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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Fabian Gouret (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | To enhance the realism of the spatial model of voting, several authors have added a valence parameter into a Downsian utility function. However, when doing so, they rarely discuss the value that the exponent on the distance between voters and candidates should take. For some values of the exponent and the valence- advantage of one candidate over another one, the single-crossing property cannot be assumed. This paper underscores the importance of this consideration by providing first a necessary and sufficient condition for this property not being satisfied. I then discuss the identification of the key parameters in two econometric frameworks to realize various hypothesis tests related to the single-crossing property. I use data from pre-election surveys of the American National Election Studies. I mainly focus on the 2008 Presidential election, and find some evidence against the single-crossing hypothesis. I also discuss the results with more recent US Presidential elections, but it is more difficult to find evidence against this hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | spatial models of voting, valence, single-crossing property, survey |
| JEL: | D72 C81 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2024-05&r= |
| By: | Anton Suvorov (New Economic School, 45, Skolkovskoye Shosse, Moscow 121353, Russian Federation and National Research University Higher School of Economics, Faculty of Economic Sciences. Pokrovsky bd., 11, Suite S1039, 109028 Moscow, Russia); Jeroen van de Ven (j.vandeven@uva.nl); Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS, GATE, 35 rue Raulin, F-69007, Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | Although they usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information within teams. We show that good news about one’s performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability. The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion. |
| Keywords: | Group Delusion, Information Disclosure, Beliefs, Skepticism, Social Image, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D83 D84 D91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2405&r= |
| By: | Baskaran, Thushyanthan (Ruhr University Bochum); Hessami, Zohal (Ruhr University Bochum); Schirner, Sebastian (Ruhr University Bochum) |
| Abstract: | Do young politicians prioritize other types of municipal spending than old politicians? We study this question using hand-collected candidate-level data on municipal elections (1996-2020), along with detailed administrative data on municipal spending in Bavaria. Our identification strategy makes use of within-party candidate-level races for marginal seats. Our findings indicate that municipalities with a higher proportion of young councilors allocate more resources to social spending. Further analysis reveals that this social spending increase is primarily driven by the expansion of public child care. Exploring mechanisms, we find evidence suggesting that young councilors affect policy choices in- directly through between- and within-party bargaining. |
| Keywords: | young and old politicians, political selection, municipal spending, local councils |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H70 H72 J13 J14 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17009&r= |