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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Däubler, Thomas; Linek, Lukáš |
| Abstract: | Do party selectors or voters choose more productive politicians? Selectors may promote quality candidates and have an informational advantage over voters, but quality need not be the key criterion for nominations, and voters may be sufficiently informed to correct inferior decisions. We empirically examine whether the type of principal responsible for the selection affects individual parliamentary work (attendance, bills, amendments, questions, speeches). Flexible-list proportional representation systems are both interesting and analytically useful in this context, since seats within parties are first allocated to candidates reaching a certain number of personal votes, while any remaining seats are awarded based on the pre-electoral list rank. This allows us to compare three types of elected candidates: selector-chosen, voter-chosen, and doubly-chosen representatives. Analysing data from the Czech Republic in the period between 2002 and 2021, we find that voters have a stronger preference for candidates with high formal education than selectors. We do not find differences in parliamentary behaviour between selector-chosen and voter-chosen types. The results speak against a potential trade-off between giving voters more influence on within-party seat allocation and the quality of chosen representatives. |
| Keywords: | list proportional representation, political selection, ballot structure, preference voting, candidate selection, flexible-list system, parliamentary behaviour |
| JEL: | H11 |
| Date: | 2024–11–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122594 |
| By: | Amaral, Ernesto F. L. (Texas A&M University) |
| Abstract: | Current analyses of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election have tended to: (1) overlook the potential impact of lower voter turnout among Democratic candidates due to their gender and race; (2) blame (or credit) African American, Hispanic, and female voters for increasing their support for Trump; and (3) focus on overall turnout rather than examining turnout rates. I provide some thoughts for this debate, based on overall election results and voter registration information from the 2016, 2020, and 2024 elections. |
| Date: | 2024–11–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:gbsdy |
| By: | Aytimur, R. Emre; Suen, Richard M. H. |
| Abstract: | How does the quality of information received by voters affect political polarisation? We address this long-standing question using an election competition model in which voters have to infer an unknown state from some noisy and biased signals. Their policy preferences are shaped by the posterior belief, which is unknown to the parties when they choose their platforms. The greater the uncertainty faced by the parties, the greater the incentive to polarise. We show that better information can either promote or suppress polarisation, depending on the gap between voters' and politicians' beliefs (disagreement). We also examine the welfare implications of polarisation. |
| Keywords: | Polarisation, Voter Information, Bayesian Learning, Election |
| JEL: | D72 D80 |
| Date: | 2024–05–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122695 |
| By: | Herault, Nicolas (University of Bordeaux); Kollmann, Trevor (Swinburne University of Technology); Thomson, Russell (Swinburne University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We estimate the causal effect of partisan media on voter behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in which Sky News Australia – a conservative 24-hour news channel – became freely available to 8 million people. Using comprehensive national polling-station-level electoral data and broadcast signal strength variation, we implement a continuous treatment difference-in-differences design comparing voting patterns in areas with and without access to the channel before and after its September 2018 free-to-air launch. We find that exposure to partisan media increased the conservative party's lead by 1.5 percentage points in Australia's 2019 federal election. These findings shed light on the role of partisan media in shaping electoral outcomes by influencing swing voters, not just by affecting who turns out to vote. |
| Keywords: | partisan news, elections, spatial economics |
| JEL: | D72 L82 R19 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17452 |
| By: | Qiang Fu; Zenan Wu; Yuxuan Zhu |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.08419 |
| By: | Panarello, Christian |
| Abstract: | Lichtman's Thirteen Keys Model has, after ten elections of success, succumbed to its first failure in Donald Trump's first victory in both the popular vote and electoral college measures. For his protection of the Keys, he has cited mass misinformation (as he suggests is produced by Elon Musk's ownership of Twitter/X) and right-wing podcasters’ assumedly uncritical support of the presidential nominee. However, this hypothesis appears arbitrary, especially relative to recent elections where the Keys have been successful. This article instead postulates a Structuralist argument – functioning to describe innate administrative normativities (the structure of government as described by its electoral and legislative composition) – which hinges on the consistency that Lichtman interpreted (particularly in his introductory work with Keilis-Borok) in showing the Keys to be a consistent model; the Keys are further shown to be unswayed by projected collective social proclivities. |
| Date: | 2024–11–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:v2kxm |