|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Federico Favaretto; Michele Mariani |
| Abstract: | We study the link among populist vote, democratic expectations and democratic performances by using individual level data in 26 European countries in 2012 and 2020. We use a Heckman model to explain the determinants of both the decision to vote and voting for populists: both are predicted by the gap between democratic expectations and perceived performance (that we define as “ideal democracy gap”), while controlling for fixed effects, political and economic variables, and attitudes. These results confirm the expectancy-disconfirmation model (EDM) that links both expectations and ideal democracy gaps for twelve aspects within electoral, liberal, social and direct dimensions of democracy to democratic dissatisfaction. Our analysis reveals differences and similarities among voter groups and within European regions |
| Keywords: | populism, voting behaviour, democratic dissatisfaction, EDM |
| JEL: | C21 D72 H30 P00 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp24219&r= |
| By: | Fujiwara, Thomas (Princeton University, Department of Economics and SPIA, and NBER); Muller, Karsten (National University of Singapore, Business School); Schwarz, Carlo (Universita Bocconi, Department of Economics and IGIER, and PERICLES) |
| Abstract: | We study how social media affects election outcomes in the United States. We use variation in the number of Twitter users across counties induced by early adopters at the 2007 South by Southwest (SXSW) festival, a key event in Twitter’s rise to popularity. We show that this variation is unrelated to observable county characteristics and electoral outcomes before the launch of Twitter. Our results indicate that Twitter lowered the Republican vote share in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, but had limited effects on Congressional elections and previous presidential elections. Evidence from survey data, primary elections, and text analysis of millions of tweets suggests that Twitter’s relatively liberal content may have persuaded voters with moderate views to vote against Donald Trump. |
| Keywords: | JEL Classification: |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:700&r= |
| By: | Salvador Barberà; Danilo Coelho |
| Abstract: | We propose mechanisms for two parties with potentially conflicting objectives to jointly select a predetermined number of candidates to occupy decision-making positions. Two leading examples of these situations are: i) the selection of an arbitrator panel by two conflicting firms, and ii) the bipartisan coalition's selection of a set of judges to occupy court vacancies. We analyze the efficiency, fairness, and simplicity of equilibrium outcomes in strategic games induced by these mechanisms. Their effectiveness hinges on the parties' preferences over the sets containing the required number of the candidates to be chosen. |
| Keywords: | appointing arbitrators, appointing judges, rule of k name, split appointment rules, compromise, unanimity compromise set, top compromise set |
| JEL: | D02 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1442&r= |
| By: | Marco Battaglini; Thomas R. Palfrey |
| Abstract: | Collective action is a dynamic process where individuals in a group assess over time the benefits and costs of participating toward the success of a collective goal. Early participation improves the expectation of success and thus stimulates the subsequent participation of other individuals who might otherwise be unwilling to engage. On the other hand, a slow start can depress expectations and lead to failure for the group. Individuals have an incentive to procrastinate, not only in the hope of free riding, but also in order to observe the flow of participation by others, which allows them to better gauge whether their own participation will be useful or simply wasted. How do these phenomena affect the probability of success for a group? As the size of the group increases, will a “power of large numbers” prevail producing successful outcomes, or will a “curse of large numbers” lead to failure? In this paper, we address these questions by studying a dynamic collective action problem in which n individuals can achieve a collective goal if a share of them takes a costly action (e.g., participate in a protest, join a picket line, or sign an environmental agreement). Individuals have privately known participation costs and decide over time if and when to participate. We characterize the equilibria of this game and show that under general conditions the eventual success of collective action is necessarily probabilistic. The process starts for sure, and hence there is always a positive probability of success; however, the process “gets stuck” with positive probability, in the sense that participation stops short of the goal. Equilibrium outcomes have a simple characterization in large populations: welfare converges to either full efficiency or zero as n→∞ depending on a precise condition on the rate at which the share required for success converges to zero. Whether success is achievable or not, delays are always irrelevant: in the limit, success is achieved either instantly or never. |
| JEL: | D71 D74 D82 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32473&r= |
| By: | Alabrese, Eleonora (University of Bath and QAPEC); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick, University of Bonn, ECONtribute, STICERD, CAGE, NIESR, CESifo, and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | Do opinion polls sway turnout and shape political competition in majoritarian systems? Can they strengthen the persistence of safe seats? Analysing national opinion polls during UK general elections and the perceived safeness of constituencies, we find that pre-election polls significantly affect voter turnout. Non-competitive elections predicted by national polls suppress turnout, especially in areas with low perceived electoral competition. This reinforces the advantage of trailing parties in their strongholds, potentially fuelling party demand for safe seats that may give rise to demands for gerrymandering. This can exacerbate spatial polarization of the electoral landscape, with implications for governance regarding opinion polling. |
| Keywords: | Opinion Polls, Closeness, Voters’ Behaviour, First past-the-post, UK general elections JEL Classification: D72, P16 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:707&r= |
| By: | Muehlheusser, Gerd (University of Hamburg); Promann, Timo (University of Hamburg); Roider, Andreas (University of Regensburg); Wallmeier, Niklas (University of Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies unethical behavior by groups and provides systematic evidence on how lying decisions are affected by group size and group gender composition. We conduct an online experiment with 1, 677 participants (477 groups) where group members can communicate with each other via a novel video chat tool. Our key findings are that (i) larger groups lie more, (ii) all-male groups stand out in their proclivity to lie, (iii) already the first female in a group causes an honesty shift, and (iv) group behavior cannot be fully explained by members' individual honesty preferences. |
| Keywords: | group decisions, unethical behavior, lying, gender differences, online experiment, group video chat |
| JEL: | C92 J16 D70 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16954&r= |
| By: | Bottasso, Anna (CIRIEC); Cerruti, Gianluca (University of Genoa); Conti, Maurizio (University of Genoa); Santagata, Marta (University of Genova) |
| Abstract: | In this study we evaluate the role that Mediterranean Medieval trade with Africa and the Middle-East still plays today in Italian politics by shaping the attitudes towards migrants of individuals that live close to Medieval ports. Trade connections between Medieval ports and Muslim Africa and Middle East might have indeed favoured the emergence of cultural traits that helped the interaction with foreigners from different cultures, ethnicity and religion a few centuries before with respect to other areas of the country. We use a representative survey of young individuals (aged 20-35) to show that, conditionally on a rich set of geographic, historic, economic and individual controls, people living close to a Medieval port are less likely to think that migrants make Italy an unsafe place as well as to report right-wing voting attitudes. Moreover, we also find, in those areas, a lower probability of xenophobic attacks during the spike of refugees from Siria of 2015. Interestingly, right-wing parties started to attract less votes near Medieval ports only when immigration had become a very salient issue. Similarly, we find a lower probability of Jewish deportations close to Medieval ports during the Nazi occupation, the only period in Italian contemporary history when a minority group was explicitly targeted by the government. This in turn suggests that some deep-rooted cultural traits, although not observed and not clearly at work in society, can become visible when the right historical and political circumstances take place. |
| Keywords: | political ideology, immigration, cultural transmission, medieval trade sea routes, Roman road network |
| JEL: | D72 N70 N90 O10 O12 P48 |
| Date: | 2024–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16996&r= |
| By: | Yannick LUCAS (Le Mans Université, Chaire ESS - Laboratoire ARGUMANS, (France)) |
| Abstract: | Democratic governance is a constitutive element of a large part of social economy enterprises. In France, the first mutuals, in the modern sense of the term, appeared in the early 19th century. Bringing together free and equal citizens sharing a collective identity and wishing to break away from charitable practices based on unequal conditions, mutuals immediately adopted democratic principles. The statutes provide for the compulsory participation of members in the general assembly during which important decisions concerning the management of the mutual are taken. The specific features of democratic practice within mutuals will evolve over time. In the first legally recognised mutuals, the President was appointed by the public authorities to prevent mutual benefit societies from being used as a front for trade union and political activities in a context where trade unions and political parties were prohibited. Democratic practice was then limited to management decisions. With the development of political freedoms, this control was to diminish and eventually disappear, but another form of limitation of democracy was to appear with the supervision of the guarantees offered by the mutual societies. At the same time, the increase in the size of mutuals and in the number of their members limits the possibilities of direct participation of members in management decisions. Democratic practice is evolving towards a representative democracy in which democratic procedures are essentially used to appoint leaders. The democratic exercise is then situated at another level within the governance bodies. These developments, combined with an increase in the consumerist practices of members, mean that mutuals, like other organisations, are suffering from a "democratic crisis" which they are trying to resolve by recreating spaces for exchange and meeting with their members. |
| Keywords: | Governance, Democracy, Mutuals, Social Economy, History |
| JEL: | I13 L31 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crc:wpaper:2303&r= |