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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15323 |
| By: | Bloem, Michael D. (College Board); Holbein, John B. (University of Virginia); Imlay, Samuel J. (College Board); Smith, Jonathan (Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | Using millions of siblings in the U.S., we detail three findings that quantify whether siblings influence one another to vote in national elections. First, and descriptively, younger siblings are 10 percentage points (50 percent) more likely to vote in their first eligible election when their older sibling votes in a prior election. Second, roughly one-third of this is caused by the older sibling voting, as determined by age-of-voting-eligibility thresholds in a regression discontinuity design. Third, the causal impact of a sibling voting runs in the other direction as well---younger siblings increase the probability of their older siblings voting in their early 20's by 14 percent. These results demonstrate the influence and importance of family and peers in creating an engaged citizenry and underscore that across a wide array of policy domains, conventional impact evaluations do not fully account for all of policies' impacts. |
| Keywords: | voting, civic engagement, political socialization, family, siblings, spillovers, peer effects |
| JEL: | J18 D19 D7 D72 D04 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17962 |
| By: | Jachimowicz, Jessica; Puppe, Clemens |
| Abstract: | Deliberative decision-making is often proposed as a mechanism to mitigate polarization in democratic processes. However, empirical evidence remains mixed, with some studies suggesting that deliberation among like-minded individuals can drive preference shifts toward extremes. We use a three-round group dictator game to systematically examine how group composition influences deliberative outcomes. Our design allows us to compare deliberation within like-minded and mixed-minded groups while also manipulating the voting rule (median vs. unanimity) to assess its impact on decision-making. Contrary to expectations of polarization, we find that deliberation moderates preferences across all conditions. This effect is strongest for selfish participants in mixed-minded groups, but also like-minded selfish groups behave significantly less extreme than individuals. On the other hand, the moderating effect of deliberation does not persist when subjects revert back to individual decision-making. Regardless of the voting rule, groups tend to converge on unanimous decisions, suggesting norm-driven behavior in deliberative and participatory settings. Our findings contribute to ongoing debates on the role of group composition and decision rules in shaping collective outcomes in social dilemmas. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:319615 |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not do so. I then show that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a voting rule satisfying the democratic principles of anonymity, optimality, monotonicity, and neutrality is self-equivalent if and only if it assigns to every voter equal probability of being a dictator (i.e., uniform random dictatorship). Thus, any society that desires stability and adheres to the aforementioned democratic principles is bound to either employ the uniform random dictatorship or decide whether to change its voting rule using a voting rule other than itself. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15310 |
| By: | H\'ector Hermida-Rivera; Toygar T. Kerman |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In Theorem 1, we show that a neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is universally self-selective. We then use this equivalence to show, in Corollary 1, that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, a unanimous and neutral voting rule is binary self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, we show that whenever there is a strong Condorcet winner; a unanimous, neutral and anonymous voting rule is binary self-selective (or universally self-selective) if and only if it is the Condorcet voting rule. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.15265 |
| By: | Alban de Gmeline (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | What was the impact of rail development on electoral behaviour in France? This paper quantifies the impact of the opening of stations on voting in the 1902 election. It distinguishes the specific effect linked to the opening of a news agent in stations. The analysis is based on a new dataset from the archives of Hachette who had a monopoly on these news agents in French railway stations. These selling points account for 2.64% of the 42.46% of votes obtained by the left-wing alliance in 1902. A political bias of Hachette may partly explain this effect. These results underscore the importance of transport infrastructure and information access in shaping political behaviors. |
| JEL: | N73 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–03–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmh:wpaper:41 |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Asuman Ozdaglar; James Siderius |
| Abstract: | We consider the political consequences of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by online platforms engaged in social media content dissemination, entertainment, or electronic commerce. We identify two distinct but complementary mechanisms, the social media channel and the digital ads channel, which together and separately contribute to the polarization of voters and consequently the polarization of parties. First, AI-driven recommendations aimed at maximizing user engagement on platforms create echo chambers (or “filter bubbles”) that increase the likelihood that individuals are not confronted with counter-attitudinal content. Consequently, social media engagement makes voters more polarized, and then parties respond by becoming more polarized themselves. Second, we show that party competition can encourage platforms to rely more on targeted digital ads for monetization (as opposed to a subscription-based business model), and such ads in turn make the electorate more polarized, further contributing to the polarization of parties. These effects do not arise when one party is dominant, in which case the profit-maximizing business model of the platform is subscription-based. We discuss the impact regulations can have on the polarizing effects of AI-powered online platforms. |
| JEL: | L10 M37 P40 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33892 |
| By: | Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin; Warut Suksompong; Markus Utke |
| Abstract: | We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in which the budget is not perfectly divisible, we depart from the prevailing literature by restricting the mechanism to output allocations that assign integral amounts. This seemingly minor deviation has significant implications for the existence of truthful mechanisms. Specifically, when voters can propose fractional allocations, we demonstrate that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be extended to our setting. In contrast, when voters are restricted to integral ballots, we identify a class of truthful mechanisms by adapting moving-phantom mechanisms to our context. Moreover, we show that while a weak form of proportionality can be achieved alongside truthfulness, (stronger) proportionality notions derived from approval-based committee voting are incompatible with truthfulness. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.05708 |
| By: | Christensen, Love (Aarhus University); Persson, Mikael (University of Gothenburg); Schwenk, Jana (University of Gothenburg) |
| Abstract: | Economic voting theory suggests that voters reward incumbents for strong economic performance and punish them for weak performance. However, this view often ignores the multidimensional nature of the economy. Hence, we lack systematic evidence about how voters simultaneously process multiple economic signals. This study provides a comprehensive examination of how voters respond to four key economic dimensions: growth, unemployment, inflation, and stock markets. We develop a theoretical framework distinguishing between different types of economic reasoning: macroeconomic, egotropic, sociotropic, and distributive reasoning. We first use descriptive data from OECD countries to understand the economy’s dimensionality and analyze survey data from national election studies to assess the impact on economic evaluations. Finally, we present findings from survey experiments conducted in Germany, Sweden, and the United States, tailored to analyze the impact of the four economic dimensions in an ideal information setting. Our results reveal interesting patterns in how voters process economic information. Voters can discern relationships between economic dimensions and their effects on personal and economic circumstances, and distributional outcomes. Subsequently, all four signals independently affect preferences for economic policy and voting intentions. Inflation emerges as a dominant factor, shaping personal and national economic evaluations. Our findings challenge traditional approaches to economic voting by exploring how voters integrate multiple economic signals. By emphasizing the multidimensionality of economic signals, we highlight implications for democratic accountability. |
| Keywords: | Economic voting; macroeconomic analyses; survey experiments; voter reasoning; political behavior |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2025_010 |
| By: | Aurel Stenzel; Johannes Lohse; Till Requate; Israel Waichman |
| Abstract: | We characterize 'Games of Altruistic Cooperation' as a class of games in which cooperation leaves the individual and the group of decision-makers worse off than defection, but favors individuals outside the group. An example is climate change mitigation. In this context, we experimentally investigate whether decentralized institutions using costly punishment and/or communication support altruistic cooperation to sustain the welfare of future generations. Without punishment or communication, cooperation is low; communication alone even increases the incidence of zero contributions. However, combining peer punishment with communication strongly increases cooperation, showing that an effective decentralized solution to a Game of Altruistic Cooperation exists. |
| Keywords: | games of altruistic cooperation, social dilemma, intergenerational good game, punishment, communication |
| JEL: | C92 D74 H41 Q54 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11880 |
| By: | Lights, Zion; Niemietz, Kristian; Snowdon, Christopher |
| Abstract: | [Foreword:] The theoretical advantage of single-issue pressure groups is that they can form broad coalitions, gathering people from across the political spectrum who need not agree on anything other than the group's single issue. For example, Women Against State Pension Inequality (WASPI) is a group that campaigns for financial compensation for women affected by the increase in the state pension age. That is all they do. WASPI do not express a view on whether or not Britain should rejoin the EU, abolish the monarchy, convert the House of Lords into an elected upper chamber, or replace the First Past The Post electoral system with Proportional Representation. With that strategy, they have managed to attract support from many different corners of the political spectrum without attaching themselves to any of those. Curiously, though, many high-profile single-issue pressure groups are not like that at all. Black Lives Matter (BLM), Extinction Rebellion (XR), Just Stop Oil (JSO), Mermaids, the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC) are very much not cross-ideological broadchurch coalitions. They are remarkably politically homogenous, including on issues that have nothing to do with their stated cause. They draw almost all of their support from one specific corner of the political spectrum. This is because groups that present themselves as single-issue campaigns often pursue unstated companion causes, the most common one of which is anti-capitalism. The most clear-cut example of this is BLM UK, where the companion cause is not 'unstated' at all, but prominently stated on their FAQ page ('We are […] all anti-capitalists'1 ) and on their GoFundMe page ('Black Lives Matter UK (BLMUK) is […] guided by a commitment to dismantle […] capitalism'2 ). Similarly, XR also regularly tweet about their anti-capitalist orientation. Why would a pressure group do that? Why would they deliberately limit their appeal to one corner of the political spectrum, thus foregoing the main advantage of being a single-issue group? And why would a movement distract from its primary cause by adding an unrelated secondary one? The answer is that for such movements, the primary and the secondary causes are not unrelated at all. For an anti-capitalist, every social problem is really just downstream from capitalism. From that perspective, an 'ally' who is not committed to dismantling capitalism is not a useful ally at all, and there is no harm in losing them. The useful allies are those who would not bother joining the group if it did not have a distinct anticapitalist vibe. (...) |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ieadps:314035 |