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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Francesco Berlingieri (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Global Labor Organization (GLO)); Béatrice d’Hombres (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)); Matija Kovacic (European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC); Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Global Labor Organization (GLO)) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the relationship between loneliness, trust, and populist voting across both extremes of the ideological spectrum. The contribution of this research is mainly two-fold. First, it considers different dimensions of loneliness and accounts for its predetermined component stemming from social isolation in childhood and adverse childhood experiences. Second, it disentangles the effects of loneliness and trust by incorporating actual trust behaviour from a large-scale trust game experiment conducted in 27 European member states, involving more than 25, 000 individuals. The richness of the data allows to account for and disentangle the impact of competitive explanatory factors such as emotions, objective social isolation, social media use and economic preferences. The main findings suggest the following: (i) social loneliness significantly impacts populist voting, particularly on the extreme right, whereas the emotional dimension of loneliness is associated with more left-leaning, but non-populist, voting preferences; (ii) higher levels of actual trust are associated with lower support for right-wing populist parties; (iii) loneliness and trust operate through distinct channels: loneliness exerts a greater impact on women and older individuals, while trust plays a more significant role among men and middle-aged individuals, and (iv) the effect of social loneliness on support of populist parties is significantly attenuated in contexts with a history of recurrent economic crises, suggesting a potential experience-based learning mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Loneliness, interpersonal trust, political polarisation, populism |
| JEL: | D72 D91 P00 C91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2025:11 |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier (LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg); Stefano Iandolo (DISES, Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy.); Hillel Rapoport (Paris School of Economics, France, CEPII, LISER and CEPR); Riccardo Turati (Department of Applied Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain.); Gonzague Vannoorenberghe (IRES-LIDAM, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We propose new ways to measure populism, using the Manifesto Project Database (1960-2019) as main source of data. We characterize the evolution of populism over 60 years and show empirically that it is significantly impacted by the skill-content of globalization. Specifically, imports of goods which are intensive in low-skill labor generate more right-wing populism, and low-skill immigration shifts the distribution of votes to the right, with more votes for right-wing populist parties and less for left-wing populist parties. In contrast, imports of high-skill labor intensive goods, as well as high-skill immigration flows, tend to reduce the volume of populism. |
| Keywords: | Globalization, Populism, Immigration, Trade. |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea2509 |
| By: | D\'ora Gr\'eta Petr\'oczy |
| Abstract: | In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the decision-maker's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting weights and the actual voting power do not necessarily coincide. Changing a decision threshold would offer some remedy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of the most important international organisations that uses a weighted voting system to make decisions. The voting weights in its Board of Governors depend on the quotas of the 191 member countries, which reflect their economic strengths to some extent. We analyse the connection between the decision threshold and the a priori voting power of the countries by calculating the Banzhaf indices for each threshold between 50% and 87\%. The difference between the quotas and voting powers is minimised if the decision threshold is 58% or 60%. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.16654 |
| By: | Patrick A. Testa; Jhacova A. Williams |
| Abstract: | Election results act as powerful signals, shaping social behavior in ways that can be dramatic and even violent. This paper shows how racial violence in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South was tied to the local performance of the anti-Black Democratic Party in presidential elections. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close presidential vote shares, we find that Southern counties where Democrats lost the popular vote between 1880 and 1900 were nearly twice as likely to experience Black lynchings in the following four years. This backlash was enkindled by local elites, who amplified narratives of Black criminality through newspapers after such defeats. These findings point to the strategic use of racial violence by Democratic elites, prefiguring the formal vote suppression of Jim Crow. |
| JEL: | D72 D83 I31 J15 N31 O10 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34004 |
| By: | Raul Magni-Berton (ESPOL-LAB - ESPOL-LAB - ESPOL - European School of Political and Social Sciences / École Européenne de Sciences Politiques et Sociales - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille); Simon Varaine (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | Previous research shows that elected governments primarily follow the preferences of high-income citizens, but the reasons for this remain controversial. In the present paper, we introduce a new synthetic measure of electoral plutocracy, i.e. the relative electoral weight of the rich compared to the poor for a given government in a parliamentary regime. The index takes into account three sources of electoral distortion that may favor the rich: i) the conversion of persons into votes (turnout), ii) the conversion of votes into seats (representation), iii) the conversion of seats into government portfolios (coalition). Using survey data on parliamentary democracies since the late 1990s, we show that, on average, a person above the median income is electorally worth 1.16 times a person below the median income (and a person from the 10th decile is electorally worth 1.48 times a person from the 1st decile). This is mainly explained by higher turnout and higher participation in governing coalitions of parties supported electorally by the rich. Finally, we illustrate the interest of our index by re-testing the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis on the link between income inequality and redistribution. We show that the positive effect of inequality on redistribution is moderated by the level of electoral plutocracy. |
| Keywords: | Inequality, Redistribution, Voter turnout, Representation, Coalition |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05167160 |