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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Steven T. Berry (Yale University); Christian Cox (University of Arizona); Philip A. Haile (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | We study voting in general elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. Our data set includes demographics and turnout of all registered voters for the years 2016Ð2020, as well as vote shares at the precinct and contest level. We estimate a Downsian voting model incorporating rich observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the voter and contest level. We find that voters with high perceived voting costs tend to favor Democrats, as do marginal voters in most districts. Variation in state voting policies accounts for a modest share of overall estimated voting costs but is sufficient to determine the majority party in some years. We also find that many statesÕ district maps favor one party in converting votes to seats. On net these biases favor Republicans. For example, we estimate that winning 50% of votes in every state would give Republicans a 9 percentage point seat advantage in the House. |
| Date: | 2025–08–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2453 |
| By: | Aaron Günther; Niklas Potrafke; Felix Rösel; Timo Wochner |
| Abstract: | What are the consequences of losing political representation in a democracy? A reform of Germany’s mixed electoral system left more than 7 million citizens in 23 constituencies without a directly elected representative after the 2025 national election. Which and how many constituencies were affected was unpredictable and quasi-random. We show that losing political representation reduces citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, discontent is independent of party preferences and spreads through social networks, reducing democratic satisfaction even among individuals who were unaware of the reform’s outcome. Political representation is a cornerstone of democracy; its erosion may give rise to democratic backsliding. |
| Keywords: | political representation, democracy, social networks |
| JEL: | D02 D72 P11 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12051 |
| By: | Klaus Gründler; Niklas Potrafke; Timo Wochner |
| Abstract: | Many democracies allow their legislators to engage in private employment, but the consequences for parliamentary priorities are still poorly understood. We collect large-scale longitudinal data on outside employment and biographic characteristics for all members of the 18th German Bundestag, and link this information to all spoken words and voting behavior in parliament. We present novel evidence that outside employment is associated with parliamentary priorities. Legislators address topics of sectors from which they receive private income more often, are more positive about these sectors, and take a generally more pro-industry stance in legislation. Our results have important implications regarding the independence of legislators. |
| Keywords: | MPs’ outside earnings, payment of politicians, lobbying |
| JEL: | D72 H11 K40 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12016 |
| By: | D. Carlos Akkar |
| Abstract: | I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who can acquire it at cost, and a strategic lobbyist who wishes the policy to be enacted. I show that the dictatorship of the most-demanding member is a dominant voting mechanism: any other voting mechanism is (i) less likely to enact a good policy, (ii) more likely to enact a bad policy, and (iii) burdens each member with a greater cost of acquiring information. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.21699 |
| By: | Sourav Das (University of Kassel); Patrick Hufschmidt (Technical University of Dortmund); Fabian Mankat (University of Kassel); Konstantinos Theocharopoulos (University of Siegen) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines Political Budget Cycles in federal systems, focusing on how a central incumbent allocates discretionary transfers across states in response to electoral incentives. We develop a theoretical model predicting that average discretionary transfers increase during federal election periods. While swing states consistently receive higher discretionary transfers due to their electoral competitiveness, the election-period increase is larger for non-swing states. Using a panel dataset of Indian states from 2006 to 2022, we find evidence consistent with the theoretical model: discretionary transfers are significantly higher in federal election periods, swing states receive more discretionary transfers in non-election periods, and the election-period increase in discretionary transfers is more pronounced for non-swing states. |
| Keywords: | Political budget cycles, Swing states, Federal systems, Elections, India |
| JEL: | D83 E62 H70 H72 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202518 |