nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2024‒09‒16
eight papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. Effects of Vote Delegation in Blockchains: Who Wins? By Hans Gersbach; Manvir Schneider; Parnian Shahkar
  2. How sensitive are the results in voting theory when just one other voter joins in? Some instances with spatial majority voting By Anindya Bhattacharya; Francesco Ciardiello
  3. New fairness criteria for truncated ballots in multi-winner ranked-choice elections By Adam Graham-Squire; Matthew I. Jones; David McCune
  4. Local Decline and Populism By Thiemo Fetzer; Jacob Edenhofer; Prashant Garg
  5. Integration and voter participation: Evidence from local governments in France By Edoardo di Porto; Angela Parenti; Sonia Paty
  6. Pocketbook Politics: The Impact of Wealth on Political Preferences and Participation By Anton Brännlund; David Cesarini; Karl-Oskar Lindgren; Erik Lindqvist; Sven Oskarsson; Robert Östling
  7. “Todo está guardado en la memoria”: The Aftermath of State Violence in Argentina By Sebastián Einstoss
  8. Beliefs About Political News in the Run-up to an Election By Charles Angelucci; Michel Gutmann; Andrea Prat

  1. By: Hans Gersbach; Manvir Schneider; Parnian Shahkar
    Abstract: This paper investigates which alternative benefits from vote delegation in binary collective decisions within blockchains. We begin by examining two extreme cases of voting weight distributions: Equal-Weight (EW), where each voter has equal voting weight, and Dominant-Weight (DW), where a single voter holds a majority of the voting weights before any delegation occurs. We show that vote delegation tends to benefit the ex-ante minority under EW, i.e., the alternative with a lower initial probability of winning. The converse holds under DW distribution. Through numerical simulations, we extend our findings to arbitrary voting weight distributions, showing that vote delegation benefits the ex-ante majority when it leads to a more balanced distribution of voting weights. Finally, in large communities where all agents have equal voting weight, vote delegation has a negligible impact on the outcome. These insights provide practical guidance for governance decisions in blockchains.
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.05410
  2. By: Anindya Bhattacharya; Francesco Ciardiello
    Abstract: In this paper we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We explore some possibilities such that under some regularity assumptions usual in this literature, if the number of voters changes from being odd to even then some results may change somewhat drastically. For example, we show that with an even number of voters if the core of the voting situation is singleton (and the core element is in the interior of the policy space) then the core is never externally stable (i.e., the situation has no Condorcet winner). This is sharply opposite to what happens with an odd number of voters: in that case, under identical assumptions on the primitives, it is well known that if the core of the voting situation is non-empty then the singleton core is always externally stable: i.e., the core element is the Condorcet winner majority-dominating every other policy vector. We find similar strikingly contrasting results with respect to the coincidence of the core and the (Gillies) uncovered set and the size and geometry of the (Gillies) uncovered set. These results rectify some erroneous statements found in this literature.
    Keywords: Spatial Voting Situations; Core; Condorcet winner; Uncovered set.
    JEL: D71 C71
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:24/03
  3. By: Adam Graham-Squire; Matthew I. Jones; David McCune
    Abstract: In real-world elections where voters cast preference ballots, voters often provide only a partial ranking of the candidates. Despite this empirical reality, prior social choice literature frequently analyzes fairness criteria under the assumption that all voters provide a complete ranking of the candidates. We introduce new fairness criteria for multiwinner ranked-choice elections concerning truncated ballots. In particular, we define notions of the independence of losing voters blocs and independence of winning voters blocs, which state that the winning committee of an election should not change when we remove partial ballots which rank only losing candidates, and the winning committee should change in reasonable ways when removing ballots which rank only winning candidates. Of the voting methods we analyze, the Chamberlin-Courant rule performs the best with respect to these criteria, the expanding approvals rule performs the worst, and the method of single transferable vote falls in between.
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.03926
  4. By: Thiemo Fetzer (The University of Warwick and University of Bonn & CEPR); Jacob Edenhofer (University of Oxford); Prashant Garg (Imperial College Business School)
    Abstract: Support for right-wing populist parties is characterised by considerable regional heterogeneity and especially concentrated in regions that have experienced economic decline. It remains unclear, however, whether the spatial externalities of local decline, including homelessness and crime, boost support for populist parties, even among those not directly affected by such decline. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in two ways. First, we gather novel data on a particularly visible form of local decline, high-street vacancies, that comprise 83, 000 premises in England and Wales. Second, we investigate the influence of local decline on support for the right-wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) between 2009 and 2019. We find a significant positive association between high-street vacancy rates and UKIP support. These results enhance our understanding of how changes in the lived environment shape political preferences and behaviour, particularly in relation to right-wing populism.
    Keywords: Local Economic Conditions, Populism, High-street Vacancies, Unemployment, Urban Transformation
    JEL: D72 R11 R12 R23
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:335
  5. By: Edoardo di Porto (University of Naples Federico II Complesso Universitario di Monte Sant’Angelo, Via Cintia, 21, 80126 Napoli, Italia); Angela Parenti (University of Pisa, Via Ridolfi 10, 56124 Pisa, Italy); Sonia Paty (Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean- Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne UMR 5824, 35 rue Raulin, 69007 Lyon, FRANCE)
    Abstract: We study the causal impact of integration on electoral participation, based on the French experience of intermunicipal cooperation (2001-2018) in which integrated municipalities transfer certain responsibilities and fiscal revenues from the lower municipal level to the higher intermunicipal level. Using a discontinuity design analysis with an exogenous population-based rule, we find that voter turnout for municipal elections decreases significantly within newly highly integrated communities. A supplementary event study analysis shows that these municipalities face a significant decrease in fiscal revenues for about two years after the decision to cooperate. These results suggest that when less is at stake, in terms of responsibilities and fiscal revenues in highly integrated municipalities, citizens feel less involved and electoral participation decreases. Furthermore, exploiting a 2014 electoral reform, this loss in participation is found to be long-lasting.
    Keywords: Decentralization, integration, electoral participation, fiscal revenues, cooperation, quasi-natural experiment
    JEL: H2 H3 H7
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2409
  6. By: Anton Brännlund; David Cesarini; Karl-Oskar Lindgren; Erik Lindqvist; Sven Oskarsson; Robert Östling
    Abstract: The rich tend to support policies favoring the affluent and are over-represented among both voters and legislators. This paper investigates whether these correlations reflect causal effects of wealth by leveraging random, positive wealth shocks in the form of lottery prizes. Compared to suitably matched controls, large-prize winners are no more likely to cast votes in national elections or run for political office. We also find no significant effects of parents’ lottery winnings on their children’s political participation. But winners of large lottery prizes become more negative toward taxes on wealth, real estate and inheritances. Although we do not detect any statistically significant effects on other political preferences, effects tend to go in the direction of a more right-wing political orientation. We find no evidence that lottery wealth changes moral values or strengthen beliefs in the importance of hard work for success in life.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32777
  7. By: Sebastián Einstoss (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andrés)
    Abstract: Can the memorials honoring the victims of state violence influence present-day elections? This paper examines a natural experiment within the Argentinean electoral system to investigate the causal link between one type of memorial and current electoral outcomes. The results show that the presence of “Baldosas por la memoria” (tiles commemorating victims of the 1976-1983 military dictatorship in Argentina) is associated with a significant drop in null votes. Furthermore, my findings suggest that these monuments could be leveraged to impact a particular right-wing political party. The hypothesis behind this result is that these tiles produce a revitalizing effect on the perceived importance of democracy.
    Keywords: Elections, Argentina, Dictatorship, Memorials, State Violence
    JEL: D72 D91 N46
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:ypaper:13
  8. By: Charles Angelucci; Michel Gutmann; Andrea Prat
    Abstract: This paper develops a model of news discernment to explore the influence of elections on the formation of partisan-driven parallel information universes. Using survey data from news quizzes administered during and outside the 2020 U.S. presidential election, the model shows that partisan congruence’s impact on news discernment is substantially amplified during election periods. Outside an election, when faced with a true and a fake news story and asked to select the most likely true story, an individual is 4% more likely to choose the true story if it favors their party; in the days prior to the election, this increases to 11%.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32802

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