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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Shiladitya Kumar |
| Abstract: | How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how reputation and re-election concerns affect candidate behavior and its resultant effect on voters' beliefs and their consequent electoral decisions. I present a formal model where, instead of assuming voters to be naive, I tackle the question by completely characterizing a set of subgame-perfect equilibria by introducing non-naive (or strategic) voting behavior into the mix. I find that non-naive voting behavior, by using the candidate's reputation as an instrument of policy discipline after the election, aids in successfully inducing candidates to put forth their maximal incentive-compatible promise (among a range of such credible promises) in equilibrium. Through the credible threat of punishment in the form of loss of reputation for all future elections, non-naive voters gain a unanimous increase in expected utility relative to when they behave naively. In fact, comparative statics show that candidates who are more likely to win are more likely to keep their promises. In this framework, voters are not only able to bargain for more credible promises but also end up raising their expected future payoffs in equilibrium. Including such forms of strategic behavior thus reduces cheap talk by creating a credible electoral system where candidates do as they say once elected. Later, I present an analysis that includes limited punishment as a political accountability mechanism. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.08249 |
| By: | Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (Università di Roma La Sapienza); Stefano Papa (DEF, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"); Alessandra Pelloni (DEF, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether communication can mitigate in-group favoritism when group membership is based on a real-life trait (Italian vs. non-Italian citizenship among university students) rather than artificially induced, as in the minimal group paradigm. In our natural group setting, the identity effect is presumably stronger, making bias harder to counter. We do not find that communication significantly increases cooperation. Moreover, it does not reduce favoritism. However, the exchange of mutual promises increases cooperation and reduce in-group bias. A notable finding not found in previous studies is that gender differences also emerge: Italian males exhibit stronger in-group bias than females, whereas the opposite holds true among non-Italians. Overall, our findings confirm that not all groups are alike and that results from minimal group experiments may not always generalize to natural groups. |
| Keywords: | In-group bias, promises, exogenous variation, natural groups, gender effect |
| JEL: | A13 C91 D03 D64 D90 |
| Date: | 2025–09–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:610 |
| By: | Arthur Jacobs; Luca Zamparelli (-) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes automation as the outcome of political choice. Firms substitute capital for labor through automation, which affects productivity and reduces the labor income share. The automation preferred by a household depends on the composition of its income, specifically its relative dependence on capital versus labor. The median voter theorem aggregates these preferences into a political choice of automation. When wealth is more concentrated than labor, a democratic one-person-one-vote regime implements less automation than the output-maximizing competitive equilibrium, while a plutocratic one-dollar-one-vote regime may induce excessive automation. Increasing wealth concentration intensifies under-automation in democracy and over-automation in plutocracy. We further show that, under plausible conditions, the competitive equilibrium entails excessive automation relative to the social welfare optimum. A calibration to U.S. data demonstrates that alternative political regimes can generate quantitatively large shifts in the labor share. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:25/1120 |
| By: | Chiang, Daniel Minghan (University of Rochester); Fan, Elliott (National Taiwan University); Hsu, Dexter (University of California, Davis) |
| Abstract: | Postwar land reforms in East Asia were implemented as a geopolitical strategy to curb communism expansion. This paper evaluates their long-term political effects in Japan and Taiwan. In Japan, reform increased support for conservative parties and reduced backing for socialist and communist factions, with intergenerational persistence. Taiwan’s reform similarly bolstered electoral support for the Kuomintang. IV analyses support a causal interpretation. Survey evidence suggests that land acquisition fostered a desire for political stability as the mechanism, rather than through reciprocity or pro-market ideology. These findings highlight land reform’s critical role in shaping postwar political alignment and deflecting communist influence. |
| Keywords: | containment, communism, land reform, Japan, Taiwan |
| JEL: | Q15 Q11 N55 P26 |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18095 |
| By: | Calacino, Anthony (University of Oxford); Martinez-Alvarez, Cesar |
| Abstract: | Are policies that contribute to reducing climate vulnerability electorally advantageous? Political science has long studied the politics of carbon dioxide mitigation, but we know less about the political logic of climate impacts. As adaptation lies at the intersection of environmental, social, and disaster policy, its electoral effects are puzzling from a theoretical perspective. We address this gap by studying a program to improve the ability of households to withstand episodes of water scarcity in Mexico City, implemented between presidential cycles. In contrast to conventional forms of social policy, this intervention prioritizes building future resilience instead of immediate material benefits. We take advantage of the means-tested nature of the program to reduce imbalances between treated and control neighbors and estimate a difference-in-differences to evaluate its impact on electoral outcomes. We find that neighborhoods receiving this adaptation policy had, on average, higher levels of support for the party in charge of its implementation at the presidential and gubernatorial levels, compared to similar neighborhoods that did not receive the program. We also posit that reductions in reliance on inadequate water sources are a mechanism that explains this result. Our findings suggest that climate adaptation may be less contentious than mitigation, therefore giving politicians strong incentives to implement them. Moreover, we contribute to the climate politics literature by providing a theoretical framework to understand the political logic of adaptation action, regardless of its specific form or domain. |
| Date: | 2025–08–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:24jkx_v1 |