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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Bernhardt, Dan (University of Illinois & University of Warwick); Pi, Shaoting (Iowa State University) |
| Abstract: | Hedge fund activists often aim to convince other shareholders to vote for a particular corporate policy, while majority shareholders recognize that activist recommendations serve their own interests, not necessarily maximizing firm value. We show how an activist can increase the likelihood of a favorable vote by delegating the tasks of acquiring information and making recommendations to another activist. This choice balances motivating the delegated activist to acquire costly information against ensuring shareholders trust the recommendation. We characterize how the hedge fund activist’s bias affects the delegation bias, information acquisition, recommendation and shareholder voting decisions, and firm value. |
| Keywords: | Hedge Fund Activism ; Delegation ; Information Acquisition ; Recommendations ; Shareholder Voting JEL Codes: D72 ; G23 ; G34 ; D83 ; K22 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wqapec:26 |
| By: | Corchón, Luis C.; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, Bernardo |
| Abstract: | Traditional collusion models typically assume that players coordinatetheir actions actively during the competition process to influence the outcomes.In contrast, we consider a repeated interaction setting betweentwo players where collusion occurs through well-defined strategies: theplayers take turns, with one holding monopoly power while the other eitherrefrains from participating or behaves as if absent. We provide afull characterization of when taking turns constitutes a subgame perfectNash equilibrium in repeated games. By allowing players to discount timedifferently, we uncover a novel, non-monotonic condition on the discountfactor that sustains collusion. We apply our findings to three specificcontexts: contests, duopoly, and political competition. |
| Keywords: | Collusion; Political competition; Repeated games; Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; Take-turns |
| JEL: | D43 C62 C73 D72 |
| Date: | 2025–03–25 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:46355 |
| By: | Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin; Omosun, Foluke |
| Abstract: | This study examines how political engagement shapes public attitudes toward legal immigration in the United States. Using nationally weighted data from the 2024 ANES Pilot Study, we construct a novel Political Engagement Index (PAX) based on five civic actions—discussing politics, online sharing, attending rallies, wearing political symbols, and campaign volunteering. Applying weighted ordered logistic regression models, we find that higher engagement predicts greater support for easing legal immigration, even after adjusting for education, gender, age, partisanship, income, urban residence, and generalized social trust. To capture the substantive effect, we visualize predicted probabilities across levels of engagement. In full-sample models, the likelihood of supporting "a lot harder" immigration drops from 26% to 13% as engagement rises, while support for "a lot easier" increases from 10% to 21%. Subgroup analyses by partisanship show consistent directionality, with notable shifts among Republicans. Social trust and education are also consistently associated with more open attitudes, while older respondents tend to support less easy pathways to legal immigration policies. These findings suggest that a cumulative increase in political participation is associated with support for legal immigration in shaping public attitudes toward legal immigration pathways, with varying intensity across partisan identities and socio-demographic characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Political Engagement, Immigration Policy, Voting Behavior, Civic Participation, Issue Salience, Elite Cues |
| JEL: | D72 F50 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esconf:314938 |