|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Schönenberger, Felix |
| Abstract: | Are politicians ideologically rigid, or do officeholders adjust policy strategically for electoral purposes? This paper sheds new light on this longstanding question by studying how U.S. House incumbents alter their roll call voting record prior to elections depending on their challenger’s platform. Estimating non-incumbent candidates' policy positions using pre-primary transaction-level campaign finance data, I classify as extremist the more liberal (conservative) of the top-two candidates in Democratic (Republican) challenger primaries. Leveraging a regression discontinuity design, I exploit the quasi-random assignment of incumbents to moderate or extremist challengers by close primary elections of the incumbent’s opponent party. I find that incumbents alter their roll-call voting record in the direction of their opponent’s position, committing to a more moderate policy when running against an extremist challenger and differentiating their position from more moderate opponents. Consistent with strategic responsiveness to electoral incentives, policy adjustment to challengers is confined to re-election seeking incumbents and to incumbents defending a seat in a competitive district. I provide suggestive evidence that incumbents' reaction to challengers is conditioned by the presence of third candidates, and reflects a trade-off between persuading swing voters at the center and mobilizing core supporters. Importantly, incumbents' adjustment is not driven by a valence advantage of moderate over extremist challengers but by incumbents’ reaction to opponents’ policy positions, suggesting strategic complementarity of policy platforms. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Candidate Positions, Congress, Legislator Behavior, Polarization |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120160&r=cdm |
| By: | Emilio Depetris-Chauvin; Felipe González |
| Abstract: | Vaccines are responsible for large increases in human welfare and yet we know little about the political impacts of publicly-managed vaccination campaigns. We fill this gap by studying the case of Chile, which offers a rare combination of a high-stakes election, voluntary voting, and a vaccination process halfway implemented by election day. Crucially, the roll-out of vaccines relied on exogenous eligibility rules which we combine with a pre-analysis plan for causal identification. We find that higher vaccination rates boost political participation and empower challengers irrespective of their party affiliation. Survey evidence suggests that vaccines could have increased preferences for challengers by lowering decision-related anxiety. |
| Keywords: | vaccines, politics, election, challengers |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:572&r=cdm |
| By: | Mehmet Ekmekci (Boston College, Department of Economics); Stephan Lauermann (University of Bonn, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study information transmission through informal elections. Our leading example is that of protests in which there may be positive costs or benefits of participation. The aggregate turnout provides information to a policy maker. However, the presence of activists adds noise to the turnout. The interplay between noise and participation costs leads to strategic substitution and complementarity effects in citizens’ participation choices, and we characterize the implications for the informativeness of protests. In particular, we show that rather than being a friction, costs may facilitate information transmission by lending credibility to protest participation. |
| Keywords: | Political Institutions |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:289&r=cdm |
| By: | Abigail Barr (University of Nottingham); Anna Hochleitner (NHH Bergen); Silvia Sonderegger (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between inequality and social instability. While the argument that inequality can be damaging for the cohesion of a society is well established, the empirical evidence is mixed. We use a novel approach to isolate the causal relationship running from inequality to social instability. We run a laboratory experiment in which two groups interact repeatedly and have an incentive to coordinate even though coordination comes at the cost of inter-group inequality. Then, we vary the extent of the inequality implied by coordination. Our results show that increasing inequality has a destabilising effect; the disadvantaged initiate the destabilisation; and a worsening of the absolute situation of the disadvantaged exacerbates the destabilising effect of increasing inequality. These findings are in line with a simple model incorporating inequality aversion and myopic best response. Finally, we show that history matters. People respond differently to the same level of current inequality depending on their past experiences. More specifically, a history of stability facilitates the re-emergence of coordination in more unequal environments, and a sudden increase in inequality is more destabilising than a gradual increase. |
| Keywords: | Collective decision making; Conflict and Revolutions;Inequality |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2024-01&r=cdm |
| By: | Mona Morgan-Collins; Wayne Valeria Rueda |
| Abstract: | Previous research identifies that women politicians facilitate other women’s political participation. Can women’s political activism also spur women’s electoral participation? Through the study of the British suffragists, we argue that women activists paved the way for other women’s political participation at the time when women politicians were virtually absent. Constructing a novel micro-level dataset of geocoded data from electoral registers, we leverage a unique historical case of the 1913 Women’s Suffrage Pilgrimage. Using a Differences-in-Differences strategy that compares polling divisions based on the proximity to the Pilgrimage across England, we provide evidence that exposure to the suffragists marching for parliamentary suffrage increased registration of women eligible to vote in local elections. Analyzing contemporary news articles, we then document the pathways through which the suffragists incited other women’s political interest and therefore electoral participation. These findings have implications for the realization of substantive representation after suffrage. |
| Keywords: | Electoral returns; Policy feedback; Public service delivery; Policy experimentation; Education; Political economy; Elections; Randomized controlled trial; Liberia; Information |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notnic:2023-16&r=cdm |
| By: | Margot Belguise |
| Abstract: | Politicians are sometimes accused of sending “red herrings”, irrelevant information meant to distract their audience from other information. When do they succeed in fooling voters? How is this affected by the media? This paper proposes a model of election with red herring. An incumbent running for re-election may send an irrelevant ”tale” to distract voters from a scandal. Some politicians may simply enjoy telling irrelevant tales, making it difficult for voters to recognize red herrings. Red herrings can thus be ”successful” in that the incumbent is re-elected despite the scandal. Equilibrium characterization sheds light on two non-trivial results. First, the game sometimes has multiple equilibria: society may coordinate on equilibria with no or some successful red herring through a self-fulfilling social norm of tale-telling. However, high media attention to tales may discipline scandal-free politicians due to voter suspicion of tales, leaving a unique equilibrium with no successful red herring. A dynamic extension introduces feedbacks between the pool of politicians and media attention. Polar cases in which red herring is predicted to increase over time or on the contrary disappear are highlighted. A second extension shows that voter polarization is predicted to have ambiguous effects on politician discipline and thereby on screening. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notnic:2023-12&r=cdm |
| By: | Fan, Simon; Pang, Yu; Pestieau, Pierre (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | This paper explains why democracies marked by inequalities may not experience aggressive redistribution through the lens of parent-child interactions. Parental concerns about the negative impacts of high taxation on their children’s motivation to study and pursue high-paying careers deter the poor majority from harboring an inclination to expropriate the rich. We construct an overlapping generations model in which workers vote on the redistributive policy under majority rule, while considering the incentive costs that the policy imposes on their children. We analyze the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium where the likelihood that a moderate income tax can be credibly enforced increases with the degree of parental altruism. In an extended model where career prospects are jointly determined by study efforts and received educational resources, we provide an analytical and numerical characterization of the conditions under which full redistribution does not materialize in the steady state under both private and public school systems. |
| Keywords: | Credible tax policy ; parental altruism ; Markov perfect equilibrium ; education ; majority voting |
| JEL: | D72 H31 I24 |
| Date: | 2024–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2024002&r=cdm |
| By: | RYO ARAWATARI (Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University); Tetsuo Ono (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper characterizes optimal fiscal rules within a model integrating fiscal rule deviations in a two-period political turnover framework. The incumbent party aims to secure favored spending through increased debt issuance due to potential power loss. The study introduces spending and deviation rules, requiring legislative approval for deviations from the spending rule. Analysis shows the optimal deviation rule, favoring flexible responses to stringent spending rules. Furthermore, larger initial debt balances warrant tighter spending rules, while the optimal deviation rule remains unaffected. Additionally, political conflict inf luences deviation rule permissiveness, aligning more with the incumbent party’s preferences as conflicts escalate. |
| Keywords: | Fiscal rules, Government debt, Political turnover. |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H62 H63 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2403&r=cdm |