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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lily Ling Yang |
| Abstract: | We consider a common-value voting model in which voters are uncertain about the precision of the information they receive. With incomplete preference, party supporters adopt their own party as their status quo and vote for it whenever it is justi able under some belief. Uncertainty is ampli ed by strategic consideration. As a result, voting becomes fully partisan and party supporters stick to their own party in large elections, even though all voters share the same preference. Additionally, voting is more partisan when voting is compulsory or when the population of party supporters is sufficiently large. |
| Keywords: | Common values, Elections, Information aggregation, Knightian uncertainty, Partisan voting |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D81 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_574 |
| By: | Patrick Mellacher (University of Graz, Austria); Gernot Lechner (University of Graz, Austria) |
| Abstract: | Many surveys require respondents to place themselves on a left-right ideology scale. However, non-experts may not understand the scale or their “objective†position. Furthermore, a uni-dimensional approach may not suffice to describe ideology coherently. We thus develop a novel way to measure voter ideology: Combining expert and voter survey data, we use classification models to infer how experts would place voters based on their policy stances on three axes: general left-right, economic left-right and libertarian-authoritarian. We validate our approach by finding i) a strong connection between policies and ideology using data-driven approaches, ii) a strong predictive power of our models in cross-validation exercises, and iii) that “objective†ideology as predicted by our models significantly explains the vote choice in simple spatial voting models even after accounting for the subjective ideological distance between voters and parties as perceived by the voters. Our results shed new light on debates around mass polarization. |
| Keywords: | machine learning, random forest, voter ideology, political economy, spatial voting. |
| JEL: | C38 D70 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2024-03 |
| By: | Afzal, Muhammad Hassan Bin |
| Abstract: | Economic hardships significantly affect public perception and voting intentions in general elections. The primary focus of my study is to capture the degree of influence that individual economic hardships have on their voting. I utilize the ANES 2024 Pilot Study Survey dataset and introduce a novel composite Inflation Behavior Index (IBR) that captures individuals' cumulative economic and cost of living experience. To that effect, the primary objectives of the current study are threefold: first, to develop a composite economic behavior index from available data and variables to capture the overall economic experience of U.S. individuals due to ongoing inflation; second, to examine how this economic behavior impacts political engagement and voting behavior utilizing appropriate and fitting mathematical models; and finally which specific personal experiences and perceptions about economy and cost of living likely to revoke party loyalty in upcoming U.S. presidential election. My study finds that increased personal economic struggles (pocketbook voting) due to inflation make it more likely for individuals to express an intention to vote against the Incumbent even if the Incumbent is from their self-identified political party. On the contrary, having a negative perception of the national economy (sociotropic voting) is less likely to revoke party loyalty in the upcoming General election. In simpler terms, voters are more likely to vote along party lines even if they perceive their party (the Incumbent) is not handling the economy and cost of living well. Having a higher level of Education, they are more likely to vote for the incumbents in both pocketbook and sociotropic scenarios. Therefore, the current research shows that party loyalty during general elections often persists but is expected to be undermined if the voter experiences adverse economic conditions due to inflation in the past. The findings of the current study provide tools and resources to craft agendas, policies, and strategies not only for policymakers and campaign strategists but also for the political parties to take focused and evidence-based actions to protect and ensure the economic well-being of the general population as well as increase the likelihood to perform better in elections and public opinion measures in a highly polarized political environment. |
| Keywords: | Economic Voting, Inflation Behavior Index (IBR), Voting Behavior, Pocketbook Voting, Elections, Sociotropic Voting |
| JEL: | E31 D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300581 |
| By: | David McCune |
| Abstract: | We analyze a type of voting paradox which we term an involvement paradox, in which a candidate who loses an election could be made into a winner if more of the candidate's non-supporters participated in the election, or a winner could be made into a loser if more of the candidate's supporters participated. Such paradoxical outcomes are possible under the voting method of single transferable vote (STV), which is widely used for political elections throughout the world. We provide a worst-case analysis of involvement paradoxes under STV and show several interesting examples of these paradoxes from elections in Scotland. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2406.20045 |
| By: | Arcangelo Dimico (Queens’ University Belfast); Francesco Lancia (Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; CEPR); Alessia Russo (University of Padua; CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effectiveness of gender reforms in increasing women's representation in selected offices. We generate exogenous variations in representation at the Italian regional and municipal elections using the passage of two gender reforms: i) party-list gender quotas, a supply-side reform intended to influence party decisions regarding candidacy, and ii) double-gender preference systems, a demand-side reform intended to influence voting decisions on candidates. We show that party-list gender quotas have no effect on the likelihood of women winning a seat, whereas double-gender preference systems are effective in increasing women's representation. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply-side reforms are susceptible to party-list manipulations, which undermine their effectiveness. In constituencies with a stronger voter gender bias, supply-side reforms may also unintentionally have a negative impact on women's representation in leadership positions. |
| Keywords: | Gender Reforms, Italian Local Elections, Political Representation |
| JEL: | D72 H52 P16 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2023:34 |
| By: | Piazolo, David; Vanberg, Christoph |
| Abstract: | We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. If the first period proposal fails, the game ends immediately with an exogenously given “breakdown” probability. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders have a signaling incentive to vote “no” on the first proposal under unanimity rule, whereas no such incentive exists under majority rule. The reason is that being perceived as a “high breakdown value type” is advantageous under unanimity rule, but disadvantageous under majority rule. As a consequence, responders are “more expensive” under unanimity rule and disagreement is more likely. These results confirm intuitions that have been stated informally before and in addition yield deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining; voting; unanimity rule; majority rule; private information; signaling |
| Date: | 2024–07–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0753 |
| By: | Mario Gilli (Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca); Andrea Sorrentino (Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a “max-min group contest”, as defined by Chowdhury et al. (2016). However, instead of a continuum effort set, we employ a binary action set. Further, we consider private good prizes, so that there is a sharing issue within the winning group. Therefore, we include two stages: the first one about the setting of a sharing rule parameter and the second one about simultaneous and independent actions’ choices. The binary action set allow us to innovate on the existing literature by (i) characterizing the full set of the second stage equilibrium actions; (ii) computationally characterizing in MATLAB the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entire game. We find conditions such that the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies have the cardinality of the continuum. We also check whether this paper’s results are due to discreteness or to binary choice, proving that in this case there are no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as proved in the continuum case in Gilli and Sorrentino (2024). |
| Keywords: | Group contests, Sharing rules, Indeterminacy |
| JEL: | D74 D71 C72 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2024.08 |
| By: | Edenhofer, Jacob (University of Oxford); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick & Bonn and affiliated with CEPR, CAGE, NIESR, ECONtribute, Grantham Institute); Garg, Prashant (Imperial College London) |
| Abstract: | Support for right-wing populist parties is characterised by considerable regional heterogeneity and especially concentrated in regions that have experienced economic decline. It remains unclear, however, whether the spatial externalities of local decline, including homelessness and crime, boost support for populist parties, even among those not directly affected by such decline. In this paper, we contribute to filling this gap in two ways. First, we gather novel data on a particularly visible form of local decline, high-street vacancies, that comprise 83, 000 premises in England and Wales. Second, we investigate the influence of local decline on support for the right-wing populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) between 2009 and 2019. We find a significant positive association between high-street vacancy rates and UKIP support. These results enhance our understanding of how changes in the lived environment shape political preferences and behaviour, particularly in relation to right-wing populism. |
| Keywords: | Local Economic Conditions ; Populism ; High-street Vacancies ; Unemployment ; Urban Transformation JEL Codes: D72 ; R11 ; R12 ; R23 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1508 |
| By: | Bernhardt, Dan (University of Illinois & University of Warwick); Shaoting Pi (Iowa State University) |
| Abstract: | Hedge fund activists often aim to convince other shareholders to vote for a particular corporate policy, while majority shareholders recognize that activist recommendations serve their own interests, not necessarily maximizing firm value. We show how an activist can increase the likelihood of a favorable vote by delegating the tasks of acquiring information and making recommendations to another activist. This choice balances motivating the delegated activist to acquire costly information against ensuring shareholders trust the recommendation. We characterize how the hedge fund activist’s bias affects the delegation bias, information acquisition, recommendation and shareholder voting decisions, and firm value. JEL Codes: D72 ; G23 ; G34 ; D83 ; K22 |
| Keywords: | Hedge Fund Activism ; Delegation ; Information Acquisition ; Recommendations ; Shareholder Voting |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1502 |
| By: | Anna Viktoria Rohrer (University of Graz, Austria); Santiago J. Rubio (University of Valencia, Spain) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of the timing of adaptation on the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for different levels of cooperation. This issue is addressed by solving a three-stage coalition formation game in a Nash-Cournot setting. In the first stage, countries decide non-cooperatively on their participation in an IEA. Then depending on the timing, countries decide on adaptation and emissions in the second and third stage. The game is solved for three levels of cooperation. Countries can either cooperate on emissions (emission agreement), on adaptation (adaptation agreement), or both actions (complete agreement). When emissions are chosen first, this extension to an emission-adaptation game is a generalization of the pure emission game. However, when adaptation is chosen first, the grand coalition is stable, provided that countries sign a complete agreement. With partial cooperation, stable coalitions are small. The results establish a connection between the strategic role of adaptation, the levels of adaptation of non-signatories and signatories for the different types of agreements and the participation in an IEA. Moreover, the results indicate that the grand coalition is stable even when it significantly enhances net benefits. |
| Keywords: | International Environmental Agreements, Emission-Adaptation Game, Prior Commitment, Strategic Effects, Participation, Effectiveness of Adaptation. |
| JEL: | D62 F53 H41 Q54 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpaper:2023-03 |
| By: | Edoardo Campanella (Harvard Kennedy School); Robert Z. Lawrence (Peterson Institute for International Economics) |
| Abstract: | Driven by the push to decarbonize the world and achieve net zero emissions by 2050, a new anti-elite revolt is in the making in developed economies: If mainstream parties ignore the losers of the green transition as they did with globalization, climate populism not only will slow the adoption of climate policies but could also shake Western democracies. Climate policies are a perfect target for populist rhetoric: They rely on expert knowledge, entail globalist thinking and action, and the counterfactual nature of their benefits--avoiding disasters that would otherwise happen--gives ample fodder for conspiracy theories. And their costs are unevenly shared, hitting those at the bottom of the income distribution significantly harder than those at the top. Climate populism is particularly a problem on the far right, where doubts about science and opposition to international cooperation are strongest. Policies need to deal with this rising political opposition. Given the depth of their grievances, and as is often the case with populism, it is unlikely that voters antagonistic to climate policies will be persuaded by rational arguments. What will change their behavior are economic incentives. If green technologies are cheaper than fossil fuel ones, they will be adopted to save money rather than the planet. Thus the costs of the green transition need to be reduced through more open trade in the short run and more innovation in the long run. In addition, those who support climate policies need to be mobilized through more engaging political strategies, more emotional narratives, and more bottom-up policy approaches. |
| Keywords: | Climate change, populism, green transition |
| JEL: | F6 P5 |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp24-16 |
| By: | Erik Madsen; Eran Shmaya |
| Abstract: | We design mechanisms for maintaining public goods which require periodic non-monetary contributions. Utilitarian welfare is maximized by concentrating contributions among low-cost group members, but such policies generally induce some members to leave the group or misreport their preferences. To forestall exit, contributions must be shifted from members with intermediate costs to some high-cost members. To deter misreporting, members must be screened using up to two membership tiers, which reward larger contributions with increased access to the good. We apply our results to the design of platforms such as Netflix and TikTok hosting crowd-sourced recommendation engines, which function as public goods supported by user feedback about new content. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.05196 |