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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Pongou, Roland; Sidie, Ghislain Junior |
| Abstract: | Ranked voting is an election format in which each voter ranks candidates on a ballot, and individual rankings are aggregated using a general rule to produce a social ranking. This paper proposes a non-cooperative model of this electoral system. The setting allows for unequal voting rights, abstention, and social incomparability of candidates, and each voter's utility is measured by how close his or her true preferences are to the social ranking. The analysis uncovers three main findings. First, it proves the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Second, it shows that truthtelling is always a Nash equilibrium regardless of the voting rule and the structure of individual preferences. Third, under mild conditions, truthtelling is Pareto-efficient when voters have strict preferences. Extending the analysis to majoritarian elections with costly voluntary participation shows that truthtelling is an equilibrium if and only if the costs of participation are not too high and the election is tight. The findings have implications for the design of ranked voting systems that are compatible with truthtelling and efficiency while allowing unrestricted freedom in the choice of the voting rule. A reinterpretation of the model in the context of intrapersonal bargaining, where the decision-maker has multiple rational selves, has implications for the occurrence of cyclic individual choices that reflect stable and efficient behavioral patterns. |
| Date: | 2024–07–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:10837 |
| By: | René Van den Brink (Department of Economics and Tinbergen Institute - VU University); Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University); Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce a power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players |
| Keywords: | axiomatization; power index; plurality game; winning coalition |
| JEL: | C71 D62 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24014 |
| By: | Glukhova, Daria (Goethe University Frankfurt) |
| Abstract: | This article explores the patterns of political representation by movement parties and their influence on policy-making in a comparative manner by investigating policy successes of four movement parties – two in Germany (AfD, die Grünen) and two in Italy (M5S, Federazione dei Verdi), - against the policy expectations of the social movements they represent. It shows that movement parties can achieve policy influence and help transmit policy demands of their associated social movements into institutions in other ways than through a powerful position in the government or in parliament. This demonstrates that a party does not have to be in a governing coalition to achieve policy success, nor does being in a government coalition at the time of policy adoption ensure policy survival in the long-term. On the contrary, parties in opposition or with low representation in parliament are able to achieve important policy impact, despite their relatively low popularity in the elections prior or following the adoption of a particular policy. Policy success can be attributed to a number of diverse factors: close alignment with the movement, impact on the agenda-setting stage through implicit or explicit influence of the party, cooptation of policy issues by established political parties, and direct participation in policy-making. The latter, however, does not by itself ensure long-term sustainability of the policy success. We elaborate on the implications of this research on theories of democratic representation, coalition governance, and public policy. |
| Date: | 2025–02–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:x73ds_v1 |
| By: | Panarello, Christian |
| Abstract: | Lichtman's Thirteen Keys Model has, after ten elections of success, succumbed to its first failure in Donald Trump's first victory in both the popular vote and electoral college measures. For his protection of the Keys, he has cited mass misinformation (as he suggests is produced by Elon Musk's ownership of Twitter/X) and right-wing podcasters’ assumedly uncritical support of the presidential nominee. However, this hypothesis appears arbitrary, especially relative to recent elections where the Keys have been successful. This article instead postulates a Structuralist argument – functioning to describe innate administrative normativities (the structure of government as described by its electoral and legislative composition) – which hinges on the consistency that Lichtman interpreted (particularly in his introductory work with Keilis-Borok) in showing the Keys to be a consistent model; the Keys are further shown to be unswayed by projected collective social proclivities. |
| Date: | 2024–11–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:v2kxm_v1 |
| By: | Sobhy, Hania |
| Abstract: | The limited electoral success of pro-Revolution forces during the Arab uprisings is often attributed to their weak political and organizational resources. Yet, in the first round of Egypt’s historic 2012 presidential elections, pro-Revolution candidates Hamdin Sabahi and Abdel-Monim Abul-Futuh jointly outperformed both the ‘old regime’ and Muslim Brotherhood contenders, with Sabahi nearly reaching the runoff. Drawing on extensive fieldwork across Egypt between 2012 and 2013, this article examines how the campaigners of these two candidates translated the Revolution’s core ideals of freedom and social justice. It introduces the notion of citizenship imaginaries to capture how campaigners communicated these ideals across divergent experiences and narratives of relating to the state. It argues that the two campaigns—differently—compensated for their weaknesses by aligning their messaging with dominant imaginaries in three important ways: downplaying appeals to democracy and radical change except when engaging “cultured voters”; advancing a vague but credible pro-poor stance; and adapting appeals traditionally tied to the two more powerful political forces: stability, Islamism and patronage. By linking resources, imaginaries and the agency of social movement actors, the article offers new perspectives on electoral dynamics and the strategic communication of mobilization frames, especially in transitional and global South contexts. |
| Date: | 2024–12–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:qkme8_v1 |
| By: | Bernard, Josef; Refisch, Martin; Grzelak, Anna; Bański, Jerzy; Deppisch, Larissa; Konopski, Michał; Kostelecký, Tomáš; Kowalski, Mariusz; Klärner, Andreas |
| Abstract: | Recently, the notion of left-behind places and regions has gained ground in academic debates on regional inequality and changing electoral landscapes. This paper proposes an approach to conceptualising and measuring regional “left-behindness” in three Central Eastern European countries that goes beyond a dichotomous division of regions into “left-behind” versus “not left-behind”. It understands left-behindness as a multi-dimensional continuum, representing regional disparities in living standards and socio-economic opportunities. Our understanding of left-behind plades is based to a large extent on the current economic conditions of the regions and their dynamics, but goes beyond them to include a wider range of socially relevant aspects of the living conditions, including educational attainment, poverty, and the attractiveness of places to live. The paper proposes an approach to measuring regional left-behindness and explores how it explains voting patterns. Thus, the paper is motivated by the seminal arguments of the 'geography of discontent' debate. Its proponents have argued that rising support for populist, right-wing nationalist-conservative and anti-system parties is often closely linked to spatial patterns of regional inequality. This argument has been repeatedly tested in Western European countries, but has remained under-researched in Central Eastern Europe. Using our approach, we were able to confirm the validity of the "geography of discontent" as a central thesis for all three countries studied. The novelty and added value of this study is that it extends the understanding of left-behindness and voting. Our multidimensional approach to left-behindness allows for a comprehensive interpretation of spatial patterns of populist voting in Central Eastern Europe. The relationship between regional left-behindness and voting behaviour varies in strength across different countries. In Czechia, there are strong associations for the parties ANO and SPD, but not for the KSČM. In eastern Germany, the association between left-behindness and support for the AfD is weaker, as is the case in Poland for the PiS. Another contribution of the multidimensional concept of left-behindness is the finding that different dimensions of left-behindness have different electoral effects. There appears to be a systematic influence of economic prosperity and relative expansion, which primarily captures the contrast between metropolitan areas and their hinterlands on the one hand, versus the rest of the country on the other—not only in terms of economic prosperity and relative expansion, but also in terms of a significant social status hierarchy. Poverty, however, shows a less stable relationship. |
| Keywords: | Community/Rural/Urban Development |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:jhimwp:350171 |
| By: | Feinstein, Yuval; David, Geffen Ben |
| Abstract: | Studies of public reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war have renewed interest in the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon of public opinion. At the same time, another group of studies has focused on political polarization and the strengthening of radical right parties in many countries. The current study synthesizes these two lines of research by exploring how public opinion in deeply polarized countries changes in response to violent international conflicts that, in a less polarized context, would likely have led most citizens to close ranks behind the government and its war policy. We analyzed original panel data collected in Israel before and after the October 7 massacre and during Israel’s retaliation in Gaza. The findings reveal a “segmented rally, ” in which the vast majority of Jewish Israelis supported the war and trusted the security forces, but trust in the government and the prime minister was more limited. In addition, the analysis identified two distinct sets of mechanisms driving opinion formation. Support for the war and security forces was motivated by feelings of threat, humiliation, and rage. In contrast, respondents’ trust or mistrust of the government and the prime minister hinged on what they viewed as the cause of the security crisis—the government or anti-government protesters—an assessment driven by their preexisting views on the government’s “judicial reform” initiative. The paper concludes by discussing the mutual impacts of polarization and public reactions to crises. |
| Date: | 2024–09–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:wpjbz_v1 |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales; Gema Pomares; David Ramos Muñoz; Angel Sánchez |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally a new model to study the effect of climate externalities and contractual incompleteness on network formation. We model a network where good/green firms enjoy direct and indirect benefits from linking with one another. Bad/brown firms benefit from having a connection with a good firm, but they are a cost to both direct and indirect connections. In efficient networks the green firms should form large connected components with very few brown firms attached. The equilibrium networks, on the other hand, have many more brown firms attached, and components are also smaller than the efficient ones. Our experiments show that empirical results are broadly in line with the theoretical equilibrium predictions, although the precise quantitative outcomes are different from the theory. |
| Keywords: | network formation, climate change, contractual externalities, efficiency and equilibrium |
| JEL: | C92 D62 D85 Q54 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11663 |