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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2025–09–01
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Hans Gersbach; Arthur Schichl; Oriol Tejada |
| Abstract: | Which level of voting costs is optimal in a democracy? This paper argues that intermediate voting costs - what we term a "Midcost democracy" - should be avoided, as they fail to ensure that electoral outcomes reflect the preferences of the majority. We study a standard binary majority decision in which a majority of the electorate prefers alternative A over alternative B. The population consists of partisan voters, who always participate, and non-partisan voters, who vote only when they believe their participation could be pivotal, given that voting entails a cost. We show that the probability of the majority-preferred alternative A winning is non-monotonic in the level of voting costs. Specifically, when voting costs are either high or negligible, alternative A wins in all equilibria. However, at intermediate cost levels, this alignment breaks down. These findings suggest that democratic systems should avoid institutional arrangements that lead to moderate voting costs, as they may undermine the majority principle. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.07300 |
| By: | Christine T. Bangum; Jon H. Fiva; Giovanna M. Invernizzi; Carlo Prato; Janne Tukiainen |
| Abstract: | We study how political parties share power internally by analyzing the allocation of list positions to different factions. We develop a theory of intraparty bargaining in which list positions shape the mobilization efforts of party activists in different factions. Our results allow us to link observable patterns in list allocations to the importance of consensus in intraparty negotiations. We empirically evaluate these predictions using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit a wave of municipal mergers to identify candidates' geography-based factional affiliations. In line with our theory's functionalist logic and consensus-based bargaining, smaller factions are over-compensated in safe list positions. While we also find a slight over-representation in the contested ranks, the relationship between size and resources is much closer to proportionality, as predicted by our theory. Our theoretical and empirical results show that parties can promote consensus among its factions while maintaining mobilization incentives, indicating that equality and efficiency within a political organization can be simultaneously achieved. |
| Keywords: | party factions, intra-party power sharing, candidate selection, geographic representation, municipal mergers. |
| JEL: | C21 C78 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12087 |
| By: | Ahlback, Johan; Yeandle, Alexander |
| Abstract: | International donors have invested heavily in strengthening electoral administration in low-income democracies, aiming to reduce irregularities and build trust. However, we know little about whether these interventions actually improve public perceptions. Using a conjoint choice experiment in Malawi, randomising organisational features of polling stations and their potential for political bias, we examine the determinants of public trust in a low-income setting. Voters are more trusting of stations with well-trained polling staff, independent monitors, security personnel, and transparency measures, effects driven by sanctioning the absence of these basic requirements. Respondents also prioritise procedurally fair measures over those that exclusively benefit their own party or ethnic group, challenging assumptions about the dominance of partisanship and ethnicity in African elections. We contribute to the literature on election administration and public opinion in low-income settings, while highlighting ways in which resource-constrained election bodies can build and maintain public support. |
| Date: | 2025–08–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xhuz5_v1 |