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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Th\'eo Delemazure; Rupert Freeman; J\'er\^ome Lang; Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Laslier; Dominik Peters |
| Abstract: | In many proportional parliamentary elections, electoral thresholds (typically 3-5%) are used to promote stability and governability by preventing the election of parties with very small representation. However, these thresholds often result in a significant number of "wasted votes" cast for parties that fail to meet the threshold, which reduces representativeness. One proposal is to allow voters to specify replacement votes, by either indicating a second choice party or by ranking a subset of the parties, but there are several ways of deciding on the scores of the parties (and thus the composition of the parliament) given those votes. We introduce a formal model of party voting with thresholds, and compare a variety of party selection rules axiomatically, and experimentally using a dataset we collected during the 2024 European election in France. We identify three particularly attractive rules, called Direct Winners Only (DO), Single Transferable Vote (STV) and Greedy Plurality (GP). |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2503.17156 |
| By: | Yasushi Sakai; Parfait Atchade-Adelomou; Ryan Jiang; Luis Alonso; Kent Larson; Ken Suzuki |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a voting process in which voters allocate fractional votes to their expected utility in different domains: over proposals, other participants, and sets containing proposals and participants. This approach allows for a more nuanced expression of preferences by calculating the result and relevance within each node. We modeled this by creating a voting matrix that reflects their preference. We use absorbing Markov chains to gain the consensus, and also calculate the influence within the participating nodes. We illustrate this method in action through an experiment with 69 students using a budget allocation topic. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.13641 |
| By: | Raymond Fisman; Jetson Leder-Luis; Catherine M. O'Donnell; Silvia Vannutelli |
| Abstract: | Revolving door laws restrict public officials from representing private interests before government after leaving office. While these laws mitigate potential conflicts of interest, they also may affect the pool of candidates for public positions by lowering the financial benefits of holding office. We study the consequences of revolving door laws for political selection in U.S. state legislatures, exploiting the staggered roll-out of laws across states over time. We find that fewer new candidates enter politics in treated states and that incumbent legislators are less likely to leave office, leading to an increase in uncontested elections. The decline in entry is particularly strong for independent and more moderate candidates, which may increase polarization. We provide a model of politician career incentives to interpret the results. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 K16 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33626 |
| By: | Conconi, Paola; Cucu, Florin; Gallina, Federico; Nordotto, Mattia |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) has long been accused of suffering from a "democratic deficit". The European Parliament (EP), the only EU institution directly elected by citizens, is seen as having limited powers. Moreover, its members (MEPs) are often portrayed as unresponsive to the interests of their constituents due to the second-order nature of European elections: instead of being shaped by EU policies, they are driven by domestic politics. In this paper, we provide evidence against these Eurosceptic arguments using data on a key policy choice made by MEPs: the approval of free trade agreements. First, we show that MEPs are responsive to the trade policy interests of their electorate, a result that is robust to controlling for a rich set of controls, fixed effects, and employing an instrumental variable strategy. Second, we carry out counterfactual exercises demonstrating that the EP's power to reject trade deals can help explain why only agreements with broad political support reach the floor. Finally, against the idea that European elections are driven solely by domestic politics, we find that the degree of congruence between MEPs' trade votes and their electorate's interests affects their re-election chances. |
| Keywords: | EU democratic deficit; European Parliament; roll-call votes; trade agreements |
| JEL: | F13 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:126839 |