nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2025–04–14
five papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. Delegated Shareholder Activism By Bernhardt, Dan; Pi, Shaoting
  2. The Electoral Effects of State-Sponsored Homophobia By Bogatyrev, Konstantin; Abou-Chadi, Tarik; Klüver, Heike; Stoetzer, Lukas F.; Haas, Violeta I.
  3. Earthquake strikes twice: electoral (dis)advantage in municipalities without economic recovery aid By Federico Fantechi; Ugo Fratesi; Felipe Livert
  4. National elections and sub-national electoral cycles: Do strong fiscal rules matter in Europe? By Antonia Lopez Villavicencio; Hugo Oriola
  5. Green Collars at the Voting Booth: Material Interest and Environmental Voting By Enrico Cavallotti; Italo Colantone; Piero Stanig; Francesco Vona

  1. By: Bernhardt, Dan (University of Illinois & University of Warwick); Pi, Shaoting (Iowa State University)
    Abstract: Hedge fund activists often aim to convince other shareholders to vote for a particular corporate policy, while majority shareholders recognize that activist recommendations serve their own interests, not necessarily maximizing firm value. We show how an activist can increase the likelihood of a favorable vote by delegating the tasks of acquiring information and making recommendations to another activist. This choice balances motivating the delegated activist to acquire costly information against ensuring shareholders trust the recommendation. We characterize how the hedge fund activist’s bias affects the delegation bias, information acquisition, recommendation and shareholder voting decisions, and firm value.
    Keywords: Hedge Fund Activism ; Delegation ; Information Acquisition ; Recommendations ; Shareholder Voting JEL Codes: D72 ; G23 ; G34 ; D83 ; K22
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1552
  2. By: Bogatyrev, Konstantin; Abou-Chadi, Tarik; Klüver, Heike; Stoetzer, Lukas F.; Haas, Violeta I.
    Abstract: Do strategies of state-sponsored homophobia translate into electoral gains?While a growing body of literature documents the increasing politicization of LGBTQ- and gender-related issues by illiberal elites, little is known about the electoral effects of these strategies. We address this important question by studying whether anti-LGBTQ mobilization pays off electorally for the initiating party. Empirically, we study the adoption of anti-LGBTQ resolu-tions in many Polish municipalities prior to the 2019 parliamentary election. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences design, we find that these resolu-tions significantly depressed turnout in affected municipalities, with oppo-sition parties showing less mobilization capacity. By contrast, turnout for the incumbent Law and Justice Party increased substantially. Overall, this study’s findings are relevant for understanding the electoral consequences of both elite-led mobilization against stigmatized and discriminated groups, and policies of subnational democratic backsliding.
    Keywords: LGBTQ rights; sexuality and politics; political homophobia; political competition; political participation
    Date: 2025–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:130436
  3. By: Federico Fantechi (University of Palermo); Ugo Fratesi (Politecnico di Milano); Felipe Livert (Politecnico di Milano)
    Abstract: Is there electoral punishment for local politicians considered by their citizens to have performed poorly during emergencies? This is studied in the Italian case, where a law officially listing earthquake-affected municipalities also de-facto prevents those left-out from receiving major aid. Electoral results after the four major earthquakes affecting the country over the past three decades are analysed through a difference-in differences approach. Results indicate that mayors of municipalities severely affected by earthquakes and not getting financial support are electorally punished in the next election. The mechanisms are investigated alongside the influence of the local context.
    Keywords: Earthquakes; Electoral Accountability; Voter Turnout; Local Governance; Disaster Recovery; Mayors
    JEL: Q54 D72 R10 R51
    Date: 2024–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ahy:wpaper:wp60
  4. By: Antonia Lopez Villavicencio; Hugo Oriola
    Abstract: This paper investigates Political Business Cycles during national elections across European Union countries and their subnational regions from 1995 to 2022, with a focus on the role of national and supranational fiscal rules. We find robust evidence that national elections are associated with increased regional public spending and reduced income and wealth tax rates. While strong fiscal rules tend to constrain or have limited effect on spending-related PBCs, they simultaneously incentivize tax-based fiscal manipulation, indicating a shift in electoral strategies from expenditure to taxation. This pattern holds across most European countries at both national and regional levels, with variations depending on specific electoral and political systems. We also show that right-wing incumbents engage in both public spending and tax-based opportunistic PBCs, while left-wing incumbents primarily focus on tax-based manipulations. Furthermore, newly elected left-wing incumbents pursue fiscal conservatism, whereas right-wing incumbents typically maintain the fiscal status quo.
    Keywords: Elections; Fiscal rules; Political business cycle; National and regional politics; European Union.
    JEL: D72 E62 H30 H71 H72 O52
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2025-15
  5. By: Enrico Cavallotti (Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics); Italo Colantone (Bocconi University, Department of Social and Political Sciences, GREEN Research Centre, Baffi Research Centre, CESifo & Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Piero Stanig (Bocconi University, Department of Social and Political Sciences, GREEN Research Centre, & Dondena Research Centre); Francesco Vona (University of Milan, Department of Environmental Science and Policy & Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)
    Abstract: We study how occupation-related material interest affects environmental voting. Specifically, material interest hinges on the greenness vs. brownness of individual occupational profiles. That is, on the extent to which individuals are expected to benefit vs. lose in a greener economy. We employ individual-level data from 14 western European countries, over 2010-2019. To measure the greenness and brownness of occupational profiles, for each individual we compute predicted greenness and brownness scores based on the predicted probabilities to be employed in each possible occupation. These probabilities are combined with occupation-specific greenness and brownness scores. Individuals characterized by higher predicted brownness are less likely to vote for Green parties and for parties with a more environmentalist agenda, while the opposite holds for individuals characterized by higher predicted greenness. Voting preferences of brown profiles tend to converge towards those of greener profiles in regions that are better placed to gain from the green transition.
    Keywords: green voting, material interests, green jobs, brown jobs, labour market effects of the green transition
    JEL: D72 Q52 P16
    Date: 2025–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2025.09

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