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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Pietro Battiston; Marco Magnani; Dimitri Paolini; Luca Rossi |
| Abstract: | We analyze strategic behaviour with positional voting in the context of the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). In the ESC, each country participates both as a candidate, by presenting an artist and a song, and as a voter, via jury members and televote, creating an ideal setting for the study of strategic voting. To determine the final ranking, the contest employs a modified version of Borda voting, where voters are prevented from voting for their country’s artist and song. Nevertheless, we find evidence of strategic behaviour among both industry experts (jury members), and televote. In both cases, voters tend to assign lower scores to close competitors of their country’s candidate. We compare strategic voting in the ESC semifinals, where little information on competitors’ strength is available, and strategic voting is more challenging, with the final, when more information has been revealed. Additionally, we investigate whether the intrinsic quality of songs or other external factors may explain our empirical observations, using data retrieved from Spotify and a specialized website. Beyond revealing that forbidding votes for one’s own candidates is not sufficient to eliminate strategic behaviour, our results underscore the crucial role of information provision, specifically the drawbacks of multistage voting procedures where information is revealed during the election. Overall, they highlight the main limitation of Borda voting as an alternative to plurality voting. |
| Keywords: | Strategic voting, Positional voting, Eurovision Song Contest |
| JEL: | D72 C72 Z11 |
| Date: | 2025–06–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2025/322 |
| By: | Daniel Halpern; Ariel D. Procaccia; Warut Suksompong |
| Abstract: | The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for approval ballots, which we call flexible-voter representation (FVR). We show that while the approval voting rule and other natural scoring rules provide the optimal FVR guarantee only for some flexibility threshold, there exists a scoring rule that is FVR-optimal for all thresholds simultaneously. We also extend our results to multi-winner voting. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.01395 |
| By: | Gerard Domènech-Gironell (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT); Caio Lorecchio (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT); Oriol Tejada (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT) |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of deliberation on political learning and election outcomes. A rational, common-valued electorate votes under majority rule, after potentially acquiring costly private information and sharing it freely through public deliberation. Our findings suggest that deliberation can lead to free-riding on information gathering, but also encourage the emergence of informed political experts. Overall, deliberation may legitimize purely electoral outcomes and yield more accurate decisions. However, deliberation may also reduce electoral accuracy. We provide conditions for these results and contribute to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of deliberative democracies. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Information Acquisition, Deliberation |
| JEL: | D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:479web |
| By: | Haoyang Liu; W. Ben McCartney; Rodney Ramcharan; Calvin Zhang; Xiaohan Zhang |
| Abstract: | Borrowers who refinanced mortgages between 2009 and 2012, a period marked by mortgage distress and dislocated housing markets, but also falling interest rates, were more likely to vote in the 2012 general election than similar borrowers who did not refinance. We exploit an eligibility cutoff in the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) to identify a causal relationship. Consistent with the resource model of voting, the effect of refinancing on turnout is strongest among borrowers with lower incomes and larger debt service reductions. Our findings shed new light on an important channel linking economic conditions and political outcomes. |
| Keywords: | household finance; mortgages; interest rates; political participation; voter turnout |
| JEL: | D12 D14 D72 E43 H31 R20 |
| Date: | 2025–05–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:feddwp:99960 |
| By: | Georg Kirchsteiger; Tom Lenaerts; Remi Suchon |
| Abstract: | Experimental evidence shows that in a repeated dilemma setting cooperation is more likely to become the norm in small matching groups than in large ones. This result holds even if cooperation is an equilibrium outcome for all investigated group sizes. But what happens if small matching groups are merged to become large ones? Our paper is based on the idea that due to norm spillovers, a large group created by a merger of small groups is more likely to cooperate than a large group of similar size that is created directly. We tested this idea experimentally in the context of an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We compared the cooperation behavior of groups that result from mergers of smaller groups with the cooperation behavior of groups with constant group size. We found that cooperation levels were significantly higher in large groups that resulted from gradual growth than in large groups of the same size that were directly created. Looking at the individual behavior, we see that more subjects develop a norm of unconditional cooperation when the group size increases than when it is already large from the beginning. Hence, our results confirm the idea that cooperation is much more likely to be achieved when groups grow from small to large than when large groups are formed directly. |
| Keywords: | Prisoner’s dilemma, Cooperation in repeated games, Group growth, Norm spillover |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/391301 |
| By: | Amanda de Albuquerque; Frederico Finan; Anubhav Jha; Laura Karpuska; Francesco Trebbi |
| Abstract: | We present a methodology for decoupling taste-based versus statistical discrimination in political behavior. We combine a flexible empirical model of voting, featuring vertical and horizontal candidate differentiation in gender, ability, and policy positions, with a large-scale micro-targeted electoral experiment aimed at increasing female candidate vote shares. Our structural econometric approach allows to separately identify preference parameters driving taste-based discrimination and beliefs parameters driving statistical discrimination through expectations about ability and policy positions of female politicians. Our application to Brazilian municipal elections uncovers substantial levels of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Counterfactual political campaigns show promise in reducing both. |
| JEL: | D72 P0 P16 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33859 |
| By: | Eric A. Baldwin; Takuma Iwasaki; John J. Donohue |
| Abstract: | Fatal school shootings often spark support for stricter gun laws, threatening the gun lobby’s influence and agenda. To prevent political fallout, do pro-gun Political Action Committees increase contributions after fatal school shootings? Leveraging a novel dataset of pro-gun PAC contributions and school shooting incidents, we implement a difference-in-differences design with staggered treatment adoption to estimate the causal effect of school shootings on contributions to House candidates. We find that pro-gun PACs increase contributions by 30.2% to candidates in districts with fatal school shootings, but show no significant response to non-fatal school shootings or other mass shootings. The temporal pattern reveals strategic behavior: contribution spikes emerge in the wake of fatal school shootings and in proximity to elections, with effects dramatically amplified as Election Day approaches; within two months of Election Day, contributions increase by 1, 730%. These effects are concentrated in competitive districts (margins of 5%). Our findings provide robust evidence that pro-gun PACs deploy targeted financial contributions in response to school shootings, with the magnitude and timing suggesting a strategic counter-mobilization effort to maintain influence in affected districts when gun policy becomes locally salient and elections are near. Our findings underscore a gap in democratic accountability: while public opinion should drive policy change, organized interests with financial power can insulate political candidates from public pressure and obstruct its translation into legislative reform. |
| JEL: | C21 C22 C23 D72 D78 K00 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33900 |
| By: | Ryoga Doi (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University and Junior Research Fellow, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | We consider situations in which the final ranking of candidates is determined by rankings of multiple factors. For example, in Formula 1 racing, the annual ranking is determined by the results of many races. In sport climbing, the final ranking is determined by combining the results of two or three events. Dependent on rules that aggregate rankings across multiple factors, a candidate can improve the final position of a fellow candidate by holding back her performance without dropping the final position. We call the property of rules that prevent this kind of strategic manipulation assistance-proofness. We show that when there are four or more events, no scoring rule other than the null rule satisfies assistance-proofness. However, when there are two events, all dichotomous scoring rules satisfy assistance-proofness. For three events, we characterize a subclass of dichotomous scoring rules that satisfy assistanceproofness. |
| Keywords: | Assistance-proofness; Scoring rules; Voting; Strategic manipulation; Collusion |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2025-12 |
| By: | Jeff Strnad |
| Abstract: | We develop and apply epistemic tests to various decentralized governance methods as well as to study the impact of participation. These tests probe the ability to reach a correct outcome when there is one. We find that partial abstention is a strong governance method from an epistemic standpoint compared to alternatives such as various forms of ``transfer delegation" in which voters explicitly transfer some or all of their voting rights to others. We make a stronger case for multi-step transfer delegation than is present in previous work but also demonstrate that transfer delegation has inherent epistemic weaknesses. We show that enhanced direct participation, voters exercising their own voting rights, can have a variety of epistemic impacts, some very negative. We identify governance conditions under which additional direct participation is guaranteed to do no epistemic harm and is likely to increase the probability of making correct decisions. In light of the epistemic challenges of voting-based decentralized governance, we consider the possible supplementary use of prediction markets, auctions, and AI agents to improve outcomes. All these results are significant because epistemic performance matters if entities such as DAOs (decentralized autonomous organizations) wish to compete with organizations that are more centralized. |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2505.04136 |
| By: | Vyacheslav Fos; Tommaso Tamburelli; Nancy R. Xu |
| Abstract: | When Federal Reserve districts experience high inflation or low unemployment but lack voting rights to influence FOMC decisions, credit extended to commercial banks through the Discount Window (DW) declines. Our identification strategy is based on the exogenous rotation of voting rights among Reserve Banks and on within borrower-time and district-time variation in DW loans and Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) loans, implying that factors related to changes in macroeconomic conditions, local credit demand, or borrower characteristics do not drive the results. The effect on bank funding sources translates into changes in the composition of loans extended by commercial banks. |
| JEL: | D7 E5 E51 E58 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33853 |
| By: | Cèlia Estruch-Garcia (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Albert Solé-Ollé (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB); Filippo Tassinari (Universitat Pompeu Fabra & BSE & IEB); Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB & CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the electoral effects of Barcelona's Superblocks pedestrianization policy, a green initiative designed to reduce car traffic and enhance urban environments. Using census tract-level data from the 2023 local elections, we assess the policy's impact on support for the incumbent mayor. Our findings reveal a positive and statistically significant increase in votes in areas directly affected by the policy, with benefits also extending to neighboring districts. Importantly, there is no evidence that the intervention led to traffic displacement, which suggests that such disruptions did not provoke electoral backlash. Further analysis indicates that the policy's effects are not driven by concerns over gentrification or mobility disruptions. Instead, the effects are stronger in more educated neighborhoods, pointing to the role of environmental attitudes in shaping political support. These results contribute to the literature on the political economy of green policies, underscoring the importance of localized impacts in shaping electoral outcomes and sustaining públic support for urban climate initiatives. |
| Keywords: | Green policies, Cities, Elections |
| JEL: | D72 Q58 R53 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2025-01 |