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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Poutvaara, Panu (University of Munich); Graefe, Andreas (Macromedia University of Applied Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Women are severely underrepresented in American politics, especially among Republicans. This underrepresentation may result from women being less willing to run for office, from voter bias against women, or from political structures that make it more difficult for women to compete. Here we show how support for female candidates varies by voters' party affiliation and gender. We conducted experimental elections in which participants made their vote choices based solely on politicians' faces. When choosing between female and male candidates, Democrats, and especially Democratic women, preferred female candidates, while Republicans were equally likely to choose female and male candidates. These patterns held after controlling for respondents' education, age, and political knowledge, and for candidates' age, attractiveness, and perceived conservatism. Our findings suggest that voter bias against women cannot explain women's underrepresentation. On the contrary, American voters appear ready to further narrow the gender gap in politics. |
| Keywords: | gender, elections, gender discrimination, political candidates, redistribution |
| JEL: | D72 J16 H23 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17376 |
| By: | Jessica Di Cocco; Eugenio Levi; Rama Dasi Mariani; Steven Stillman |
| Abstract: | Existing research has identified several economic and cultural determinants of populist voting. We focus on a related explanation: whether populist leaders are able to capitalize on a sense of distrust between individuals. There is currently limited causal evidence on the relationship between interpersonal trust and support for populist parties, and the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship are not well understood. Using three distinct causal identification strategies, each grounded in different assumptions, we find consistent evidence that a deficit in trust significantly bolsters support for populist political parties throughout Europe. Notably, this influence extends beyond ideological boundaries, encompassing both far-right and far-left populist parties. |
| Keywords: | populism, trust, immigration |
| JEL: | D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11394 |
| By: | Hall, Andrew B. (Stanford U and Hoover Institution); Miyazaki, Sho (Stanford U) |
| Abstract: | Since the 19th century, political reformers have proposed broadening civic and corporate governance by allowing voters to delegate to any other voter — sometimes known as liquid democracy. Today, systems like liquid democracy have become an important part of ongoing efforts to create democratic online platforms governed by users rather than elites. We provide a first empirical political science study of liquid democracy in a high-stakes, real-world setting, analyzing data from over 250, 000 voters and 1, 700 proposals across 18 crypto projects (“DAOs†) built on the Ethereum blockchain. We find that, on average, 17% of voting tokens are delegated, with substantial clumping on the most-popular delegates. Delegation is primarily bottom-up, with smaller token-holders more likely to delegate. More active voters receive more delegations, suggesting somewhat informed decision-making. Using a difference-in-differences design, we estimate that creating online hubs to coordinate delegation significantly increases delegation and overall voting rates. In sum, liquid democracy can foster bottom-up participation, particularly when paired with tools for coordination. On the other hand, real-world participation remains relatively low among both voters and delegates, posing an important challenge to liquid democracy not yet contemplated in existing theoretical literature. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:4220 |
| By: | Chun Chee Kok (Monash University); Gedeon J. Lim (University of Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the long-run effects of a colonial-era, large-scale resettlement program of ethnic minorities, on contemporary economic outcomes and political preferences of ethnic majority individuals in receiving areas. In ethnic Malay-majority Malaysia, the colonial British relocated 500, 000 rural ethnic Chinese minorities into fenced-up, isolated, monoethnic camps (1948 – 1960) all across rural Malaysia. This brought some pre-existing ethnic Malay-majority areas into closer contact with ethnic Chinese minorities but not others. Criteria for resettlement locations were largely military in nature. Using a spatial randomization inference-type approach, we construct counterfactual village locations based on this criteria. We find that areas located immediately next to Chinese New Villages (0-2km) experienced better economic outcomes and, in turn, had lower vote shares for the ethno-nationalistic coalition, than polling districts located next to similarly suitable, counterfactual locations. We provide suggestive evidence that these lower vote shares were driven by all voters, not just the ethnic Chinese. Together, our results suggest that persistent differences in inter-ethnic proximity can have a lasting, negative impact on voter preferences for ethno-nationalistic politics through improvements in economic outcomes and sustained increases in casual, interethnic interactions. |
| Keywords: | ethnic diversity, inter-group contact, immigration, Southeast Asia, voting |
| JEL: | D72 J15 P50 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajr:sodwps:2024-06 |
| By: | Frédéric Docquier; Chrysovalantis Vasilakis |
| Abstract: | We test whether the level of right-wing populism in a given country influences the size and skill composition of its immigration and emigration flows. To do so, we use an instrumental variable approach, where we instrument variations in right-wing populism using a combination of collective memory, represented by the average vote share of right-wing parties between 1900 and 1950, and trigger variables, such as economic insecurity shocks. Our results show that an increase in right-wing populism leads to a decrease in the inflow of college-educated migrants, and this relationship is twice as strong as the effect on the inflow of low-skilled migrants. To a lesser extent, we also find that right-wing populism leads to an increase in high-skilled emigration, while leaving low-skilled emigration unaffected. These effects are not necessarily associated with the election of a populist government or stricter migration policies, suggesting that both in- and out-migration decisions may be influenced by the broader political climate and prevailing voter attitudes. As a result, right-wing populism tends to lower the average educational attainment of both immigrants and left-behind voters, which helps explain the persistence of right-wing populism despite its proven negative impact on the economy. |
| Keywords: | Immigration; Emigration; Selection; Right-Wing Populism |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2024-10 |
| By: | Sergei Mikhalishchev (Durham University Business School); Vladimir Novak (National Bank of Slovakia) |
| Abstract: | We study a model with rationally inattentive voters and investigate how an office-seeking challenger designs a policy platform in the presence of the incumbent who offers a simple stability-providing policy that preserves the status quo. We show that the incumbent’s simple policy, while not in the best interest of the electorate, creates negative externalities by encouraging the challenger to propose a more moderate platform, which is sub-optimal for the voter. The model also explains why and when the incumbent benefits from the high uncertainty and intermediate cost of information. |
| JEL: | H0 P16 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:svk:wpaper:1112 |
| By: | Speit, Andre; Voss, Paul (HEC Paris); Danis, Andras (Central European University) |
| Abstract: | The equity lending and option market both allow investors to decouple voting and cash flow rights of common shares. We provide a theory of this decoupling. While either market enables investors to acquire voting rights without cash flow exposure, empirical studies demonstrate a substantial difference in implied vote prices. Our model explains this surprising difference by uncovering the mechanism by which vote prices in the equity lending market are endogenously lower than those implied by the option market. We show that even though votes are cheaper in the equity lending market, activists endogenously choose to purchase votes in both markets. |
| Keywords: | decoupling; empty voting; shareholder activism; vote trading; empty creditor |
| JEL: | G30 G34 |
| Date: | 2024–01–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1501 |
| By: | Laura Barros; Aiko Schmei{\ss}er |
| Abstract: | The supply of politicians affects the quality of democratic institutions. Yet little is known about the economic motivations that drive individuals into politics. This paper examines how experiencing a job loss affects individuals' decisions to enter political life and explores its implications for political selection. Using highly granular administrative data linking individual records of political participation with comprehensive employer-employee data for all formal workers in Brazil, and leveraging mass layoffs for causal identification, we find that job loss significantly increases the likelihood of joining a political party and running for local office. Layoff-induced candidates are positively selected on various competence measures, suggesting that economic shocks may improve the quality of political entrants. Further, we observe that the increase in candidacies is more pronounced among laid-off individuals with greater financial incentives from office holding and higher predicted income losses. Finally, using a regression discontinuity design, we find that eligibility for unemployment benefits increases the likelihood of becoming a party member and running for local office. These results are consistent with the reduction in private-sector opportunity costs and the increased time resources explaining the rise in political entry. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.23705 |
| By: | Becker, Max; von Ondarza, Nicolai |
| Abstract: | Far-right forces emerged strengthened following the 2024 European Parliament elections. Nonetheless, they still remain divided within the legislative body. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) made moderate gains and is now joined by the Patriots for Europe (PfE) and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) groups. Although the alliance of France's National Rally and Hungary's Fidesz has made the PfE the third-largest group in the Parliament, its direct influence is likely to remain limited. After all, the core interest of the PfE and its members is more focused on funding, publicity and national arenas. The biggest prize, however, is influence in the Council and European Council, where the PfE hopes to gain more direct say via national governments. This could have a lasting impact on European politics, however, it is less likely to affect members of the EP. |
| Keywords: | 2024 European Parliament elections, Council of the European Union, European Council, European Commission, European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Patriots for Europe (PfE), Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), Fidesz, Giorgia Meloni, Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Alternative for Germany (AfD) |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:305232 |
| By: | Mitchell Linegar; R. Michael Alvarez |
| Abstract: | What are the opinions of American registered voters about election fraud and types of election fraud as we head into the final stages of the 2024 Presidential election? In this paper we use data from an online national survey of 2, 211 U.S. registered voters interviewed between June 26 - July 3, 2024. Respondents were asked how common they thought that ten different types of election fraud might be in the U.S. In our analysis, we show that substantial proportions of U.S. registered voters believe that these types of election fraud are common. Our multivariate analysis shows that partisanship correlates strongly with endorsement of types of election fraud, with Republicans consistently more likely to state that types of election fraud are common, even when we control for a wide variety of other factors. We also find that conspiratorial thinking is strongly correlated with belief in the occurrence of types of election fraud, even when we control for partisanship. Our results reported in this paper provide important data regarding how American registered voters perceive the prevalence of types of election fraud, just months before the 2024 Presidential election. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.21988 |
| By: | Christoph Koenig (DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | Election forensics are a widespread tool for diagnosing electoral manipulation out of statistical anomalies in publicly available election micro-data. Yet, in spite of their popularity, they are only rarely used to measure and compare variation in election fraud at the sub-national level. The typical challenges faced by researchers are the wide range of forensic indicators to choose from, the potential variation in manipulation methods across time and space and the difficulty in creating a measure of fraud intensity that is comparable across geographic units and elections. This paper outlines a procedure to overcome these issues by making use of directly observed instances of fraud and machine learning methods. I demonstrate the performance of this procedure for the case of post-2000 Russia and discuss advantages and pitfalls. The resulting estimates of fraud intensity are closely in line with quantitative and qualitative secondary data at the cross-sectional and time-series level. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Additive Regression Trees, Election Forensics, Election Fraud, Election Monitoring, Machine Learning, Russia |
| Date: | 2024–10–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:584 |