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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Anna-Sophie Kurella (University of Mannheim, Germany); Salvatore Barbaro (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Western democracies are grappling with escalating political polarization. While scholars have explored various societal and economic factors contributing to this phenomenon, the influence of the electoral system has received limited attention. In this paper, we argue that the use of the proportional representation system (PR), a common electoral approach, contributes to the rise in polarization. PR systems prioritize voters’ top preferences, allowing candidates to increase their electoral support even as the proportion of citizens strongly opposed to them grows. We formally demonstrate that PR systems incentivize candidates and parties to adopt extreme positions, a trend discouraged under the Borda count system. Using the Borda count as a benchmark, our empirical analyses with data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) confirm that polarizing candidates, often positioned at ideological extremes, benefit under PR voting rules. Our study reveals an additional asymmetric effect of PR systems, which disproportionately favors right-leaning polarizing candidates. This phenomenon is attributed to the more pronounced disagreement that far-right ideology provokes among moderate and left-leaning citizens compared to radical left ideologies. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Voting Schemes, Political Polarization, Proportional Representation |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2024–06–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2410&r= |
| By: | Salvatore Barbaro (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Research from various disciplines has addressed the relationships between electoral systems and political polarization. The results are inconclusive. This paper systematically examines how different electoral systems either promote political polarization or render it unattractive for candidates to distinguish themselves through polarization. We assume a polarized electorate and investigate Condorcet-consistent voting procedures as well as scoring rules, both single and two-staged. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Voting Schemes, Political Polarization, Scoring Rules |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2024–06–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2411&r= |
| By: | Salvatore Barbaro (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany); Anna-Sophie Kurella (University of Mannheim, Germany); Maike Roth (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany) |
| Abstract: | One of the primary goals of the social sciences is to understand the factors influencing fluctuations in support for political parties. However, the relationship between electoral outcomes and electorate preferences can be tenuous. The aggregation function’s impact on translating voters’ preferences into outcomes can vary significantly. Conversely, electoral outcomes may not accurately reflect how voters perceive winning or losing parties. Through an empirical case study, we examine short and long-term data. Our analysis reveals several key findings: Firstly, applying different electoral methods yields significantly divergent outcomes. Secondly, electoral trends do not necessarily align with voters’ perceptions of the respective parties over time. Lastly, plurality-based methods can result in seat share gains for parties even in the face of declining support. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Voting Schemes |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2024–06–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2412&r= |
| By: | Mona Förtsch |
| Abstract: | Do changes in public infrastructure impact voter turnout? After reunification numerous high schools have been closed in East Germany. Difference-in-differences estimations show that high school closures between 1992 and 2010 triggered a decline in voter turnout in the following state election, suggesting a sense of resignation among voters. However, this effect is not mirrored in national elections, indicating that voters do not extend their frustration to a higher level. The decline in voter turnout in state elections is rather short-living. This suggests that while voters may initially react to changes in local public infrastructure, they demonstrate resilience, at least in the medium term. |
| Keywords: | Local schools, Voter turnout, Resilience, Germany, Elections |
| JEL: | D72 H40 R10 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_411&r= |
| By: | Lucie Coufalová (Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Economics, Brno, Czech Republic); Michaela Kecskésová (Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Economics, Brno, Czech Republic); Štěpán Mikula (Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Economics, Brno, Czech Republic); Michal Ševčík (Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Economics, Brno, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of regional development on democracy building in the Czech Republic following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the autocratic communist regime in 1989. By exploiting the variation in regional development arising from the economic transition process, we identify that regional development, approximated by nighttime light intensity growth, leads to a rise in voter turnout in parliamentary elections. The heightened voter turnout is associated with increased electoral support for pro-system, pro-democratic parties, indicating that regional development facilitates democracy building. Conversely, we find no effect of regional development on the electoral support for the direct successor of the pre-1989 Communist Party. This suggests that while regional development may mitigate anti-system sentiment, it does not eliminate nostalgia for the fallen autocratic regime. |
| Keywords: | economic voting; Czech parliamentary elections; democracy building; voter turnout; economic transition; nighttime lights; regional development; communotropic voting |
| JEL: | D72 P25 O18 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2024-04&r= |
| By: | Aytimur, R. Emre; Suen, Richard M. H. |
| Abstract: | How does the quality of information received by voters affect political polarisation? We address this long-standing question using an election competition model in which voters have to infer an unknown state from some noisy and biased signals. Their policy preferences are shaped by the posterior belief, which is unknown to the parties when they choose their platforms. The greater the uncertainty faced by the parties, the greater the incentive to polarise. We show that better information can either promote or suppress polarisation, depending on the gap between voters' and politicians' beliefs (disagreement). We also examine the welfare implications of polarisation. |
| Keywords: | Polarisation, Voter Information, Bayesian Learning, Election |
| JEL: | D72 D80 |
| Date: | 2024–05–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121112&r= |
| By: | Alabrese , Eleonora (University of Bath and QAPEC); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick, University of Bonn, ECONtribute, STICERD, CAGE, NIESR, CESifo, and CEPR.) |
| Abstract: | Do opinion polls sway turnout and shape political competition in majoritarian systems? Can they strengthen the persistence of safe seats? Analysing national opinion polls during UK general elections and the perceived safeness of constituencies, we find that pre-election polls significantly affect voter turnout. Non-competitive elections predicted by national polls suppress turnout, especially in areas with low perceived electoral competition. This reinforces the advantage of trailing parties in their strongholds, potentially fuelling party demand for safe seats that may give rise to demands for gerrymandering. This can exacerbate spatial polarization of the electoral landscape, with implications for governance regarding opinion polling. |
| Keywords: | Opinion Polls ; Closeness ; Voters Behaviour ; Firstpast-the-post ; UK general elections JEL Codes: D72 ; P16 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1494&r= |
| By: | Alastair Langtry; Niklas Potrafke; Marcel Schlepper; Timo Wochner |
| Abstract: | This paper presents novel empirical evidence that gambling style behaviour – which has been documented in many areas of economic decision-making – is important in politics. We show that politicians ‘gamble for re-election’ in the context of a political leader selection. To overcome challenges arising from secret ballots, we exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs’ individual decisions in a de facto vote for the 2021 leadership election of Germany’s centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when faced with tougher re-election races in their constituency. Quantitatively, a 10 pp. decrease in the probability to be re-elected is associated with a 2.9 pp. increase in the likelihood to vote for the riskier candidate. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election provides a new explanation for intra-party dissent and rationalises why parties may choose low quality leaders when better ones are available. |
| Keywords: | risk-taking, politicians’ behaviour, political leader selection, intra-party competition |
| JEL: | D72 D81 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11125&r= |
| By: | Mehic, Adrian (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the electoral impact of increased foreign tourism, using data from Croatia. Exploiting exogenous variation in travel times to coastal municipalities from improved road infrastructure, I show that foreign tourism reduces nationalist voting and increases the center-left vote share. This effect is partly due to manufacturing spillovers and demographic shifts within municipalities. Further complementing these findings, individual-level survey data indicates that workers within the hospitality sector are more likely to hold left-wing views. I further show that this is likely driven by economic concerns, rather than the diffusion of socially liberal views. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructure; Tourism; Voting; Nationalism |
| JEL: | D72 F63 L83 O18 Z32 |
| Date: | 2024–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1490&r= |
| By: | von Ondarza, Nicolai; Stürzer, Isabella |
| Abstract: | The debate in the European Union (EU) on the expansion of majority decision-making is entering a new round. Germany, in particular, is seeking to build a coalition in favour of more majority decisions in light of the, at times, difficult decision-making process concerning foreign and security policy, and the prospect of future EU enlargement. Too often, however, this debate is not taking into account how and with what results majority decisions are being used in other, sometimes equally contested policy areas. An analysis of the public votes since 2010 compiled in the SWP's new EU Council Monitor shows that EU member states generally strive for consensus, even in majority decisions. Larger groups of member states are almost never outvoted. Still, Hungary and Poland increasingly stand out as two states that are outvoted more often than others, albeit to a slightly lesser degree than the United Kingdom (UK) was before Brexit. One way out of the dilemma between strengthening the EU's ability to act and protecting vital national interests could be a well-balanced "sovereignty safety net". |
| Keywords: | European Union (EU), majority decision-making, qualified majority voting (QMV), EU enlargement, public votes, "sovereignty safety net" |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297221&r= |
| By: | Bergh, Andreas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Kärnä, Anders (Sveriges Riksbank) |
| Abstract: | Populist parties have grown rapidly in popularity in most European countries, and are increasingly common in government coalitions. Analyzing 183 populist parties in 33 European countries from 1980 to 2021, we estimate the average effect of being in government on election results. On average, we find a post-power penalty at about 6 percentage points for populist parties lose about in the election after being part of the government. The size of the post-power penalty does not vary with growth, inequality, social spending, globalization, or unemployment during their term. Our results suggest that populist parties thrive when they can channel voters’ negative sentiments without having the responsibility of governing. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition; Populism; Political parties |
| JEL: | P16 |
| Date: | 2024–06–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1491&r= |
| By: | Fabio Padovano (CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, University of Rennes 1 and DSP, Università Roma Tre, Italy); Youssoufa Sy (University of Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, Condorcet Center for Political Economy, F-35000 Rennes, France; and the European Doctorate in Law and Economics (EDLE), Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands.) |
| Abstract: | The Political Legislation Cycles (henceforth, PLC) theory predicts peaks of legislative production before elections, as incumbents adopt vote-maximizing strategies to secure reelection. Like for budget cycles, the presence of legislative cycles can be interpreted as quantitative evidence of a dynamic inefficiency in the agency relationship between voters and politicians. This paper presents the first panel test of PLC theory, to identify the institutional features that contribute to this inefficiency. The test exploits a brand-new dataset including the legislative activity of 19 countries, mainly from 1975 to the 2010s. The estimates show that the total number of laws decreases by 14% at the beginning of a new legislature and increases roughly by 40% near its end, when elections are held at the expected time. The magnitude of this cycle increases by 55 percentage points in PR electoral systems compared to majoritarian ones, by 45 percentage points in parliamentary governments compared to presidential ones and by at least 9 percentage points in countries with a degree of decentralization higher than the average. Finally, the level of democracy affects the PLC in a nonlinear way. |
| Keywords: | Political legislation cycles, Economic theory of legislation, Comparative institutional analysis, Negative binomial regression. |
| JEL: | C49 D72 H19 H61 H62 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cccrwp:2023-02-ccr&r= |
| By: | Irene Maria Buso; Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Gueth; Lorenzo Spadoni |
| Abstract: | We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, an institutional mechanism designed to enhance cooperation. In this mechanism, contributors have the option to voluntarily contribute to the public good and decide whether to join a (sub)group where partners equally share the contribution cost. Theoretically, stable cost-sharing partnerships enhance efficiency since their partners fully contribute, while outsiders would free-ride. Our data reveal that individual joining and contribution behaviors do not always align with benchmark predictions: partnerships are not always formed, and when they are, they are not always of the optimal size; partners often contribute less than maximally, and outsiders more than minimally. Nonetheless, we document systematic evidence of partnership formation and significantly improved provision of public goods across rounds. |
| Keywords: | Public Good, Group Formation, Group Size, Experiments |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D85 |
| Date: | 2024–06–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2024/309&r= |
| By: | Gilli, Mario; Sorrentino, Andrea |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider a deterministic complete information two groups contest where the effort choices made by the teammates are aggregated into group performance by the weakest-link technology (perfect complementarity), that is a “max-min group contest”, as defined by Chowdhury et al. (2016). However, instead of a continuum effort set, we employ a binary action set. Further, we consider private good prizes, so that there is a sharing issue within the winning group. Therefore, we include two stages: the first one about the setting of a sharing rule parameter and the second one about simultaneous and independent actions’ choices. The binary action set allow us to innovate on the existing literature by (i) characterizing the full set of the second stage equilibrium actions; (ii) computationally characterizing in MATLAB the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the entire game. We find conditions such that the set of within-group symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies have the cardinality of the continuum. We also check whether this paper’s results are due to discreteness or to binary choice, proving that in this case there are no subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, as proved in the continuum case in Gilli and Sorrentino (2024). |
| Keywords: | Public Economics |
| Date: | 2024–06–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:343494&r= |
| By: | Bendiek, Annegret; Becker, Max; Borrett, Camille; Bochtler, Paul |
| Abstract: | The political debate over implementing qualified majority voting (QMV) into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is of high political relevance, especially given the shifting geopolitical landscape in Europe, including Russia's aggression against Ukraine and uncertainties regarding the US's engagement post-2024 elections. Germany, along with a group of other EU member states, is leading efforts to integrate a "sovereignty safety net" within the CFSP framework. This initiative is designed to ease the concerns of reluctant member states, by providing enhanced veto options for matters affecting national interests. Moreover, mechanisms like constructive abstention and the "passerelle clause" could be further exploited to facilitate common CFSP actions without requiring treaty reforms. Nonetheless, it is crucial that all measures designed to build political consensus for expanding the use of QMV within the CFSP, strike the right balance between national interests and European solidarity. This balance is essential for strengthening the EU's resilience and operational capability. Cyber foreign and security policy, with its transnational nature and need for swift and unified responses, presents a favorable testing ground for this approach. |
| Keywords: | Qualified majority voting, QMV, Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, Common Security and Defence Policy, CSPD, constructive abstention, passerelle clause, Group of Friends, cybersecurity, cyberattacks, cyber diplomacy toolbox, CDT, European Peace Facility, Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, EU Cyber Security Strategy, European Defence Union, Coordination Centre for the Cyber and Information Domain, Cyber Rapid Response Teams, European Repository of Cyber Incidents, EuRepoC, European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, emergency brake, blocking minority, Ioannina mechanism, Passerelle-Verfahren |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297224&r= |
| By: | Deer, Lachlan; Hsieh, Chih-Sheng; König, Michael D.; Vega-Redondo, Fernando |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic model of collective action in which agents are connected by a social network. Our approach highlights the importance of communication in this problem and conceives that network &- which is continuously evolving &- as providing the channel through which agents not only interact but also communicate. We consider two alternative scenarios that differ only on how agents form their expectations: while in the "benchmark" context agents are completely informed, in the alternative one their expectations are formed through a combination of local observation and sociallearning à la DeGroot. We completely characterize the long-run behavior of the system in both cases and show that only in the latter scenario (arguably the most realistic) there is a significant long-run probability that agents eventually achieve collective action within a meaningful time scale. We suggest that this sheds light on the puzzle of how large populations can coordinate on globallydesired outcomes. Finally, we illustrate the empirical potential of the model by showing that it can be efficiently estimated for the Egyptian Arab Spring using large-scale cross-sectional data from Twitter. This estimation exercise also suggests that, in this instance, network-based social learning played a leading role in the process underlying collective action. |
| Keywords: | Collective Action; Networks; Coordination; Social Protests; Degroot; Social Learning |
| Date: | 2024–06–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:43961&r= |
| By: | Arija Prieto, Pablo; Antonini, Marcello; Ammi, Mehdi; Genie, Mesfin; Paolucci, Francesco |
| Abstract: | The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most significant public health crises in modern history, with considerable impacts on the policy frameworks of national governments. In response to the pandemic, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and mass vaccination campaigns have been employed to protect vulnerable groups. Through the lens of Political Budget Cycle (PBC) theory, this study explores the interplay between incumbent electoral concerns and political dynamics in influencing the implementation of NPIs and vaccination rollout within the administrative regions of Italy and Spain during the period spanning June 2020 to July 2021. The results reveal that incumbents up for the next scheduled election are 5.8 % more likely to increase the stringency of containment measures than those that face a term limit. The findings also demonstrate that the seats of the incumbent and coalition parties in parliament and the number of parties in the coalition have a negative effect on both the efficiency of the vaccination rollout and the stringency of NPIs. Additionally, the competitiveness of the election emerges as an important predictor of the strictness of NPIs. Therefore, our results suggest that incumbents may strategically manipulate COVID-19 policy measures to optimize electoral outcomes. The study underscores the substantive influence of political incentives, competitive electoral environments, and government coalitions on policy formulation during health emergencies. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19 policy responses; electoral competitiveness; Italy; non-pharmaceutical Interventions; political budget cycle theory; Spain; vaccine rollout |
| JEL: | D72 I18 |
| Date: | 2024–07–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123715&r= |