nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2024‒08‒26
three papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. European elections and their implications for the Cyprus issue: Populist challenges and Turkish Cypriot inclusion By Kaymak, Erol
  2. Who’s Afraid of Policy Experiments? By Robert Dur; Arjan Non; Paul Prottung; Benedetta Ricci
  3. Executive compensation: investor preferences during say-on-pay votes and the role of proxy voting advisers By Gomtsian, Suren

  1. By: Kaymak, Erol
    Abstract: One of the big surprises of the June 2024 European Parliamentary elections occurred in the Republic of Cyprus, where a 24-year-old YouTuber and social media influencer, Fidias Panayiotou, won a seat running as an independent having secured over 19 percent of the vote. Whereas the vast majority of polls had predicted the rise of the radical right National People's Front Party (ELAM) in Cyprus along with other far-right parties in Europe, Panayiotou's victory and overall vote tally was unforeseen. His win came at the expense of the left-wing Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), dashing the hopes for the re-election of Turkish Cypriot MEP Niyazi Kızılyürek, whose 2019 election to the European Parliament was seen as a milestone for bi-communal relations in divided Cyprus. Kızılyürek's defeat highlights the persistent difficulties in achieving greater political integration and representation for Turkish Cypriots within the EU framework. This underscores the urgent need for inclusive dialogue, economic integration, and proactive measures to address Cyprus's unique challenges, aiming to foster a more cooperative and resilient future for the island. Initiative - in other words, a new model for structured relations with a partner that is very important for the EU and Germany. Here, the EU should also show more flexibility than in the past.
    Keywords: European Parliamentary elections 2024, Republic of Cyprus, Democratic Rally (DISY), National People's Front Party (ELAM), Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), European People's Party group (EPP), Niyazi Kızılyürek, Annita Demetriou
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:300621
  2. By: Robert Dur; Arjan Non; Paul Prottung; Benedetta Ricci
    Abstract: In many public policy areas, randomized policy experiments can greatly contribute to our knowledge of the effects of policies and can thus help to improve public policy. However, policy experiments are not very common. This paper studies whether a lack of appreciation for policy experiments among voters may be the reason for this. Collecting survey data representative of the Dutch electorate, we find clear evidence contradicting this view. Voters strongly support policy experimentation and particularly so when they do not hold a strong opinion about the policy. In a subsequent survey experiment among a selected group of Dutch politicians, we find that politicians conform their expressed opinion about policy experiments to what we tell them the actual opinion of voters is.
    Keywords: policy experiments, randomized controlled trials, voters, politicians, public policy, survey experiment, conformism
    JEL: C93 D72 D78
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11194
  3. By: Gomtsian, Suren
    Abstract: Shareholder say-on-pay voting allows institutional investors to influence the incentives of managers and, consequently, corporate behaviour. Surprisingly, the preferences of investors on executive compensation have been largely overlooked in the ongoing debates on the role of say-on-pay in corporate governance and the impact of shareholder stewardship on sustainable corporate behaviour. The analysis of investor disclosed explanations of say-on-pay votes in the FTSE 100 companies during 2013–2021 shows that institutional investors rely repeatedly on several dominant themes aimed at improving the incentives of corporate managers and controlling managerial rent extraction. But shareholder interests remain the core focus of say-on-pay votes, with only few investors demanding that companies reward executive directors for protecting the interests of a broader range of affected stakeholders. Additionally, most investors can be grouped into several clusters formed around the voting recommendations of proxy advisers. A group of UK-based institutional investors stands out by taking a more individualistic and diverse approach to the stewardship of executive compensation. These findings highlight the role of local investors in the oversight of executive pay, the growing influence of proxy advisers along with the increasing share of foreign institutional investors, and the influence of best practice governance codes in driving investor stewardship preferences.
    Keywords: and governance (ESG); corporate governance; environmental; executive pay; investor stewardship; say on pay; shareholder engagement; social
    JEL: R14 J01
    Date: 2024–03–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:120792

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