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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Gualtieri, Giovanni (National Research Council, Italy); Nicolini, Marcella (University of Pavia); Sabatini, Fabio (Sapienza University of Rome); Ventura, Marco (Sapienza University of Rome) |
| Abstract: | We study the electoral repercussions of the L'Aquila earthquake in 2009, one of Italy's most catastrophic post-WWII seismic events. We construct a unique municipality-level dataset, combining high-resolution data on the ground acceleration recorded during the earthquake with European election results and social capital metrics. Our findings indicate that the intensity of the shock positively influenced support for the incumbent national government but provided no electoral advantage to local incumbents. Analyzing potential transmission mechanisms, we find that relief measures did not automatically translate into political rewards. Instead, social capital played a pivotal role in shaping post--disaster electoral outcomes. The national government's electoral gains were concentrated in municipalities with a low density of civic organizations, where citizens relied predominantly on political institutions for assistance. Individual level evidence from survey data further supports our findings. Nonetheless, the impact of the earthquake was not enduring. In the subsequent elections, the incumbent government experienced a decline in support in the very municipalities where it had initially gained favor following the disaster. |
| Keywords: | elections, relief spending, redistribution, social capital, natural disasters, Italy, Silvio Berlusconi |
| JEL: | D72 H10 H12 Q54 Z1 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17758 |
| By: | Federico Weinschelbaum; David K. Levine; Felipe Zurita |
| Abstract: | Does the ability of the electorate to replace corrupt politicians deter corruption? This paper analyzes the limitations of electoral accountability. We show that if the electorate cannot commit elections offer no defense against corruption. However, when a commitment technology exists, the electorate can strategically choose to remove only those caught taking bribes. This incentivizes corrupt politicians to pass up bribe opportunities for which the value is small. We then examine how improved monitoring can impact outcomes and show that increasing information quality does not always benefit the electorate. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udt:wpecon:2025_08 |
| By: | Barbara Biasi; Wayne Sandholtz |
| Abstract: | Public service reforms often provoke political backlash. Can they also yield political benefits for the politicians who champion them? We study a Wisconsin law that weakened teachers' unions and liberalized pay, prompting mass protests. Exploiting its staggered implementation across school districts, we find that the reform cut union revenues, raised student test scores, and increased pay for some teachers. Exposure to the law increased the incumbent governor's vote share by about 20% of his margin of victory and reduced campaign contributions to his opponent. Gains were larger in districts with stronger unions ex ante and in those where more voters benefited from the reform. Our findings highlight how even politically risky reforms can generate electoral benefits under the right circumstances. |
| Keywords: | education reform, political feasibility, collective bargaining, teacher salaries. |
| JEL: | I20 P46 P11 J31 J45 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11817 |
| By: | Levi, Eugenio (Link Campus University); Bayerlein, Michael (German Institute for International and Security Affairs); Grimalda, Gianluca (University of Passau); Reggiani, Tommaso G. (Cardiff University) |
| Abstract: | We study how preferences for migration-related narratives differ between private and public contexts and how social media fuel opinion polarization. Using a German representative sample (n=1, 226), we found that individuals, especially from the left and center, avoided publicly endorsing anti-migration narratives. In an experiment on Twitter (n=19, 989) we created four Twitter profiles, each endorsing one of the narratives. Far-right users exhibited markedly different engagement patterns. While initial public endorsements, measured by follow-back rates, aligned with private preferences, social media interactions amplified support for the most hostile and polarizing narrative. We conclude that social media significantly distort private preferences and amplify polarization. |
| Keywords: | immigration, narratives, political polarization, economic reciprocity, survey experiment, field experiment, group identity, social media, Twitter |
| JEL: | D72 D91 C93 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17749 |
| By: | Kensei Nakamura; Shohei Yanagita |
| Abstract: | When a collective decision maker presents a menu of uncertain prospects to her group members, each member's choice depends on their predictions about payoff-relevant states. In reality, however, these members hold different predictions; more precisely, they have different prior beliefs about states and predictions about the information they will receive. In this paper, we develop an axiomatic framework to examine collective decision making under such disagreements. First, we characterize two classes of representations: Bewley multiple learning (BML) representations, which are unanimity rules among predictions, and justifiable multiple learning (JML) representations, where a single prediction has veto power. Furthermore, we characterize a general class of representations called hierarchical multiple learning representations, which includes BML and JML representations as special cases. Finally, motivated by the fact that these representations violate completeness or intransitivity due to multiple predictions, we propose a rationalization procedure for constructing complete and transitive preferences from them. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.04368 |
| By: | Alastair Langtry |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model of network formation and public goods provision in local communities. Here, networks can sustain public good provision by spreading information about people's behaviour. I find a critical threshold in network connectedness at which public good provision drops sharply, even though agents are highly heterogeneous. Technology change can tear a community's social fabric by pushing high-skilled workers to withdraw from their local community. This can help explain rising resentment toward perceived ``elites'' -- their withdrawal actively harms those left behind. Moreover, well-meaning policies that upskill workers can make them worse off by reducing network connectedness. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.06872 |