nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2024‒01‒29
four papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. Civil Rights Protests and Election Outcomes: Exploring the Effects of the Poor People's Campaign By Anderson, D. Mark; Charles, Kerwin Kofi; Karbownik, Krzysztof; Rees, Daniel I.; Steffens, Camila
  2. A Bayesian Networks Approach for Analyzing Voting Behavior By Miguel Calvin; Pilar Rey del Castillo
  3. Promotions and Group Identity By Ďuriník, Michal; Morita, Hodaka; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
  4. Executive compensation: investor preferences during say-on-pay votes and the role of proxy voting advisers By Gomtsian, Suren

  1. By: Anderson, D. Mark (Montana State University); Charles, Kerwin Kofi (Yale University); Karbownik, Krzysztof (Emory University); Rees, Daniel I. (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Steffens, Camila (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
    Abstract: The Poor People's Campaign (PPC) of 1968 was focused on highlighting, and ultimately reducing, poverty in the United States. As part of the campaign, protestors from across the country were transported to Washington, D.C. in 6 separate bus caravans, each of which made stops en route to rest, recruit, and hold non-violent protests. Using data from 1960-1970, we estimate the effects of these protests on congressional election outcomes. In the South, we find that PPC protests led to reductions in Democratic vote share and turnout, while in the West they may have benefited Democratic candidates at the expense of their Republican rivals.
    Keywords: Poor People's Campaign, election outcomes, voting behavior, protests, race
    JEL: D72 I30 J15 N32
    Date: 2023–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16667&r=cdm
  2. By: Miguel Calvin; Pilar Rey del Castillo
    Abstract: The problem of finding the factors influencing voting behavior is of crucial interest in political science and is frequently analyzed in books and articles. But there are not so many studies whose supporting information comes from official registers. This work uses official vote records in Spain matched to other files containing the values of some determinants of voting behavior at a previously unexplored level of disaggregation. The statistical relationships among the participation, the vote for parties and some socio-economic variables are analyzed by means of Gaussian Bayesian Networks. These networks, developed by the machine learning community, are built from data including only the dependencies among the variables needed to explain the data by maximizing the likelihood of the underlying probabilistic Gaussian model. The results are simple, sparse, and non-redundant graph representations encoding the complex structure of the data. The generated structure of dependencies confirms many previously studied influences, but it can also discover unreported ones such as the proportion of foreign population on all vote variables.
    Keywords: Bayesian networks, Gaussian distributions, voting behaviour, elections, voter turnout, political participation
    JEL: C46 D31 D72 D91
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10855&r=cdm
  3. By: Ďuriník, Michal; Morita, Hodaka; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
    Abstract: How does group identity influence promotion decisions and what impact does it have on the performance of organizations through promotions? We provide answers based on two experiments in which we identify the effect of group identity on the employers’ preferences regarding whom to promote, their expectations of the post-promotion effort of promoted and non-promoted workers, and the post-promotion effort itself. In both experiments, we find strong evidence of group identity biasing the employers’ preferences. The observed group identity bias in the promotion decision significantly reduces efficiency. Contributions to the literature on promotions in organizations and discrimination in promotions are discussed.
    Keywords: Group identity, in-group favoritism, post-promotion effort, post-promotion productivity, promotion decision
    JEL: C91 J7 M50
    Date: 2023–11–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119389&r=cdm
  4. By: Gomtsian, Suren
    Abstract: Shareholder say-on-pay voting allows institutional investors to influence the incentives of managers and, consequently, corporate behaviour. Surprisingly, the preferences of investors on executive compensation have been largely overlooked in the ongoing debates on the role of say-on-pay in corporate governance and the impact of shareholder stewardship on sustainable corporate behaviour. The analysis of investor disclosed explanations of say-on-pay votes in the FTSE 100 companies during 2013–2021 shows that institutional investors rely repeatedly on several dominant themes aimed at improving the incentives of corporate managers and controlling managerial rent extraction. But shareholder interests remain the core focus of say-on-pay votes, with only few investors demanding that companies reward executive directors for protecting the interests of a broader range of affected stakeholders. Additionally, most investors can be grouped into several clusters formed around the voting recommendations of proxy advisers. A group of UK-based institutional investors stands out by taking a more individualistic and diverse approach to the stewardship of executive compensation. These findings highlight the role of local investors in the oversight of executive pay, the growing influence of proxy advisers along with the increasing share of foreign institutional investors, and the influence of best practice governance codes in driving investor stewardship preferences.
    Keywords: executive pay; investor stewardship; corporate governance; environmental; social; and governance (ESG); say on pay; shareholder engagement
    JEL: R14 J01 F3 G3 J50
    Date: 2023–11–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:121068&r=cdm

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