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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Th\'eo Delemazure; Dominik Peters |
| Abstract: | Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called Approval-IRV, that allows voters more freedom by allowing them to give equal preference to several candidates. Such weak orders are a more expressive input format than linear orders, and they help reduce the cognitive effort of voting. Just like standard IRV, Approval-IRV proceeds in rounds by successively eliminating candidates. It interprets each vote as an approval vote for its most-preferred candidates among those that have not been eliminated. At each step, it eliminates the candidate who is approved by the fewest voters. Among the large class of scoring elimination rules, we prove that Approval-IRV is the unique way of extending IRV to weak orders that preserves its characteristic axiomatic properties, in particular independence of clones and respecting a majority's top choices. We also show that Approval-IRV is the unique extension of IRV among rules in this class that satisfies a natural monotonicity property defined for weak orders. Prior work has proposed a different generalization of IRV, which we call Split-IRV, where instead of approving, each vote is interpreted as splitting 1 point equally among its top choices (for example, 0.25 points each if a vote has 4 top choices), and then eliminating the candidate with the lowest score. Split-IRV fails independence of clones, may not respect majority wishes, and fails our monotonicity condition. The multi-winner version of IRV is known as Single Transferable Vote (STV). We prove that Approval-STV continues to satisfy the strong proportional representation properties of STV, underlining that the approval way is the right way of extending the IRV/STV idea to weak orders. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.11407&r=cdm |
| By: | Gustaf Arrhenius; Klas Markstr\"om |
| Abstract: | In many circumstances there is a trade off between the number of voters and the time they can be given before having to make a decision since both aspects are costly. An example is the hiring of a committee with a fixed salary budget: more people but a shorter time for each to develop their competence about the issue at hand or less people with a longer time for competence development? In this paper we investigate the interaction between the number of voters, the development of their competence over time and the final probability for an optimal majority decision. Among other things we consider how different learning profiles, or rates of relevant competence increase, for the members of a committee affects the optimal committee size. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first that includes the potentially positive effects of having a heterogeneous group of voters on majority decisions in a satisfactory way. We also discuss how some earlier attempts fail to capture the effect of heterogeneity correctly. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.09523&r=cdm |
| By: | Amory Gethin; Vincent Pons |
| Abstract: | Recent social movements stand out by their spontaneous nature and lack of stable leadership, raising doubts on their ability to generate political change. This article provides systematic evidence on the effects of protests on public opinion and political attitudes. Drawing on a database covering the quasi-universe of protests held in the United States, we identify 14 social movements that took place from 2017 to 2022, covering topics related to environmental protection, gender equality, gun control, immigration, national and international politics, and racial issues. We use Twitter data, Google search volumes, and high-frequency surveys to track the evolution of online interest, policy views, and vote intentions before and after the outset of each movement. Combining national-level event studies with difference-in-differences designs exploiting variation in local protest intensity, we find that protests generate substantial internet activity but have limited effects on political attitudes. Except for the Black Lives Matter protests following the death of George Floyd, which shifted views on racial discrimination and increased votes for the Democrats, we estimate precise null effects of protests on public opinion and electoral behavior. |
| JEL: | D72 P0 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32342&r=cdm |
| By: | Maria Cotofan; Karlygash Kuralbayeva; Konstantinos Matakos |
| Abstract: | This study examines how regional temperature variations across OECD countries influence political behavior and support for offset policies. Our analysis reveals that exposure to higher temperatures correlates with political moderation, reduced backing for extreme and populist parties, heightened climate concerns, and increased support for environmentally conscious agendas. These effects are primarily driven by older individuals, who exhibit increased concerns about climate change and the economic costs of climate policies following temperature spikes. Moreover, they express support for policies aimed at mitigating these economic impacts. Conversely, younger individuals show less apprehension about the economic consequences of climate policies and demonstrate readiness to bear them, including through higher energy bills. These findings emphasize the necessity of accounting for age-related perspectives when formulating effective climate policies for the future. |
| Keywords: | preference formation, environmental policies, policy support, voting |
| Date: | 2024–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1991&r=cdm |
| By: | Toygar T. Kerman; Anastas P. Tenev |
| Abstract: | We study a multiple-receiver Bayesian persuasion model in which the sender wants to achieve an outcome and commits to an experiment which sends correlated messages to homogeneous receivers. Receivers are connected in a network and can perfectly observe their immediate neighbors’ messages. After updating their beliefs, receivers choose an action to match the true state of the world. Surprisingly, the sender’s gain from persuasion does not change monotonically with network density. We characterize a class of networks in which increased communication among the receivers is strictly better for the sender and hence strictly worse for the receivers. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian Persuasion, Networks, Critical Mass, Voting |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D82 D85 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp772&r=cdm |
| By: | Lennart Ante; Aman Saggu; Benjamin Schellinger; Friedrich Wazinksi |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the potential of blockchain-based fan tokens, a class of crypto asset that grants holders access to voting on club decisions and other perks, as a mechanism for stimulating democratized decision-making and fan engagement in the sports and esports sectors. By utilizing an extensive dataset of 3, 576 fan token polls, we reveal that fan tokens engage an average of 4, 003 participants per poll, representing around 50% of token holders, underscoring their relative effectiveness in boosting fan engagement. The analyses identify significant determinants of fan token poll participation, including levels of voter (dis-)agreement, poll type, sports sectors, demographics, and club-level factors. This study provides valuable stakeholder insights into the current state of adoption and voting trends for fan token polls. It also suggests strategies for increasing fan engagement, thereby optimizing the utility of fan tokens in sports. Moreover, we highlight the broader applicability of fan token principles to any community, brand, or organization focused on customer engagement, suggesting a wider potential for this digital innovation. |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.08906&r=cdm |
| By: | Gold, Robert; Lehr, Jakob |
| Abstract: | How to break the populist wave? With the elections to the European Parliament ahead, and the Presidential Elections in the US looming, this question bothers policymakers in many Western democracies. Our study shows that regional policies effectively decrease populist support. Specifically, EU Regional Policy investing into the development of lagging-behind regions decreases the vote share obtained by right-fringe populist parties by 15-20 percent. Moreover, regional policy investments increase trust in democratic institutions, and decreases discontent with the EU. |
| Abstract: | Wie kann der Aufstieg des Populismus gestoppt werden? Angesichts der bevorstehenden Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament und der Präsidentschaftswahlen in den USA beschäftigt diese Frage politische Entscheidungsträger in vielen westlichen Demokratien. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass regionalpolitische Maßnahmen die Unterstützung populistischer Parteien wirksam verringern können. Konkret finden wir, dass die EU-Regionalpolitik, die in die Entwicklung von rückständigen Regionen investiert, dazu führt, dass der Stimmenanteil rechtspopulistischer Parteien um 15-20% sinkt. Darüber hinaus erhöhen regionalpolitische Investitionen das Vertrauen in demokratische Institutionen und verringern die Unzufriedenheit mit der EU. |
| Keywords: | Populism, Regional Policies, European Integration, Regression Discontinuity Design, Populismus, Regionalpolitik, Europäische Integration, Regression Discontinu-ity Design |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkpb:289601&r=cdm |
| By: | Julia Cagé; Moritz Hengel; Nicolas Hervé; Camille Urvoy |
| Abstract: | For democracies to function, voters need to be exposed to a variety of views, and media outlets play a key role in this process. Using novel data on hosts and guests appearing in millions of French television and radio shows over 20 years, this article shows that media largely differ in how much attention they devote to different political groups. We investigate the inner workings of media organizations leading to such differences, and in particular quantify the role played by hosts when it comes to deciding who to invite. Thanks to thousands of hosts moving across outlets, we őrst estimate a two-way őxed effects model and decompose the across-outlet variance in political group representation into three factors: (i) differences in host composition, (ii) host compliance with distinct editorial lines, and (iii) host sorting on outlets. We show that channel-level decisions and sorting largely explain across-outlet differences. Overall, hosts have little agency, but we document heterogeneity depending on their characteristics. To complement this analysis, we then study how hosts adapt to a major ownership-driven change in the editorial line, relying on a difference-in-differences framework. We őnd that hosts who stayed after the takeover largely complied with the new editorial line, but that many others left the acquired outlets. Our őndings have important implications for the optimal regulation of the media industry and highlight the limitations of existing legislation on media pluralism. |
| Keywords: | Media bias; Slant; Journalists; Pluralism; Media ownership; Media capture |
| JEL: | L15 L82 J40 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_537&r=cdm |