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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Michael Eldar; Sinem Hidir |
| Abstract: | Political actors routinely target custom audiences on social media in order to influence elections. We model this process, focusing on the way in which it induces voters to learn about their own preferences. This differs from the past literature, which has focused on party platforms and the effects of bias. We find that the optimal strategy based on some empirically estimated parameters is to target groups favoring one’s opponents, providing a rational explanation for negative campaigning. More generally, log-concave cost of voting distributions can give rise to a non-convex set being targeted—weak supporters of the politician and strong sup porters of their opponent. We make use of this setup to provide a novel analysis of the effects of micro-targeting on turnout, and find a sense in which lower costs of voting encourage negative campaigning. |
| Date: | 2025–04–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:1077 |
| By: | Valentina Bosetti; Italo Colantone; Catherine E. De Vries; Giorgio Musto |
| Abstract: | This narrative review delves into the politics of climate policy, with specific focus on the so-called "green backlash". That is, rising resistance by voters, parties, and governments to the climate transition. We start by reviewing the literature on the political consequences of climate policies. The evidence points to a green backlash among citizens negatively affected by the decarbonization transition. Populist right forces emerge as main beneficiaries of the backlash. They tend to be more skeptical regarding anthropogenic climate change and less supportive of climate policies. Their electoral success has negative implications for countries' climate policy making and performance. Finally, we draw insights from the literature to reflect on what can be done to improve the political sustainability of climate policies. |
| Keywords: | Climate policies; green backlash; right-wing populism |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bcu:greewp:greenwp26 |
| By: | Nina Xue (Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business); Lata Gangadharan (Monash University); Philip J. Grossman (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Many decisions are made by groups operating under uncertainty, with beliefs playing a critical role. However, little is known about how groups, often driven by self-serving motivations, aggregate these beliefs. In an experiment, we examine how groups form and update beliefs following communication. Belief updating in groups is more asymmetric (and pessimistic) but this asymmetry is not driven by self-serving motivations. Based on text analyses, risk is a prominent topic in discussions and we observe a self-serving bias in more risk-averse groups. Group decision making is a necessary but not sufficient condition for biased beliefs – group composition also matters. |
| Keywords: | belief updating, group decision making, self-serving bias, communication, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D23 D83 |
| Date: | 2025–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp375 |
| By: | Wayne Aaron Sandholtz; Pedro C. Vicente |
| Abstract: | Tax revenue is vital for development, but governments must balance raising revenues with maintaining political support. Partnering with a city government in Mozambique, we experimentally vary the provision of information highlighting the role of municipal tax revenues in 1) local public good provision and 2) local political autonomy. We measure how this information affects property owners’ tax morale and political support for the government. Public goods information raises tax morale, especially in areas of low baseline public good provision, but has no effect on voting. The political message increases electoral support generally, but raises tax morale only among co-partisans. These results suggest that communication about the uses of public revenue offers a politically feasible way to increase tax morale. |
| Keywords: | Tax morale, Public goods, Information, Political economy, Experiments, Mozambique |
| JEL: | O12 H00 P00 C93 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp671 |