nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2025–04–28
eight papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. On Pendular Voting By Hans Gersbach
  2. The TikTok factor: Young voters and the support for the populist right By Janne Tukiainen; Ilona Lahdelma; Mika Maliranta; Risto Rönkkö; Juho Saari
  3. Elite Reform and Mass Resistance: Female Suffrage and Political Preferences in Germany, 1893-1933 By Mathias Bühler; Navid Sabet
  4. Pay Incentives in Politics: Evaluating a Large-Scale Salary Increase for Local Politicians By Augusto Cerqua; Samuel Nocito; Gabriele Pinto
  5. Economic Shocks and the Electoral Fortunes of Effective Legislators By Davide Cipullo; Barton E. Lee
  6. Left-behind regions in Poland, Germany, Czechia: Classification and electoral implications By Bernard, Josef; Refisch, Martin; Grzelak, Anna; Bański, Jerzy; Deppisch, Larissa; Konopski, Michał; Kostelecký, Tomáš; Kowalski, Mariusz; Klärner, Andreas
  7. Institutional rules and biased rule enforcement By Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; Rablen, Matthew D.
  8. The Cost of Tolerating Intolerance: Right-Wing Protest and Hate Crimes By Sulin Sardoschau; Annalí Casanueva Artís

  1. By: Hans Gersbach
    Abstract: “Pendular Voting” presents a novel two-stage voting procedure: A randomly chosen citizen group votes on a proposal replacing the status quo. Depending on the outcome, a “counterproposal” ensues, that is closer to/further away from the status quo than the original proposal. All citizens vote pairwise on the status quo, initial proposal, and counterproposal (majority voting), the counterproposal being the default outcome in case of cyclical collective preferences. We analyze the process on a one-dimensional policy space, allowing for uncertainty about preference distribution. Manipulation may only occur in the first stage, without impacting the final outcome. Pendular Voting can engineer outcomes closer to the median voter’s preferences than standard procedures, even with selfish agenda setters.
    Keywords: democracy, manipulation, information sharing, referendum.
    JEL: C72 D70 D72
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11783
  2. By: Janne Tukiainen; Ilona Lahdelma; Mika Maliranta; Risto Rönkkö; Juho Saari
    Abstract: Young voters’ electoral behavior has been a particular target of interest because young people waver between apolitical and radical attitudes and the formally dominant main-stream parties suffer from this the most. We examine possible explanations into why this shift away from mainstream parties is happening by a conjoint survey experiment that tested for possible differences in policy preferences between young people aged 15 –29 and adults aged 30 – 79. We also survey the respondents’ media consumption habits, political sophistication, and trust in institutions. Results show that even though young people in Finland show no differences on average in policy preferences when compared to adults, they were systematically more in favor of voting for the populist extreme right. This difference is likely to stem from the young men who have less trust in institutions and less political sophistication than adults and an increased likelihood to get their political information from TikTok.
    Keywords: TikTok, young voters, political communication, policy preferences, political socialization
    Date: 2024–12–18
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pst:wpaper:351
  3. By: Mathias Bühler; Navid Sabet
    Abstract: Who drives social change—the people or activist elites? While progressive reforms are often championed by elites, their preferences may diverge from those of the broader group they aim to represent, producing unintended political consequences. We study this dynamic in the context of female suffrage in Germany, a reform driven by activist elites but ultimately lacking support from the broader female electorate. Using newly digitized voting data from Munich, linked to individual socioeconomic records, we identify the political preferences of elite and non-elite women. We exploit variation in elite composition based on pre-franchise socioeconomic characteristics, as well as variation in World War I widowhood, which increased the observability of non-elite women in household records. Precincts with more elite women supported the social-liberal party that had long advocated women’s rights, while those with greater non-elite female presence shifted toward nationalist parties promoting traditional gender norms. This divergence persists across multiple elections and is not explained by warrelated shocks or male voting behavior. Our findings suggest that formal inclusion alone may be insufficient to shift entrenched social and political hierarchies.
    Keywords: suffrage, elite
    JEL: N40 D70 P40
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11771
  4. By: Augusto Cerqua; Samuel Nocito; Gabriele Pinto
    Abstract: We evaluate the impact of a recent reform that sharply increased the salaries of Italian local politicians on electoral competition and the valence attributes of the candidates elected. Exploiting misaligned election dates across Italian cities, we propose a novel methodology, the time-shifted control design (TSCD), to estimate the reform’s impact on municipalities up to 30, 000 inhabitants, representative of almost the entire universe of Italy’s local administrative units. We find a boost in the entry of new political candidates after the first post-reform electoral round, with no significant enhancement in the overall quality of the political class. These outcomes possibly stem from the varying distribution of compliers—whose candidacy decision is influenced by the reform—across diverse political and economic contexts. Thus, we find that in less affluent areas or those with fewer entry barriers, the pay rise drew a larger number of mayoral candidates, encouraging individuals from outside the political sphere to enter the competition. In the poorest contexts, we also observe a shift in the profile of councilors and members of the mayor’s executive committee, where the pay rise attracted individuals with lower educational levels but with experience in white-collar positions.
    Keywords: local governments, politicians’ wages, time-shifted control design
    JEL: D04 D72 J45 C13
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11778
  5. By: Davide Cipullo; Barton E. Lee
    Abstract: Analyzing U.S. House elections (2002-2010), measures of legislators’ effectiveness, and exogenous increases in Chinese import competition, we document a conditional relationship between legislative effectiveness and electoral success. In districts ex-posed to large trade shocks, incumbent legislators who were more effective legislators were more likely to be reelected compared to less effective incumbents. Instead, in districts exposed to small trade shocks, more effective incumbents were less likely to be reelected. Our results are driven by trade shocks affecting voters’ preferences for policy change and, in turn, their support for effective legislators. Our results have consequences for the effectiveness of future legislators.
    Keywords: legislative effectiveness, China shock, elections, trade shock
    JEL: D72 F14 P00
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11791
  6. By: Bernard, Josef; Refisch, Martin; Grzelak, Anna; Bański, Jerzy; Deppisch, Larissa; Konopski, Michał; Kostelecký, Tomáš; Kowalski, Mariusz; Klärner, Andreas
    Abstract: Recently, the notion of left-behind places and regions has gained ground in academic debates on regional inequality and changing electoral landscapes. This paper proposes an approach to conceptualising and measuring regional "left-behindness" in three Central Eastern European countries that goes beyond a dichotomous division of regions into "left-behind" versus "not left-behind". It understands left-behindness as a multi-dimensional continuum, representing regional disparities in living standards and socio-economic opportunities. Our understanding of left-behind plades is based to a large extent on the current economic conditions of the regions and their dynamics, but goes beyond them to include a wider range of socially relevant aspects of the living conditions, including educational attainment, poverty, and the attractiveness of places to live. The paper proposes an approach to measuring regional left-behindness and explores how it explains voting patterns. Thus, the paper is motivated by the seminal arguments of the 'geography of discontent' debate. Its proponents have argued that rising support for populist, right-wing nationalist-conservative and antisystem parties is often closely linked to spatial patterns of regional inequality. This argument has been repeatedly tested in Western European countries, but has remained under-researched in Central Eastern Europe. Using our approach, we were able to confirm the validity of the "geography of discontent" as a central thesis for all three countries studied. The novelty and added value of this study is that it extends the understanding of left-behindness and voting. Our multidimensional approach to left-behindness allows for a comprehensive interpretation of spatial patterns of populist voting in Central Eastern Europe. The relationship between regional left-behindness and voting behaviour varies in strength across different countries. In Czechia, there are strong associations for the parties ANO and SPD, but not for the KSéCM. In eastern Germany, the association between leftbehindness and support for the AfD is weaker, as is the case in Poland for the PiS. Another contribution of the multidimensional concept of left-behindness is the finding that different dimensions of left-behindness have different electoral effects. There appears to be a systematic influence of economic prosperity and relative expansion, which primarily capturesthe contrast between metropolitan areas and their hinterlands on the one hand, versus the rest of the country on the other-not only in terms of economic prosperity and relative expansion, but also in terms of a significant social status hierarchy. Poverty, however, shows a less stable relationship.
    Abstract: Der Begriff der "abgehängten" Orte und Regionen hat in akademischen Debatten über regionale Disparitäten und sich verändernde Wahllandschaften an Bedeutung gewonnen. Dieses Paper schlägt einen Ansatz zur Konzeptualisierung und Messung regionaler Disparitäten in drei mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern vor, der über eine dichotomische Unterteilung der Regionen in "abgehängt" versus "nicht abgehängt" hinausgeht. "Abgehängtheit" wird als ein mehrdimensionales Kontinuum verstanden, das regionale Disparitäten in Bezug auf Lebensstandards und sozioökonomische Chancen darstellt. Unser Verständnis von "abgehängten" Regionen basiert weitgehend auf den aktuellen wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen der Regionen und deren Dynamik, geht jedoch darüber hinaus und schließt ein breites Spektrum sozial relevanter Aspekte der Lebensbedingungen ein, einschließlich Bildungsniveau und Armut. Das Paper schlägt einen neuen Ansatz zur Messung regionaler Disparitäten vor und untersucht, wie diese Wahlverhalten erklären. Das Paper nimmt Bezug auf die grundlegenden Argumente der Debatte über die "Geographie der Unzufriedenheit". Darin wird argumentiert, dass die zunehmende Unterstützung für populistische, rechtspopulistische national-konservative und Anti-System-Parteien oft eng mit räumlichen Mustern regionaler Disparitäten verbunden ist. Diese These wurde wiederholt in westeuropäischen Ländern getestet, jedoch in Mittel- und Osteuropa noch unzureichend untersucht. Mit unseren Analysen können wir die Gültigkeit der Annahmen der "Geographie der Unzufriedenheit"für alle drei untersuchten Länder im Grundsatz bestätigen. Die Neuheit und der Mehrwert dieses Papers bestehen darin, dass darin das Verständnis von regionalen Disparitäten und Wahlverhalten erweitert wird. Unser multidimensionaler Ansatz zur Messung regionaler Disparitäten ermöglicht eine umfassende Interpretation räumlicher Muster populistischen Wahlverhaltens in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die Beziehung zwischen regionalem "Abgehängtsein" und Wahlverhalten variiert in ihrer Stärke zwischen den verschiedenen Ländern. In Tschechien bestehen starke Assoziationen zu den Parteien ANO und SPD, jedoch nicht zur KSéCM. In Ostdeutschland ist der Zusammenhang zwischen "Abgehängtsein" und Unterstützung für die AfD schwächer, ebenso wie in Polen für die PiS. Ein weiterer Beitrag des multidimensionalen Konzepts des "Abgehängtseins" ist die Erkenntnis, dass verschiedene Dimensionen unterschiedliche Wahleffekte haben. Es scheint einen systematischen Einfluss von wirtschaftlichem Wohlstand und regionalem Wachstum zu geben, der sich vor allem in Unterschieden zwischen städtischen Gebieten und deren ländlichem Umland einerseits und dem Rest des Landes andererseits zeigt. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Armut und sozialer Exklusion auf der einen Seite und dem Wahlverhalten auf der anderen Seite ist jedoch weniger stabil.
    Keywords: Geographie der Unzufriedenheit, politische Geographie, abgehängte Regionen, regionale Disparitäten, Wahlgeographie, Deutschland, Tschechien, Polen, Europäische Union, geography of discontent, political geography, left-behind places, regional disparities, electoral geography, Germany, Czechia, Poland, European Union
    JEL: D72 O18 O57
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:jhtiwp:312565
  7. By: Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; Rablen, Matthew D.
    Abstract: This study investigates how institutional rules and fairness in enforcement affect cooperation and compliance in heterogenous groups. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1, 254), we vary both the existence of a rule governing contributions to a public good as well as whether enforcement of the rule is biased against some players. We find that merely stating a rule has a stronger effect on behaviour than rule enforcement. Specifically, institutional rules promote cooperation by strengthening personal and social norms, which in turn sustains contributions over time. In contrast, in the absence of a rule, norms are weaker and contributions decline. Fair rule enforcement reduces free-riding and increases compliance, but it also crowds out full cooperation. Finally, we find no evidence that biased rule enforcement erodes norms, reduces cooperation, or diminishes rule compliance. Our findings highlight the crucial role of institutional rules in strengthening norms and sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups, even in the absence of enforcement or when rule enforcement is biased.
    Keywords: public goods, rule compliance, rule enforcement, social norms
    JEL: H41 C72 C91 C92
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluord:315749
  8. By: Sulin Sardoschau; Annalí Casanueva Artís
    Abstract: Freedom of speech is central to democracy, but protests that amplify extremist views expose a critical trade-off between civil liberties and public safety. This paper investigates how right-wing demonstrations affect the incidence of hate crimes, focusing on Germany’s largest far-right movement since World War II. Leveraging a difference-in-differences framework with instrumental variable and event-study approaches, we find that a 20% increase in local protest attendance nearly doubles hate crime occurrences. We explore three potential mechanisms—signaling, agitation, and coordination—by examining protest dynamics, spatial diffusion, media influence, counter-mobilization, and crime characteristics. Our analysis reveals that large protests primarily act as signals of broad xenophobic support, legitimizing extremist violence. This signaling effect propagates through right-wing social media networks and is intensified by local newspaper coverage and Twitter discussions. Consequently, large protests shift local equilibria, resulting in sustained higher levels of violence primarily perpetrated by repeat offenders. Notably, these protests trigger resistance predominantly online, rather than physical counter-protests.
    Keywords: protest, signal, hate crime, refugees, right-wing
    JEL: D74 J15 D83 Z10 D72
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11745

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