nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2026–04–13
five papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. Back to Black: The Median Voter Revisited By Mathieu Martin; Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; Zéphirin Nganmeni; Ashley Piggins
  2. On the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in the Spatial Model with Dual Additive Valence By Mathieu Martin; Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; Zéphirin Nganmeni; Ashley Piggins
  3. Demography, Early Voting, and Election Integrity in South Korea: Evidence Across Four Electoral Cycles By Kim, Minseong
  4. Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania By Uberti, Luca; Imami, Drini; Mendola, Mariapia
  5. Sailing through history: the legacy of medieval sea trade on migrant perception and extreme right voting By Bottasso, Anna; Cerruti, Gianluca; Conti, Maurizio; Santagata, Marta

  1. By: Mathieu Martin; Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; Zéphirin Nganmeni; Ashley Piggins (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA)
    Abstract: A long-standing foundational problem in the spatial theory of politics is the generic emptiness of the majority core when there is more than one dimension in the policy space. This implies that, in general, we cannot predict where win-motivated candidates will locate in an electoral contest decided by majority rule. We assume that the candidates face some uncertainty: they observe each voter’s ideal point in the policy space but not their indifference surfaces. Given any proper spatial voting game, we first identify the set of imprudent positions in the space. If a candidate adopts an imprudent position, then there exists a position for their opponent that will defeat them for certain. We introduce a new concept, the prudent core, as the set of positionsthat are not imprudent in this sense. We show that the prudent core is always non-empty. With majority voting and an odd number of voters, the prudent core equals the dimension-by-dimension median. The prudent core equals the majority core whenever the latter is nonempty.
    Keywords: Spatial theory of politics, median voter theorem, prudent core, prudence
    JEL: D71 D72 D81
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2026-04
  2. By: Mathieu Martin; Linus Thierry Nana Noumi; Zéphirin Nganmeni; Ashley Piggins (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA)
    Abstract: In spatial voting games, the valence is traditionally modeled as a non-ideological attribute that is uniformly assigned to a candidate by all voters, independent of their policy preferences. In its original for-mulation, additive valence is assumed to be entirely detached from the candidate policy considerations. In this paper, we explore an alterna-tive framework in which additive valence interacts with the candidates' policy platforms. Each candidate possesses an individual valence level, but voters choose to recognize this valence only if the candidate is perceived as competent in defending their proposed policy. This perceived competence is assumed to be common knowledge among voters. The core objective of this study is to determine the conditions under which Nash equilibria arise in the context of electoral competition with policy-dependent additive valence.
    Keywords: Spatial voting, Electoral competition, Dual valence, Equilibrium
    JEL: D70 D71 D72
    Date: 2026
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2026-03
  3. By: Kim, Minseong
    Abstract: Allegations of fraud in South Korean elections have centered primarily on the in-precinct early-voting channel, which consistently produces higher democratic Party vote shares than same-day ballots. We assess these claims using a unified framework applied to four elections spanning 2020-2025: the 21st General Election (2020), the 22nd General Election (2024), the 20th Presidential Election (2022), and the 21st Presidential Election (2025). First, we apply several forensic statistical tests - including simulation-adjusted second-digit Benford's law, last-digit uniformity, mixture-model fingerprinting, and evaluation of the widely-cited 63:37 early-vote ratio claim - and find no systematic pattern indicative of large-scale vote manipulation, while flagging a candidate-specific last-digit anomaly in the 2022 presidential election that warrants ongoing scrutiny. Second, we regress Democratic vote share and early-vote share on principal components derived from census, employment, and housing data at the sub-district (dong) level, with province-interacted election fixed effects and population-weighted least squares. Across all elections, sociodemographic characteristics explain 73-94% of the geographic variation in vote shares, and the same predictors perform equally well for early votes and same-day votes. For the 2025 presidential election - a three-candidate contest - we instrument the third-party candidate's vote share using the 2017 conservative-reform candidate's support, recovering a causal estimate of vote diversion. Our findings suggest that geographic patterns in early voting are well-explained by who votes early, not by when ballots are counted.
    Date: 2026–03–28
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:5d94n_v1
  4. By: Uberti, Luca (University of Milano Bicocca); Imami, Drini (Agricultural University of Tirana); Mendola, Mariapia (University of Milan Bicocca)
    Abstract: We study the impact of an election campaign on the labor market outcomes of incumbent party supporters. Using unique data on voters’ political preferences during a pre-election period in Albania and a DiD design that compares the evolution of outcomes among close neighbours, we show that supporting the ruling party significantly increases individuals’ employment and earnings. This labor market premium is particularly large among individuals with low costs of campaign participation, while atronage jobs are concentrated in lower-tier public sector positions. Administrative data further reveal that the allocation of jobs to party supporters is strongly associated with a higher vote share for the incumbent. These findings suggest that parties strategically allocate public employment to reward grassroots supporters and mobilize votes, a practice that fosters corruption and weakens democratic institutions.
    Keywords: job patronage, political corruption, vote-buying, Albania, post-communist transition
    JEL: D72 D73 H83 J45 M59
    Date: 2026–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18510
  5. By: Bottasso, Anna; Cerruti, Gianluca; Conti, Maurizio; Santagata, Marta
    Abstract: This study evaluates whether exposure of local areas to medieval Mediterranean trade with Africa and the Middle East still shapes Italian political attitudes. Such exchanges may have fostered cultural traits that eased interaction with people of different cultures, ethnicities, and religions. We show that individuals living near a medieval port are less likely to view migrants as a security threat or to report right-wing voting preferences; these areas also had fewer xenophobic attacks during the 2015 Syrian refugee surge. We also find that right-wing parties received fewer votes near medieval ports only when immigration was highly salient. Finally, we document a lower probability of Jewish deportations near medieval ports during the Nazi occupation, the only period when a minority group was explicitly targeted. This suggests that deep-rooted cultural traits can re-emerge when historical and political conditions make them relevant.
    Keywords: persistence studies; trade networks; political preferences; cultural persistence; immigration
    JEL: F22 D72
    Date: 2026–06–30
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:137817

This nep-cdm issue is ©2026 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.