|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Edo, Anthony (CEPII, Paris); Renault, Thomas (CES, University of Paris); Valette, Jérôme (CEPII, Paris) |
| Abstract: | How does the electoral success of a far-right political force shape the strategies and policy platforms of mainstream candidates? We answer this question by exploiting the political shock of the creation of the Front National, an anti-immigration party, in 1972 and its sudden electoral breakthrough in the 1980s. Through a comprehensive textual analysis of candidate manifestos in French parliamentary elections from 1968 to 1997, we find that right-wing candidates respond to local far-right success, measured as voting shares, by amplifying the salience of immigration in their manifestos. They also adopt more negative positions on immigration and increasingly associate it with issues such as crime and the welfare state. In contrast, the ideological positions of left-wing candidates do not shift in response to far-right electoral gains. We finally show that the strategic adjustments of right- wing candidates help mitigate electoral losses to far-right competitors. |
| Keywords: | party platform, electoral competition, anti-immigrant parties, political economy, immigration |
| JEL: | F22 P16 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18311 |
| By: | Shuhei Kitamura; Ryo Takahashi; Katsunori Yamada |
| Abstract: | Electoral accountability is a cornerstone of democratic governance, yet whether voters effectively punish corruption remains theoretically and empirically contested. While canonical models predict that corruption revelations reduce incumbent support, strategic voting considerations—especially beliefs about others’ behavior—can yield ambiguous accountability outcomes. We exploit a major corruption scandal involving Japan’s ruling party during a national election to examine how social information shapes electoral responses to misconduct. In a pre-registered field experiment, we randomly provided voters with information about prevailing social norms of intolerance toward the scandal. This intervention significantly increased overall turnout and challenger support, particularly among swing voters, consistent with enhanced accountability. Yet the same treatment increased incumbent support among ruling-party loyalists. We show that these heterogeneous effects are systematically driven by voters’ prior beliefs about others’ voting intentions: those expecting others to punish sanctioned more when learning they would not, whereas those expecting tolerance defended more when learning others would punish. These findings reconcile conflicting evidence on electoral accountability by showing how strategic considerations fundamentally shape democratic sanctioning, and suggest that information campaigns can either strengthen or undermine accountability depending on the distribution of voter expectations, with important implications for anti-corruption interventions. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1289r |
| By: | Clemence Tricaud; Romain Wacziarg |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we argue that recent trends in party seat margins and election vote margins result from structural changes in the nature of US political competition. We assemble a comprehensive database of electoral results for the House, Senate and presidential contests, from the 19th century until today. Seat margins declined in the recent period, so the margins of control of the House, Senate, and Electoral College by either party have become smaller. However, this was not accompanied by a decline in the margins of victory at the constituency level. We propose a model of electoral competition with multiple districts that can rationalize these trends. We show theoretically that an increase in politicians’ information about voter preferences, together with the growing nationalization of politics, can account for the decrease in seat margins and the concurrent stability in vote margins. As implied by the model, we document that campaign contributions received by House and Senate candidates are increasingly concentrated in a dwindling set of swing constituencies. |
| JEL: | D72 P0 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34566 |
| By: | Stefano Carattini; Ian Fletcher; Chad W. Kendall; Michael K. Price; Arthur Vu |
| Abstract: | Many socially desirable policies are not implemented because of their ex-ante unpopularity, but this unpopularity may be overcome through experience with the policy. In this paper, we examine how opposition to carbon pricing in the state of Washington turned into support after voters experienced a cap-and-trade policy with revenues earmarked for environmental purposes – "cap-and-invest." Analyzing voting behavior at the census block group level, we observe that support varies by political affiliation as expected, but experience consistently increases support across the board. Using a proprietary survey, we further show that the increase in support among voters in Washington state is specific to the cap-and invest policy they experienced; support for carbon pricing or climate policies more generally remained unchanged. |
| JEL: | D72 H23 P0 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34559 |
| By: | Shuhei Kitamura; Ryo Takahashi; Katsunori Yamada |
| Abstract: | Elections are a primary mechanism through which citizens can hold politicians accountable for misconduct. However, whether voters actually punish corruption at the ballot box remains an open question, as electoral decisions often involve strategic considerations, including beliefs about how others think and behave. To better understand how such strategic considerations operate in this context, we conducted a pre-registered information intervention during a major political corruption scandal in Japan. The treatment provided information about the prevailing social norm—specifically, the perceived social intolerance of the scandal. The treatment increased turnout and support for a challenger, particularly among swing voters who initially believed that others were intolerant of corruption. Among party loyalists with more lenient prior beliefs, the same information backfired, increasing support for the incumbent. The turnout effect among swing voters was sizable—approximately six percentage points—comparable in magnitude to benchmark mobilization interventions involving personalized contact or social pressure. To account for these patterns, we develop a simple model that incorporates mechanisms—notably moral reinforcement and identity reinforcement—that generate predictions consistent with the observed heterogeneity in responses. By highlighting how perceptions of prevailing norms shape voter behavior in the presence of strategic considerations, this study contributes to a broader understanding of how democratic institutions can remain resilient in the face of political misconduct. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1289 |
| By: | Sandholtz, Wayne Aaron (Nova School of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides experimental evidence on the electoral effect of a large education reform in a developing democracy. The reform significantly improved school quality on many dimensions (Romero, Sandefur, & Sandholtz, 2020). In this paper, I show that the reform reduced the incumbent party's pres- idential vote share by 2.1 percentage points (5%). The reform also reduced teachers' job satisfaction, support for the incumbent government, and political engagement. Electoral effects were positively correlated with effects on teachers' political engagement; the reform lost most votes where it caused greatest political disengagement of teachers. |
| Keywords: | randomized controlled trial, elections, policy feedback, political economy, public service delivery, development, education, Liberia |
| JEL: | I25 O10 P00 C93 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18346 |
| By: | Asatryan, Zareh; Christofzik, Désirée I.; Nover, Justus |
| Abstract: | We study the degree and nature of political budget cycles in public investments when two instruments are available: investments by core governments and, more indirectly, by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While fiscal pressure on core budgets may induce politicians to shift election-induced investments to SOEs, voters' uncertainties in clearly attributing the benefits of SOE investments to incumbent politicians may encourage the opposite. Using administrative micro-data for over 10, 500 SOEs and their public owners at the municipal level in Germany, we document substantial election cycles in both instruments. This suggests that German municipal councilors use investments broadly to enhance their re-election prospects. The total effect of elections on municipal investments in our sample is over EUR 1 billion for the pre-election year in each electoral cycle, while the past literature focusing only on core budgets would miss about a third of this effect. |
| Keywords: | election cycles, core budgets, outsourcing, transparency |
| JEL: | H11 L32 D72 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:333898 |
| By: | Jesús Fernández-Villaverde (University of Pennsylvania); Tomohide Mineyama (International Monetary Fund); Dongho Song (Johns Hopkins University) |
| Abstract: | We study how uneven gains from globalization can endogenously generate protectionism as a political equilibrium. Using U.S. data, we document that regions more exposed to import competition display stronger opposition to globalization, especially among households with little financial wealth, and that firms in trade-exposed sectors sharply increase lobbying expenditures. To interpret these patterns, we develop and quantify a general equilibrium Ricardian model with heterogeneous households, input–output linkages, and endogenous trade policy shaped by voting and lobbying. Distributional shocks reallocate political support among voters, while lobbying propagates through production networks, generating strategic complementarities that sustain protectionism. Calibrated to U.S.–China sectoral data from 1991–2019, the model accounts for rising inequality, declining support for globalization, and key aggregate trends in consumption and trade. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, heterogeneous households, multi-sector, production network, Ricardian trade, voting, political lobbying |
| JEL: | D57 D58 D63 D72 F1 F2 F4 F6 |
| Date: | 2026–04–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:26-001 |
| By: | Olivier Chanel (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France); Stéphane Luchini (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France); Miriam Teschl (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France); Alain Trannoy (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France) |
| Abstract: | This paper tests experimentally how preferences for redistribution of members of the general public depend on how money is earned. An experiment was designed to form of “microparticipatory-democracy”where redistribution from winners to losers is decided through a sequential strategy-proof majority voting procedure. Based on five distributive justice theories, we elicit people’s preferences for redistribution when their earnings come from four factors: effort, social circumstances, brute luck, and option luck. In the aggregate, our results show that a relative majority of people agree with Dworkin’s cut, namely, to compensate for social circumstances and brute luck but not effort and option luck. Participants with bad outcomes are more likely to engage in a self-serving vote, but on average, the dominant concern in voting remains people’s fairness view. The knowledge of the distribution of earnings and petition for equality of opportunity make participants vote more in favor of redistribution. |
| Keywords: | Social justice, micro participatory-democracy, equality of opportunity, responsibility, Experiment |
| JEL: | D63 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2530 |
| By: | Patrick A. Testa |
| Abstract: | Elections select officeholders and policies, but they also signal to political actors where to invest their time and money. This paper presents a framework for understanding these effects, in which political investors (e.g., donors, activists) allocate resources where expected political fundamentals favor their party. Investors possess idiosyncratic local knowledge but also public information in the form of recent election results. These signals are complementary: where local knowledge is good, even the narrowest vote-share majorities can align beliefs and concentrate investment. I apply this framework to the changing political geography of the United States between 1940 and 1972, when urban and minority areas came into play for the Democratic Party. A regression discontinuity design based on close presidential elections shows that counties narrowly won by Democrats saw pronounced increases in Democratic local officeholding and voter support in subsequent election periods. This does not reflect direct impacts of presidential elections on local offices, but rather indirect shifts through political investment, including heightened activity in newspaper advertising, phone banking, and civil rights mobilization. Effects are concentrated in urban, Black, and union areas where dense organizational networks enhanced local political knowledge. Together, the findings show how elections organize political actors not only at the ballot box but through the information they convey. |
| JEL: | D72 J15 J18 N32 N42 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34585 |
| By: | Luca Corazzini; Christopher Cotton (Queen's University); Enrico Longo (Unviersity of Venice) |
| Abstract: | Collective efforts often rely on high-capacity “stars†—star employees, lead investors, or major donors—whose participation disproportionately determines success. Is it better to engage them early to set direction, or later to ensure completion? We investigate this strategic design problem experimentally, where collective success requires coordination on both direction and effort. We find that sequential engagement significantly outperforms simultaneous action, following a clear heuristic: stars should lead when the broader team is disorganized (to focus attention) but anchor when the team is already organized (to resolve effort failure). Regardless of when star engagement occurs, groups tend to support the majority’s preferred action when it is clear. Disorganized groups, in contrast, look to the preferences of the star for guidance. Finally, groups converge towards more equitable outcomes than equilibria imply, with the star taking on a disproportionate, but not excessive, share of costs. The timing that maximizes success also maximizes the payoffs of both the star and majority members, suggesting that managers can focus on effectiveness, relying on cooperative norms to prevent excessive free-riding and ensure fairness. |
| Keywords: | Collective Action, Teamwork, Collaboration, Star Performer, Crowdfunding, Charitable Giving, Leadership, Organizational Design |
| JEL: | C92 D23 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1542 |
| By: | Yotam Gafni |
| Abstract: | Consider a social-choice function (SCF) is chosen to decide votes in a formal system, including votes to replace the voting method itself. Agents vote according to their ex-ante preference between the incumbent SCF and the suggested replacement. The existing SCF then aggregates the agents' votes and arrives at a decision of whether it should itself be replaced. An SCF is self-maintaining if it can not be replaced in such fashion by any other SCF. Our focus is on the implications of self-maintenance for centralization. We present results considering optimistic, pessimistic and i.i.d. approaches w.r.t. agent beliefs, and different tie-breaking rules. To highlight two of the results, (i) for the i.i.d. unbiased case with arbitrary tie-breaking, we prove an ``Arrow-Style'' Theorem for Dynamics: We show that only a dictatorship is self-maintaining, and any other SCF has a path of changes that arrives at a dictatorship. (ii) If we take into account wisdom of the crowd effects, for a society with a variable size of ruling elite, we demonstrate how the stable elite size is decreasing in both how extractive the economy is, and the quality of individual decision-making. All in all we provide a basic framework and body of results for centralization dynamics and stability, applicable for institution design, especially in formal ``De-Jure'' systems, such as Blockchain Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2512.22051 |
| By: | Alves, Daniel H. |
| Abstract: | After several failed attempts in previous years, Brazil's Plano Real finally ended hyperinflation in 1993–1994, and a significant driver of inequality and poverty was eliminated as a result. By combining data from Congress and newspaper archives, 17 interviews, and secondary sources, this article takes a qualitative approach to explore the notion that increased electoral competition and effective coalition management enabled price stabilization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), the economy minister leading the plan and the winner of the 1994 presidential election, campaigned as the anti-inflation candidate, promising newly enfranchised low-income voters that reining in prices would boost their earnings. Meanwhile, the minoritarian executive took advantage of coalitional tools to cultivate legislative alliances and approve the plan's measures. For analytical generalization, a potential model is proposed for further investigations on the relationship between competitive elections, cross-party cooperation, and price stability in nine other country cases within and outside Latin America. Related Articles: Adegboye, Alex, Kofo Adegboye, Uwalomwa Uwuigbe, Stephen Ojeka, and Eyitemi Fasanu. 2023. “Taxation, Democracy, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa: Relevant Linkages for Sustainable Development Goals.” Politics & Policy 51(4): 696–722. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12547. Segatto, Catarina Ianni, and Daniel Béland. 2018. “The Limits of Partisanship: Federalism, the Role of Bureaucrats, and the Path to Universal Health Care Coverage in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 46(3): 416–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12252. Zimerman, Artur, and Flávio Pinheiro. 2020. “Appearances Can be Deceptive: Political Polarisation, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil.” Politics & Policy 48(2): 339–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12345. |
| Keywords: | Brazil; coalition dynamics; cross-party cooperation; electoral competition; inequality; inflation; Latin America; macroeconomic stabilization; political economy; politics of public policy; poverty |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2024–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:130713 |