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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Kröper, Marius |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the long-run effects of non-strategic administrative failures on voter participation. I exploit a natural experiment from Berlin's 2021 elections, in which hundreds of precincts experienced ballot shortages, multi-hour queues, and unlawful polling closures. Using precinct-level administrative data and a stacked event study design, I show that precincts exposed to administrative failures in the 2021 Berlin election experienced a 1.8 percentage points (2.4\%) decline in turnout across three subsequent elections over the next four years. The drop is concentrated in in-person voting and only partially offset by increases in postal participation in subsequent elections. Effects are largest among young voters, welfare recipients, and residents with migration backgrounds. Survey evidence suggests two mechanisms: disrupted civic habit formation and short-term erosion of institutional trust. |
| Keywords: | State Capacity, Voter Turnout, Voting Costs, Administrative Failure |
| JEL: | D72 H11 H70 R50 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tudcep:333402 |
| By: | Matteo Gamalerio (University of Barcelona); Massimo Morelli (Bocconi University); Margherita Negri (University of St Andrews) |
| Abstract: | We show that polities using plurality rule to elect their policymakers are more likely to adopt more restrictive immigration policies than those using dual-ballot systems. Plurality rule provides stronger incentives for right-wing, anti-immigrant parties to run alone, as opposed to joining a coalition with other right-wing parties that offer a less restrictive immigration policy. We prove the result theoretically and empirically. Our theoretical results hold with sincere and strategic voters, with and without endogenous turnout, and can be extended to the comparison between plurality rule and proportional representation without majority bonuses in parliamentary elections. Empirically, we combine municipal-level data on migration-related expenditures and mayoral elections and establish causality using a regression discontinuity design. |
| Keywords: | electoral rules; immigration; salience |
| JEL: | D72 J24 J61 R23 |
| Date: | 2025–11–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:san:econdp:2503 |
| By: | Francesco Fasani (University of Milan, CEPR, CReAM, RF-Berlin and IZA); Simone Ferro (University of Milan); Alessio Romarri (Department of Applied Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, IEB and RF-Berlin); Elisabetta Pasini (Alma Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first causal evaluation of the political impact of asylum seekers in the UK. Although they are dispersed across areas on a no-choice basis, political bargaining between central and local governments introduces potential endogeneity in their allocation. We address this concern with a novel IV strategy that exploits predetermined public-housing characteristics. Focusing on 2004-2019, we estimate a sizeable increase in the Conservative-Labour vote share gap in local elections: a one within-area standard deviation increase in dispersed asylum seekers widens the gap by 3.1 percentage points in favour of the Conservatives. We observe a similar shift to the right in national elections and longitudinal survey data on voting intentions, along with an increase in the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum. Electoral gains are observed for UKIP as well, although this finding is less robust. No effect is detected for non-dispersed asylum seekers, who forgo subsidised housing and make independent residential choices. Turning to mechanisms, voters move to the right without becoming more hostile towards foreigners. Leveraging the universe of MPs' speeches, we show that representatives from more exposed areas emphasise asylum and migration more, with no systematic change in tone or content. This heightened salience appears to shape voters' choices, with Conservative MPs particularly effective at channelling discontent. |
| Keywords: | Refugees; Elections; Brexit; MP speeches. |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2520 |
| By: | Darius, Philipp (Hertie School); Drews, Wiebke; Neumeier, Andreas; Riedl, Jasmin |
| Abstract: | Social media platforms play an increasingly important role in political campaigning, enabling parties to bypass traditional media and mobilize support directly. While prior research highlights the online prominence of far-right and radical populist actors, most studies are limited to single platforms or national contexts. This study presents the first cross- platform and cross-national analysis of digital campaign communication by 401 parties across all 27 EU member states during the 2024 Euro- pean Parliament election. Using data from Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X/Twitter, and YouTube, we examine party activity and audience engage- ment. By linking digital trace data with expert surveys, we test whether populist radical right parties disproportionately succeed in raising engage- ment online. Our findings confirm strong platform-specific advantages of radical populist parties, particularly on TikTok, YouTube and Facebook. We also observe high engagement for far-left populist parties with similar emotional and anti-elitist communication strategies. The more Eurosceptic positions a party holds, or the more frequently experts describe them to use emotional appeals or anti-elitist communication, the more audience engagement they received across several platforms. Overall the findings emphasize a disproportionate online support for radical populist parties across the European Union. |
| Date: | 2025–11–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:42vfx_v1 |
| By: | Yash Prajapati |
| Abstract: | This paper examines public goods and evaluates the mechanism through the game theory. Public goods are characterized by nonexclusivity and nonrivalry and this creates fundamental challenges for allocation. We analyze why competitive markets undersupply public goods by deriving the inefficiency formally through Nash equilibrium. The paper evaluates theoretical solutions including Lindahl pricing, Clarke-Groves mechanisms, and voting schemes. The paper will cover their efficiency properties and practical limitations. We show how strategic interaction leads to free-riding behavior using roommates dilemma and other examples. We also cover why a large household lives in messy conditions not because individuals are lazy, but because they are rational players in a Nash equilibrium. We also examine voting mechanisms, the median voter theorem, and recent developments in truth-revealing mechanisms. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.15686 |
| By: | Paulsen, Mona |
| Abstract: | This article considers whether Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can develop a collective response to a globally welfare-damaging situation that impacts individual Members differentially. We conclude that collective action remains within the letter and spirit of the WTO Agreements. We set out the enabling procedures for collective action in a WTO dispute setting, in particular, the use of the rarely used situation complaint. We were motivated by the United States’ move to redraw its trade relations and break from its international trade commitments through bilateral negotiations in which it holds asymmetric leverage, buttressed by a pre-emptive announced escalation in response to any attempt by counterparties to join in forging a collective response. We conclude that, if undertaken, collective action can raise each Member’s voice into a countervailing choir and, more importantly, it can reinforce the mutual benefits derived from the multilateral trading system. Collective action thus serves a double purpose in engaging domestic concerns and the collective interests of those intending to preserve the multilateral system on which each Member depends |
| Keywords: | WTO; collective action; dispute settlement; situation complaint; MFN |
| JEL: | F13 F51 F53 K33 K34 |
| Date: | 2025–11–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129560 |