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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (Université Jean Monnet, Université Lyon 2, emlyon, GATE, CNRS, 42100, Saint-Etienne, France); Roberto Brunetti (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas, LEMMA); Isabelle Lebon (Normandie Univ., CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, Caen, France and TEPP-CNRS, Caen, France); Simone Marsilio (Leibniz University Hannover, Hannover, Germany) |
| Abstract: | If individuals are to be empowered in their selection or use of a voting rule, it is necessary that they understand it. This paper analyzes people’s understanding of two voting rules: evaluative voting and majority judgment. We first distinguish three components of understanding in this context: how to fill in the ballot; how votes are aggregated; and how to vote strategically. To measure each component, we draw on results from a lab experiment on incentivized voting where participants are exogenously assigned single-peaked preferences and answer comprehension questions on the rules employed. We find that most participants understand how to fill in the ballot with both voting rules. However, participants’ understanding of vote aggregation under majority judgment is lower and, crucially, more heterogeneous. While some participants correctly understand its aggregation property, a sizable group fails to grasp it. We also observe no difference in voting behavior between evaluative voting and majority judgment: the data confirm the theoretical prediction that under evaluative voting there will be a high incidence of strategic voting through the use of extreme grades, but contradict the prediction that under majority judgment voters will vote less strategically. Finally, we find that with majority judgment, the better voters understand how votes are aggregated, the more they vote strategically, hence resulting in inequality in voter agency. |
| Keywords: | voting rules; understanding; evaluative voting; majority judgment; agency; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D71 D72 O35 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2524 |
| By: | Jeremy Bowles; Horacio Larreguy; Shelley Liu; Ahmet Akbiyik |
| Abstract: | Political polarization is an increasing global concern. Although recent research suggests that media exposure can mitigate polarization through persuasion, it is unclear whether polarized individuals are willing to engage with diverse news sources, especially in electoral autocracies where citizens may distrust state-aligned media outlets or lack familiarity with credible alternatives. We implemented a field experiment in Türkiye exposing citizens to cross-partisan online media sources over seven months, which increased participants’ consumption of assigned outlets across the board. We find evidence of ideological moderation with important asymmetries. While assignment to pro-government media durably bolstered appraisals of the ruling party and increased vote intentions, assignment to anti-government media, while increasing affinity for opposition parties, had narrower and shorter-lasting impacts. Distinct logics explain these differences: while participants came to trust and learn more about anti-government outlets, the broader and more diverse coverage of pro-government outlets appears responsible for their persuasive impacts. Our findings highlight both the potential and limits of media exposure to shift political views in polarized electoral autocracies. |
| Keywords: | polarization, cross-partisan media, electoral autocracy |
| JEL: | C93 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12260 |
| By: | Strebel, Michael A. (University of Bern) |
| Abstract: | Local governments in many countries struggle to find candidates for elected office. In the resulting uncontested elections, voters cannot choose between different candidates and hold local representatives accountable. Amalgamation might be a solution for this challenge to democracy since larger jurisdictions need fewer elected officials per voter. Combining data on all Swiss local government mergers in the 21st century with data on local executive elections, this article assesses whether amalgamation reforms indeed increase candidate supply and hence local electoral contestation. Staggered difference-in-differences regressions show that amalgamation increases the number of candidates/seat. The underlying mechanisms seem to go beyond a ``mechanical'' effect that results from a mere expansion of the candidate pool. This study, thus, provides first empirical evidence that local government amalgamation might contribute to mitigate a hidden supply side crisis of electoral democracy at the local level. |
| Date: | 2025–11–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:cyrtm_v1 |