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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Enrico Cantoni; Vincent Pons; Jérôme Schäfer |
| Abstract: | In recent years, voter ID laws and convenience voting have generated heated partisan debates. To shed light on these policy issues, we survey the recent evidence on the institutional determinants and effects of voter turnout and broaden the perspective beyond the most debated rules. We begin by discussing the importance of electoral participation both for its consequences on policy choices and for democratic legitimacy. Building on a simple cost-benefit model of voting, we then review (quasi)-experimental work studying the effects of voting procedures and of other election rules. Voting procedures (which determine how people vote) primarily affect the cost of participation. The obstacles they create matter more when they occur ahead of the election, when the stakes are not salient (e.g., voter registration requirements), and less when parties mobilize voters against them and when alternative ways to vote exist (e.g., when people can choose whether to vote by mail or in person). Election rules upstream from the election (such as campaign finance laws) and downstream (such as the use of proportional representation vs. plurality rule to map vote choices into a set of election winners) mostly operate through benefits, for instance by affecting electoral competitiveness and the number of candidates. We conclude by highlighting questions for future research. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 J15 P00 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32941 |
| By: | Clinton Gubong Gassi (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Eric Kamwa (Université de Lorraine, BETA, F-54000 Nancy, France) |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces the q-fixed majority property for committee selection rules, which extends the traditional fixed majority principle to a flexible framework. We examine conditions under which the committee scoring rules satisfy the q-fixed majority property. Focusing on (weakly) separable rules, we find that the Bloc rule is the only which satisfies it for all q > 1/2. In addition, the q-bottom majority property is introduced, highlighting conditions under which committees can be excluded based on voter consensus. |
| Keywords: | Voting, multiwinner elections, committee scoring rules, q-fixed majority. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-17 |
| By: | Blumenthal, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | Effectively tackling environmental problems requires the implementation of appropriate policies by politicians. I propose a model of electoral accountability in which voters learn about politicians' policy preferences and environmental policies' appropriateness by observing past policy choices and outcomes. Compared to a benevolent policymaker benchmark, I show that reputational concerns can lead to suboptimal policymaking, as a result of the interdependence between voters' learning about implemented policies and their induced preferences over politicians: when favourable policy outcomes lead voters to prefer policy persistence, the desire to appear responsive can stifle the implementation of the right environmental policy. |
| Date: | 2024–09–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:trn8u |
| By: | Olivier Marie (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Thomas Post (Maastricht University); Zihan Ye (Zhejiang University of Technology); Xiaopeng Zou (Zhejiang University) |
| Abstract: | The consequences of granting democratic rights to citizens in otherwise authoritarian regimes has been extensively studied. Much less is know about the implications of retracting these rights when a government wants to recentralize power. Autonomous governance in rural China, introduced in the 1980s, has declined over the past two decades. In 2018, the Communist Party promoted a “one head†policy, replacing the dual governance of village chief and party secretary with a single office-holder. We examine the short-term impacts of this policy on voting behavior and political perceptions using a nationally representative survey and election timing as an instrument. Our findings reveal a significant decrease in election turnout in “one head†villages due to reduced competition. However, villagers’ perceptions improve: they report less corruption and greater confidence in local government. This suggests that recentralization was achieved at the cost of electoral involvement but without negative backlash on institutional quality perceptions. |
| Keywords: | Recentralization, dual office-holding, election turnout, political perceptions, rural China |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H77 P3 R28 |
| Date: | 2024–06–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240040 |
| By: | Agustín Casas (Universidad CUNEF); Federico Curci (Universidad CUNEF) |
| Abstract: | We exploit the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as a shock to the anti-Russia attitudes in Spain. We collect data from multiple sources: the Spanish NATO referendumof 1986, monthly public opinion surveys with voting and pro-war attitudes, and the universe of political speeches in the Spanish Congress. Using different empirical strategies we robustly identify the effect of the invasion on domestic politics. The three main results are the following: we show that the Russia-Ukraine conflict increased by around 5 percentage points the current intention to vote for the main center-right party (Partido Popular–PP) among the individuals in the municipalities that strongly supported NATO in the 1986 referendum. Similarly, in those municipalities, individuals have lower “sympathy” for Russia and a stronger perception of the country as a military threat. Finally, the increase in the voting intention for the PP goes hand in hand with the legislators’ narrative in Congress: after the invasion, PP legislators are more likely to mention Russia in their speeches, and when they do, they talk more negatively about it. |
| Keywords: | Public Opinion, International Organizations, NATO, Russia, Ukraine |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:337 |