogenous assignment of soldiers from each of 34, 947 French municipalities into line infantry regiments during World War I. We show that soldiers from poor, rural municipalities---where the novel redistributive message of the left had previously failed to penetrate---voted for the left by nearly 45% more after the war when exposed to left-wing partisans within their regiment. We provide evidence that these differences reflect persuasive information provision by both peers and officers in the trenches that proved particularly effective among those most likely to benefit from the redistributive policies of the left. In contrast, soldiers from neighbouring municipalities that served with right-wing partisans are inoculated against the left, becoming moderate centrists instead. |
| Keywords: | Political Persuasion, Transmission, War, Voting Behavior, Conflict, Peer Effects, France, World War I |
| JEL: | D74 N44 L14 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:2539 |
| By: | Nainggolan, Lukas Bonar; Lansink, Alfons Oude; Rommel, Jens; Höhler, Julia |
| Abstract: | Agricultural and forestry production are inherently connected to the provision of impure public goods, yet public good provision generally remains below socially optimal levels. One promising approach to increase provision are social norms and non-binding collective agreements facilitated through cooperatives, although existing evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. We conducted a threshold public goods experiment with 141 farmers and foresters from Greece and Italy to examine the effectiveness of collective agreements and the relationship between social norms and cooperation. Our results show that non-binding collective agreements significantly increase individual contributions. We contribute to the literature by showing that not only average social norms, but also their distribution, are correlated with individual contributions, with greater heterogeneity within groups associated with lower contributions. Overall, focal points are shaped by expectations of peers’ contributions. Two key implications follow: cooperatives can effectively facilitate collective action, and managing heterogeneity among farmers and foresters is essential for sustaining cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Public Economics |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aes026:397870 |
| By: | Neisser, Carina (University of Cologne); Wehrhöfer, Nils (Bundesbank) |
| Abstract: | We study how public disclosure of politicians’ outside income affects their behavior. We exploit a disclosure reform targeting German federal MPs and tax-return data in a difference-in-differences setup using unaffected state MPs as controls. MPs increase their outside income by 24%, driven by likely right-leaning MPs. A representative survey experiment uncovers that right-leaning voters interpret outside income as a signal of competence and hard work, while left-leaning voters associate it with weaker representation. Consistent with this, we show that newspapers cover right-leaning MPs’ outside activities more favorably. Our findings suggest that politicians strategically use public disclosure as a signaling tool. |
| Keywords: | tax data, outside income, politicians, income disclosure |
| JEL: | D72 D83 J45 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18576 |