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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Robert Gold; Julian Hinz; Michele Valsecchi |
| Abstract: | Do economic sanctions affect internal support of sanctioned countries’ governments? To answer this question, we focus on the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 and identify their effect on voting behavior in both presidential and parliamentary elections. On the economic side, the sanctions significantly hurt Russia’s foreign trade — with regional variance. We use trade losses caused by the sanctions as measure for regional sanctions exposure. For identification, we rely on a structural gravity model that allows us to compare observed trade flows to counterfactual flows in the absence of sanctions. Difference-in-differences estimations reveal that regime support significantly increases in response to the sanctions, at the expense of voting support of Communist parties. For the average Russian district, sanctions exposure increases the vote share gained by President Putin and his party by 13 percent. Event studies and placebo estimations confirm the validity of our results. |
| Keywords: | economic sanctions, voting behaviour, gravity estimation, rally-around-the-flag |
| JEL: | F12 F14 F15 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11033&r=cdm |
| By: | Freitas Monteiro, Teresa; Prömel, Christopher |
| Abstract: | One of the primary objectives of protests and demonstrations is to bring social, political, or economic issues to the attention of politicians and the wider population. While protests can have a mobilizing and persuading effect, they may reduce support for their cause if they are perceived as a threat to public order. In this study, we look at how local or spontaneously organised xenophobic demonstrations affect concerns about hostility towards foreigners and worries about immigration among natives in Germany. We use a regression discontinuity design to compare the attitudes of individuals interviewed in the days immediately before a large far-right demonstration and individuals interviewed in the days immediately after that demonstration. Our results show that large right-wing demonstrations lead to a substantial increase in worries about hostility towards foreigners of 13.7% of a standard deviation. In contrast, worries about immigration are not affected by the demonstrations, indicating that the protesters are not successful in swaying public opinion in their favour. In the heterogeneity analyses, we uncover some polarisation in the population: While worries about hostility against foreigners increase and worries about immigration decrease in left-leaning regions, both types of worries increase in districts where centre-right parties are more successful. Lastly, we also show that people become more politically interested in response to protests, mainly benefiting left-wing parties, and are more likely to wish to donate money to help refugees. |
| Keywords: | Protests, Right-wing Extremism, Xenophobia, Attitudes, Polarisation |
| JEL: | D72 D74 D83 J15 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:289616&r=cdm |
| By: | Margot Belguise |
| Abstract: | Politicians often use “red herrings” to distract voters from scandals. When do such red herrings succeed? I develop a model in which an incumbent runs for re-election and potentially faces a scandal. Some incumbents enjoy telling “tales” (attention-grabbing stories) while others use tales to distract voters from the scandal. Multiple equilibria can arise: one with a norm of tale-telling in which red herrings succeed and another with a norm against tale-telling in which they fail. Increased media attention to tales has a non-monotonic effect, facilitating red herrings at low attention levels, but serving a disciplinary function at high levels. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notnic:2024-01&r=cdm |
| By: | Claudia Landwehr (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz); Armin Schäfer (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In the face of mounting evidence for the substantive under-representation of marginalized groups and for the lack of responsiveness to their concerns in democratic legislation, calls for measures to improve descriptive representation have become louder. While better descriptive representation may be in the interest of a majority of citizens, the implementation of respective measures is eventually down to political elites. We therefore ask what legislators in the United States and Germany think about the importance of descriptive representation. Leveraging data from new surveys in both countries, we analyze respondents’ views on descriptive representation concerning gender, age, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. We hypothesize, first, that process preferences for better descriptive representation are correlated with substantive preferences for progressiv e policies and that parties on the left will deem descriptive representation more important. Secondly, we expect intersectionality to affect the formation of process preferences, and members of disadvantaged groups to be more supportive of better descriptive representation of all groups. Our findings show clear differences between parties, confirming that left-leaning parties tend to be more supportive of descriptive representation. Moreover, women are more supportive of descriptive representation in most parties, with female legislators supporting not only women’s representation but also better descriptive representation for other groups. The group least supportive of descriptive representation are men in right-wing parties. |
| Date: | 2024–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2407&r=cdm |
| By: | Eric Chyn; Kareem Haggag; Bryan A. Stuart |
| Abstract: | How do majority groups respond to a narrowing of inequality in racially polarized environments? We study this question by examining the effects of the Freedmen’s Bureau, an agency created after the U.S. Civil War to provide aid to former slaves and launch institutional reform in the South. We use new historical records and an event study approach to estimate impacts of the Bureau on political economy in the South. In the decade immediately after the war, counties with Bureau field offices had reduced vote shares for Democrats, the major political party that previously championed slavery and opposed Black civil rights during Reconstruction. In the longer-run, we find evidence of backlash in the form of higher Democratic vote shares and increases in several forms of racial violence, including lynchings and attacks against Black schools. This backlash extends through the twentieth century, when we find that counties that once had a Bureau field office have higher rates of second-wave and third-wave Ku Klux Klan activity and lower rates of intergenerational economic mobility. Overall, our results suggest that the initial impacts of the Freedmen’s Bureau stimulated countervailing responses by White majorities who sought to offset social progress of Black Americans. |
| JEL: | D72 D74 I31 J15 N31 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32314&r=cdm |