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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Torun Dewan (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science); Christopher Kam (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia); Jaakko Meriläinen (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics); Janne Tukiainen (Department of Economics, University of Turku) |
| Abstract: | To what extent did class shape political behavior during early democratization and industrialization, and did class voting reflect economic interests or durable political identities? We use newly collected individual-level panel data from open-ballot elections in the nineteenth-century England—around 130, 000 recorded vote choices linked to voters’ occupations across elections—to provide evidence on the class-basis of voting. Voting was strongly structured by occupation: skilled workers and the petite bourgeoisie disproportionately supported Liberals and their free-trade agenda, while the gentry, farm workers, and unskilled workers leaned Conservative. Exploiting within-voter mobility, we show that these alignments reflected durable political identities rather than contemporaneous economic interests: Although socially mobile voters resemble their destination class in cross-sectional comparisons, within-voter estimates show that individuals did not systematically change their vote choice when their class changed. Class-based political alignments were thus behaviorally durable at the individual level, even though the Industrial Revolution profoundly transformed society. |
| Keywords: | Class-based voting, economic voting, poll books, socialization, social mobility, voting behavior |
| JEL: | D72 N33 N93 P00 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp179 |
| By: | Thomas Groll; Sharyn O'Halloran |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of distributive competition under redistricting that explains both electoral outcomes and the equilibrium allocation of policy benefits by endogenizing voter pivotality. In a multi-district model with primaries, general elections, and group-targeted transfers, districting shapes political influence through two channels: a selection channel for descriptive representation (who wins office) and a competition channel for substantive representation (who receives policy benefits). District composition alters candidate matchups, shifting voter responsiveness and political leverage, and each channel alone yields distinct predictions about whether packing or cracking voters is optimal. For minority voters, the welfare effects of districting depend on electoral leverage, preferences over descriptive versus partisan representation, primary rules, and competitiveness. The channels align on packing when minorities are electorally weak and value descriptive representation, and align on cracking when minorities are electorally pivotal and prioritize partisan outcomes. When the channels diverge, or when endogenous feedback reshapes electoral leverage, minority welfare can be nonmonotonic in voter concentration. Our results identify when majority-minority districts enhance minority welfare and when dispersion strengthens political influence. |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2604.01340 |
| By: | Dey, Subhasish (University of Warwick); Natarajan, Vidhyarth (Independent Researcher); Sahoo, Soham (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore) |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the debate on identity politics by examining whether the religious composition of voters predicts electoral outcomes. Using assembly constituency-level data from six elections in West Bengal, India, between 2011 and 2024, we study how the Muslim population share relates to party performance. We show that religious composition becomes a much stronger correlate of electoral outcomes in the later period (from 2016 onwards): constituencies with higher Muslim shares increasingly align with the incumbent Trinamool Congress (TMC), while the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) consolidates support in constituencies with lower Muslim shares. We also document heterogeneity within predominantly Hindu constituencies. Economically vulnerable areas – proxied by higher shares of marginal agricultural labourers – remain relatively more supportive of the TMC, while better-off agricultural constituencies shift towards the BJP. Together, the results suggest that West Bengal’s recent electoral realignment reflects both strengthening religious polarisation and an interaction between identity-based mobilisation and material considerations, with implications for political competition and accountability in democracies. |
| Keywords: | religion, electoral-outcome, TMC, BJP, West Bengal, India |
| JEL: | D72 Z12 P16 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18475 |
| By: | Brunella Bruno and Immacolata Marino |
| Abstract: | The People’s Party is the only major populist movement in American history that was quickly reabsorbed by mainstream parties. We study the main trigger of its rise— technological disruption from railroad expansion—and discuss its dissolution in light of the conceptual framework we develop and test empirically. We construct a novel county-level measure of Technological Disruption Exposure (TDE) that captures the change in competitive pressure each county faced from all other counties, driven by railroad-induced reductions in transportation costs between 1870 and 1890. TDE positively predicts People’s Party vote share in the 1894 congressional elections: a one standard deviation increase raises Populist support by nearly 3 percentage points. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect is concentrated in counties with high crop specialization—where competitive vulnerability translates into concentrated losses. A commitment-politics framework organizes these patterns: railroads reduced the probability of being a market winner in high-TDE counties, where voters shifted from discretionary to commitment politicians. The 1890s episode is uniquely informative because, unlike today, there was fiscal and institutional room to rebuild trust: mainstream parties credibly adopted Populist demands, and the movement dissolved. Today those conditions do not hold—which may explain why modern populism has proven more persistent. |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp26269 |
| By: | Valentino Larcinese; Alberto Parmigiani |
| Abstract: | Does higher income inequality increase political inequality by raising the political influence of rich donors? We attempt to answer this question by providing evidence of the effects of a policy-induced rise in income inequality on the concentration of campaign contributions in the US. Using a novel dataset at the Census tract level we show that the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which disproportionately benefited wealthy taxpayers, caused a spike in individual contributions, predominantly from donors at the top of the income distribution. The effect was similar for both parties and unrelated to the recipients' ideology or office sought. For members of Congress, the effect was larger for legislators that voted in favour of the tax bill and for candidates likely to be well-connected or from privileged backgrounds. We also find that an increase in disposable income is more likely to induce political donations when the donor and the recipient share a similar social background. Taken together, our results suggest that the effects of tax policy extend beyond the economic domain, with implications for the distribution of political influence through campaign contributions. |
| Keywords: | income inequality, political inequality, political influence, taxation, campaign finance |
| JEL: | D72 H24 D31 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12574 |