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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Stergios Athanasoglou; Somouaoga Bonkoungou |
| Abstract: | We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. We propose a novel family of neutral and strategy-proof rules, which we call sequential unanimity rules. By demonstrating their formal equivalence to the M-winning coalition rules of Moulin (1983), we show that sequential unanimity rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness. We establish our results by developing algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The analysis can be extended to accommodate the full preference domain in which voters may be indifferent between candidates. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.13009&r=cdm |
| By: | Bell, D’Wayne (Harvard University); Holbein, John B. (University of Virginia); Imlay, Samuel J. (College Board); Smith, Jonathan (Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | We study how colleges shape their students' voting habits by linking millions of SAT takers to their college-enrollment and voting histories. To begin, we show that the fraction of students from a particular college who vote varies systematically by the college's attributes (e.g. increasing with selectivity) but also that seemingly similar colleges can have markedly different voting rates. Next, after controlling for students' college application portfolios and pre-college voting behavior, we find that attending a college with a 10 percentage-point higher voting rate increases entrants' probability of voting by 4 percentage points (10 percent). This effect arises during college, persists after college, and is almost entirely driven by higher voting-rate colleges making new voters. College peers' initial voting propensity plays no discernible role. |
| Keywords: | college choice, returns to college, civic engagement, voting |
| JEL: | I23 I26 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16813&r=cdm |
| By: | Mathias Bühler; Andrew Dickens; Andrew C. Dickens |
| Abstract: | We document the importance of local information in mass media for the political engagement of citizens and accountability of politicians. We study this in the context of Canada, where until 1958, competition in television markets was suppressed—Canadians received either public or private television content, but never both. While public television provided national-level informational content, private television content was distinctly local and more politically relevant to voters. We find that the introduction of television reduced voter turnout, but that this effect is exclusive to public television districts. Our findings qualify existing knowledge about the political effects of the rollout of new media, by allowing the informational content to vary while holding the media type constant. We support our argument with evidence from parliamentary debates: politicians from districts with private television are more likely to speak and act on behalf of their constituents in Parliament. Our findings thus suggest that politicians are held accountable by relevant media content. |
| Keywords: | media content, television, voting, political engagement, political accountability, natural language processing |
| JEL: | D72 L82 N42 N92 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10959&r=cdm |
| By: | Becker, Max; von Ondarza, Nicolai |
| Abstract: | Far-right parties are gaining support across Europe. Their level of participation in national governments is increasing, and they are expected to make further gains in the European Parliament elections in June 2024. As their influence over European Union (EU) policy rises, it is imperative to assess how they are positioning themselves on crucial dimensions of EU foreign and security policy. A closer look shows that geostrategic issues remain a cleavage point that is contributing to the fragmentation of the far-right spectrum. Their positions fluctuate between a transatlantic orientation and clear support for Ukraine among the national-conservative European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), to fundamental opposition with an anti-Western stance among parts of the right-wing populist to extremist parties in the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group. Due to the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy, the biggest challenges will come with national elections and coalition-making. |
| Keywords: | European Union, EU, European Parliament, European Parliament elections 2024, European elections 2024, far-right parties, EU foreign and security policy, European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR, Identity and Democracy, ID, Fidesz, EU relations with Russia, EU relations with China, EU relations with the United States, EU relations with NATO, enlargement of the EU, CFSP, CSDP, voting behaviour, geostrategic positioning, fragmentation of the far-right spectrum |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:284716&r=cdm |
| By: | Barr, Abigail (University of Nottingham); Hochleitner, Anna (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sonderegger, Silvia (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between inequality and social instability. While the argument that inequality can be damaging for the cohesion of a society is well established, the empirical evidence is mixed. We use a novel approach to isolate the causal relationship running from inequality to social instability. We run a laboratory experiment in which two groups interact repeatedly and have an incentive to coordinate even though coordination comes at the cost of inter-group inequality. Then, we vary the extent of the inequality implied by coordination. Our results show that increasing inequality has a destabilising effect; the disadvantaged initiate the destabilisation; and a worsening of the absolute situation of the disadvantaged exacerbates the destabilising effect of increasing inequality. These findings are in line with a simple model incorporating inequality aversion and myopic best response. Finally, we show that history matters. People respond differently to the same level of current inequality depending on their past experiences. More specifically, a history of stability facilitates the re-emergence of coordination in more unequal environments, and a sudden increase in inequality is more destabilising than a gradual increase. |
| Keywords: | Collective decision making; Conflict and Revolutions; Inequality |
| JEL: | C92 D01 D63 D74 |
| Date: | 2024–03–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2024_002&r=cdm |
| By: | Clinton Gabon Gassi (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France) |
| Abstract: | We consider cooperative games where the coalition structure is given by the set of winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of games models some real-life situations in which some agents have economic performances while some others are endowed with a political power. On this class of cooperative games, the Myerson value has been identified as the Harsanyi power solution associated to the Equal Division power index and has been characterized in the large class of Harsanyi power solutions with respect to the associated power index. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the Myerson value for this class of games without focusing on the whole family of Harsanyi power solutions and therefore, without taking into account any power index. We identify the Myerson value as the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, extra-null player property, and Equal Treatment of Veto. |
| Keywords: | TU-game, Voting structure, Harsanyi dividends, Harsanyi power solution, Myerson value. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-10&r=cdm |
| By: | Thieme, Sebastian; Kates, Sean |
| Abstract: | Why do candidates rely on fundraising event attendees to finance their campaigns? De-spite public concerns around this mode of donation, fundraising events have received little scholarly attention. We use a source of novel data – campaign finance disclosures in four U.S. states which indicate event- and non-event status of donations linked to political candidates – to examine two hypotheses. First, events help candidates draw on individual donors’ non-ideological motivations, including material motivations. Sec-ond, events help candidates fundraise when ideological motivations are relatively low. We provide evidence that donors discount ideology when they attend events, and link agenda powers of legislative incumbents to increases in event donations, including from individuals in related business sectors. Further, we show that early donations from individuals are more likely to be made via events than later donations, especially for incumbents. Our results highlight implications of event fundraising for responsiveness, partisan polarization, and candidate selection. |
| Date: | 2024–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:129155&r=cdm |