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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Roberto Brunetti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Simone Marsilio (UniSR - Universita Vita Salute San Raffaele = Vita-Salute San Raffaele University [Milan, Italie]) |
| Abstract: | If individuals are to be empowered in their selection or use of a voting rule, it is necessary that they understand it. This paper analyzes people's understanding of two voting rules: evaluative voting and majority judgment. We first distinguish three components of understanding in this context: how to fill in the ballot; how votes are aggregated; and how to vote strategically. To measure each component, we draw on results from a lab experiment on incentivized voting where participants are exogenously assigned single-peaked preferences and answer comprehension questions on the rules employed. We find that most participants understand how to fill in the ballot with both voting rules. However, participants' understanding of vote aggregation under majority judgment is lower and, crucially, more heterogeneous. While some participants correctly understand its aggregation property, a sizable group fails to grasp it. We also observe no difference in voting behavior between evaluative voting and majority judgment: the data confirm the theoretical prediction that under evaluative voting there will be a high incidence of strategic voting through the use of extreme grades, but contradict the prediction that under majority judgment voters will vote less strategically. Finally, we find that with majority judgment, the better voters understand how votes are aggregated, the more they vote strategically, hence resulting in inequality in voter agency. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiment, majority judgment, evaluative voting, understanding, voting rules |
| Date: | 2024–07–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04653702 |
| By: | Ryo Arawatari (Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University); Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Osaka) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the optimal supermajority threshold for approving fiscal rule suspensions within a two-period political turnover model. Faced with the potential loss of power, the incumbent party aims to secure preferred expenditures by increasing public debt. To counteract this, an expenditure rule requiring legislative approval for suspension is introduced. The analysis shows that the voting threshold in parliament should exceed a simple majority, making a simple majority rule suboptimal. A stricter supermajority is necessary when fiscal expenditure rules are more flexible, as it allows for more effective responses to economic fluctuations. Moreover, while higher initial debt levels call for stricter expenditure rules, the optimal supermajority threshold remains unaffected by the debt level. Finally, as political polarization among voters intensifies, the optimal threshold decreases, increasingly aligning with the incumbent party’s preferences. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal rules, Government debt, Political turnover |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H62 H63 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2605 |
| By: | Shuhei Kitamura; Ryo Takahashi; Katsunori Yamada |
| Abstract: | Elections can deter corruption only if voters punish tainted incumbents. We study whether punishment depends on second-order beliefs—beliefs about how other voters will react. Before Japan’s October 2024 general election amid a funding scandal, we ran a pre-registered online survey experiment. To study this channel, we provided no new factual information about the scandal itself and instead reported a baseline statistic about perceived public intolerance of the underlying corruption: treated respondents learned that, in our baseline survey, the average respondent estimated that 67% of other respondents viewed the conduct as unacceptable. The message increased turnout by 6 percentage points and support for opposition challengers by 7 percentage points. Effects were sharply heterogeneous. Swing voters, especially those who initially overestimated how widely others would punish, became more likely to vote and back challengers. By contrast, ruling-party supporters, especially those who initially underestimated how widely others would punish, shifted toward the incumbent when they learned that intolerance of the corruption was higher than expected. More broadly, anti-corruption messages may affect voting not only by changing beliefs about wrongdoing, but also by changing beliefs about others’ reactions, helping explain why such campaigns often have mixed effects. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1289rr |
| By: | Nicola Fontana (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Tommaso Nannicini (School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute); James M. Snyder, Jr. (Department of Government, Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | We study whether the partisan affiliation of U.S. state governors affects the outcome of partisan judicial elections. Exploiting close gubernatorial races from 1946 to 2023, we find that electing a Democratic (Republican) governor significantly increases the subsequent vote share of Democratic (Republican) judicial candidates. This executive spillover effect arises despite the formal institutional independence of the judiciary and holds in contexts with similar levels of polarization and partisanship. Our findings show that, under partisan judicial elections, even narrow shifts in executive power can erode the separation of powers, as some voters adjust their judicial choices in response to the partisan control of the executive. This effect is stronger when executive and legislative powers are unified and when the judicial election occurs soon after the governor's race. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Elections; Partisan Alignment; Regression Discontinuity |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K40 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0626 |